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Abstract
This thesis examines the cognitive attitude of belief, taking belief 
to be the -ttitude people take to wh-.t they think is true. Can this 
attitude be an J.ysed in terms of mental occurrences or events? The 
theories of Hume, Ogden nd Riohards, and ,rentano are examined nd 
criticised for faults peculiar to e ch of them. Occurrence theories 
re rejected generally for failing to ccount satisfactorily for implicit 
nd unformulated beliefs.
Is belief then a disposition to .ct? Behaviourism is discussed in 
the versi n presented by ’. . iralthwaite m d  shown to provide neither
oess ry nor sufficient c . 1 ns for the attribution of oelief.
behaviourism is criticised for its general tendency to reduce speculative 
concerns to pr ctic 1 .
Jelief, lor. with attitudes suoh as hope, is shown to differ from 
ooourrent montai events ni st-.t s, lthough sharing with suoh states a 
degree of spistemolo ic 1 privaoy. How is belief to be identified? 
Belief of individuals is shown to be founded on each individual's 
ccept nee of public orlter ttitudes to truth. Weyw rd oeliefs
;.re possible only iven that the individual shows in other ways that he 
grasps these criteria .nd attitudes. This theory brings out the 
strengths of oth aseooi tionist nd behaviourist accounts.
The object of belief i3 shown to De a proposition rather than the 
concrete s ntences or 3t tements ssented to. In this theory, proposi­
tions re thought of in terns of the understanding of the believer rather 
than as timeless, bstract entities. Atteints to give n extensional 
ccount of belief-objects fail because of referential opacity; they Iso 
have problems in th t two people, particul; rly if they come from different 
cultural backgrounds, ay osent to the s me statement ; nd mean different 
things by it.
Moral beliefs nd belief in people .nd things .re shown sometimes 
to include attitudes of emotive commitment and other feelings which can 
be distinguishe from co.oiitive belief.
The relationship between the long term and largely unformulated 
ttitu of belief nd explicit acts of judgment or assent is examined.
These ssents re constitutive of belief, in that person m iking n 
assent thereby fonts his belief on the subject. This is because of wht t 
e re doing when we ct* lly judge that ao-.ething is so. Theories 
•which postulate unoonsoi . , oppose* to unforwulated beliefs, nd 
theories hich suggest th- t we know what we believe by introspecting our 
internal states .re rejected.
ti nship bet en belief and the 'ill is disouased. Deso rtes' 
account of this relationship in his fourth Meditation is partially defended 
gainst oriticism made by J. L. Ova ns, on the grounds th.it it shows us we 
o ht to ....he ourselves responsible -or our csents. In ..ssenting, we 
ccept certain standards for Judgment; we should become conscious of 
this in order to make ourselves responsible for v.h.it e believe.
The ndesirability, but not the impossibility of having logically 
inconsistent beliefs is demonstrated. beliefs naturally tend to form 
themselves into ■ oohsrent Loture of the world. t *e learn to believe 
through entering such system. The influence of the context of belief 
on individu 1 beliefs is examined in examples taken from the history of 
science -nd common sense. Belief systems Iso influence the way evidence 
is seen -nd interpreted. but these factors re shown not to le d 
neccss rily to sceptic .1 or ivl. tivistic conclusions.
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Introductory Note
Although all the following points are taken up in the thesis, it 
would he as well before starting to clarify the precise nature of the 
subject matter. What is being attempted is an analysis of belief as 
simply the general attitude people take to what they think is true. V/e 
are not, therefore, trying to put belief on some point of a scale of 
epistemological attitudes, somewhere between certainty or probable 
opinion, for example. Nor are we attempting to distinguish occasions 
when people might be justified in saying that they know from occasions 
when they should simply say that they believe. In thinking of belief as 
a cognitive attitude essentially, we are able to distinguish it from 
feelings of conviction and from such attitudes as the trust or commitment 
people have to their friends or their values - attitudes which sometimes 
accompany cognitive beliefs and which are sometimes spoken of as 'beliefs'. 
Finally, what we are dealing with is belief as found in mature human 
beings, an attitude which seems to be open, ideally, to rational control 
and development. Although we shall suggest a legitimate analogous 
sense of 'belief' which may be applied to animals and non-rational beings, 
what we say in this thesis provides some support for Aristotle's postula­
tion of an intimate connection between belief - at least in its fully- 
fledged form - and rationality,*
*c.f. Be Anima. A28al6-23
1CHAPTER I
Occurrence Theories of Belief
Introduction
The theories we will consider in this chapter have one point in 
common; they all see belief in terms of actual occurrences in the mind 
of the believer. We say 'occurrences' rather than 'acts', because of the 
three accounts considered, only that of Brentano lays any stress on the 
idea that belief may be based on the conscious activity of the believing 
subject. In Part 1, we look at Hume and Ogden and Richards, who see 
belief in terms of the passive, almost mechanical association of ideas in 
the mind of the believer. In this respect, Brentano's account* has 
certain advantages. But, as we will show in Part 3, all three accounts 
fail in the first place because of their common assumption, that belief 
is to be analysed in terms of mental occurrences. Such an assumption 
must be modified to deal with the fact that we predicate and predicate 
correctly beliefs of people without implying that there is any mental 
activity going on. Moreover, following Wittgenstein, it becomes extremely 
difficult to say just what is going on in one's mind, even when we do 
actually reflect on or form our beliefs.
Part 1 - Hume and Ogden and Richards
Owing to the basic similarities between the accounts given by Hume 
and Ogden and Richards, despite the somewhat different vocabularies used, 
our criticisms of the two accounts share most of the fundamental points.
So, after an exposition of Hume**, we will go straight on to an exposition 
of Ogden and Richards***, and then give a combined criticism of both 
theories'***.
*Part 2
**Part la
***Part lb
2Part la - Hume*
Despite being somewhat discredited of late, Hume's theory of belief 
has had a considerable influence as being one of the clearest expositions 
of an associationist view of mental activity. As we shall see, it has 
been presented in a more up to date looking form as recently as 1930 in 
Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning.
Hume sees his task as that of distinguishing between ideas we believe 
and those we simply imagine. Unlike the behaviourist, he insists that 
there must be a difference in our mental states themselves to account for 
the difference between having an idea and believing it. According to 
him, it would be the belief that has an effect on the action, not the 
action which constitutes the belief. In SHU**, the distinction between 
imagination and belief has to be drawn in terms of two different mental 
states, otherwise we would have to say that we could believe what we 
wanted. For the mind can imagine what it pleases, whereas, Hume thinks, 
we cannot believe what we please; 'it follows, therefore, that the 
difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, 
which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not 
on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure.'
At this point, it must be noted that Hume excludes from his account 
of belief propositions which can be known by a priori means (intuition or 
demonstration). Here there is no problem for him because of the terms 
he has set up the problem in. For he thinks that once we understand the 
terms being considered, we have to proceed in the correct way. It is not 
possible for 'the imagination to conceive anything contrary to a demonstra­
tion'.*** Although Hume is surely wrong here, for a man could on occasion
*In this thesis, the Treatise of Human Nature (THN) and the Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (KHU) are both quoted in the editions 
of Selby-Bigge (Oxford 189^ and 1962, respectively). References to 
IHU are not by pages, but by the marginal sections of the text.
** 39
♦** THN, p 95
3.
think and perhaps even believe that 2+2=5, his approach here highlights 
his attempt to deal with the problem of belief as one concerning the 
relations between ideas. It may be possible to give an account of the 
development of analytic ideas on this basis, by showing how one idea leads 
necessarily through association to another. But in judgments about the 
world, we can imagine what we like, whereas Hume is certain we cannot 
believe what we like. 'That is it that makes us believe some ideas and 
not others?
The difference cannot be in the ideas themselves, for, when one man 
believes an idea and another disbelieves it, they must both be dealing 
with the same idea or there would be no disagreement between them.
Something must be added to the mere idea to constitute belief. Hume* asks 
if this addition might be the idea of existence, but says that this cannot 
be what is wanted because
the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any 
object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we 
wou'd conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to 
or alteration on our first idea.
Hume seems to be saying here that when we think of any object, for example 
God, we think of that object as existent, and that, further, to believe 
that God exists in no way alters the idea we had of God in the first 
place, but is simply to take the idea to be true.** Because the idea of 
the existence of an object is no addition to the simple idea of the same 
object, Hume thinks that anything we conceive of, we conceive of as 
existing. Here he runs together two distinct things, the simple idea of 
a given object x and the existential proposition, 'there is an x 
Certainly, 'there is an x ' and the bare term ' x ' are not substitutable 
for each other in many contexts, while the proposition 'there are unicorns' 
is false, even if it is not asserted, but the simple idea of a unicorn is
* THN, p 94
** c.f. THN, p 96n
1
if.
neither true nor false. Moreover, on Hume's view, it would be difficult 
to deny the existence of anything without self-contradiction. However, 
he is correct in saying that in believing God to be existent, my idea of 
God neither increases nor diminishes. In judging that God is existent,
I make God the subject of an existential proposition which I then assent 
to. If in believing God to exist, I altered the concept in some way to 
extend the definition of God, there would be no disagreement between 
theists and atheists, for they would not be talking about the same thing.
So Hume is right to say that it is not the addition of the idea of 
existence which transforms a simple idea into a belief.
Hume's solution to his problem is to say that when we believe an 
idea we add to it 'a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that 
depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes 
and principles, of which we are not masters'.* In terms of his own system, 
Hume is not justified in appealing to a causally produced feeling to 
explain belief, because he will use the subjective experience of belief 
in order to explain the illusion we have of causal necessity. However, 
as it stands, the idea has a certain phenomenological plausibility. Our 
beliefs do seem constrained in a way in which our ideas are not, while 
the difference between an idea and a belief can sometimes be characterised 
by a feeling of solidity, vivacity, firmness, etc., present in a belief 
and absent in a mere fiction - something which gives to a belief a sense 
of reality analogous to that which the mind finds in a present impression.
The belief feeling is not one that we can call up at will. It is 
one that arises when a present impression leads to an associated idea.
These present impressions may be either actual present sensations or 
memories. Hume maintains that there are three ways in which ideas can 
be associated with a present impression, resemblance, contiguity and
THN, p 624
5causation (which he finally analyses in terms of customary or constant
conjunction). Resemblance and contiguity can enliven and help to revive
beliefs; a picture of an absent friend makes my idea of him more lively,
while proximity to my home makes it touch me more deeply than when I am
distant from it. But it is only causation that can actually bring about
the feeling of belief. EHU 44 explains how:
When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately 
carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. 
This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not 
from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and
experience. And as it first begins from an object, present to the
senses, it renders the idea of the flame more strong and lively than 
any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises 
immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys 
to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impres­
sion present to the senses.
It is to be noted that transition from the impression to the belief is
quite mechanical, and is based on what has happened to us in the past.
Our memory of past happenings is called forth when some part of the past
happening is repeated, in such a way that we expect what has happened in
the past to happen again.* The parallel between this human process and
animal instinct and learning is not one that Hume rejects; indeed, he
considers it to be one of the strong points of his analysis:
The experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with 
beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing 
but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us 
unknown to ourselves... Though the instinct be different, yet 
still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as 
much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of 
incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.
Hume does not ask why resemblance and contiguity cannot produce
belief. Indeed, as H. H. Price points out*,'there is a passage in THN
which deals with beliefs which arise when the mind is in a deranged state,
which contradicts the assertion that only constant conjunction can produce
* c.f. EHU, 82 
** EHU, 85
*** Belief. London, 1969, pp 171-5
6belief:
’Then the imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood 
and spirits, acquires such a vivacity a3 disorders all its powers 
and faculties, there is no means of distinguishing betwixt truth 
and falsehood; but every loose fiction or idea, having the same 
influence as the impressions of the memory, or the conclusions 
of the judgement, is receiv'd on the same footing, and operates 
with equal force on the passions. A present impression and a 
customary transition are now no longer necessary to enliven our 
ideas... 'Se may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser 
degree... in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a 
counterfeit belief... *
From what he has said before, it is by no means clear that in proposing 
a causal theory of mental activity, Hume should be able to distinguish 
well-formed from ill-formed beliefs, which is what he is doing here. 
Price concludes on the basis of this passage that Hume may be intending 
us to take constant conjunction as the associative link present in sane 
and sensible beliefs. But in face of his repeated insistences that the 
distinguishing mark of belief as such is the presence of the relation of 
constant conjunction associating a present impression with a lively idea, 
it would be difficult to uphold such an interpretation simply on the 
basis of one passage which is inconsistent with the rest. Price adds 
that in matters of empirical fact, constant conjunction may be a fair 
criterion of a good belief. But whether constant conjunction is enough 
to account for empirical beliefs is something we shall have to consider 
after we have looked at Ogden and Richards' analysis of belief.
Part lb - C, K. Orden and I. A, Richards: The Meaning of Meaning.**
Ogden and Richards's account of belief differs from that of Hume in 
that they try to do without specifically mental elements such as ideas, 
or at least to explain them in physical terms. However, in giving an 
account of thinking in 'purely causal terms', they show themselves 
descendents of Hume, and the similarities between the two analyses are 
indeed striking. Basically, thought and belief are treated as
* THN, p 123
** London, 1930 - all references to this edition
7expectations based on traces of past experience, expectations which are 
roused by some stimulus, which the subject has learned to associate with 
the experiences
Thus when we strike a match, the movements we make and the sound of 
the scrape are the present stimuli. But the excitation which 
results is different from what it would be had we never struck 
matches before. Past strikings have left in our organisation, 
engrams, residual traces, which help to determine what the mental 
process will be. For example, this mental process is among other 
things an awareness that we are striking a match. Apart from the 
effects of previous similar situations we should have no such 
awareness. Suppose further that the awareness is accompanied by 
an expectation of a flame. This expectation again will be due to 
the effects of situtvtions in which the striking of a match has 
been followed by a flame. The expectation is part of an engram 
complex, which is called up by a stimulus (the scrape) similar to a 
part only of the original stimulus-situation. *
An engram is taken to be the residual trace of an adaptation made by the
organism to a stimulus, while a sign is a stimulus similar to some part
of the original stimulus sufficient to call up the engram of the whole
stimulus.
When an engram is called up, we adapt ourselves once again to what 
is called the referent - that is, the experience which the sign which 
excites the engram stands for. Thus, in a cognitive situation of expecta­
tion, the re-occurrence of only part of the whole original situation will 
cause us to make ourselves ready for the whole. There seems nothing
specifically rational about this type of expectation; the behaviour of 
animals is analysed on the same lines - as the result of a stimulus, the 
organism adapts itself to future change in the environment by bodily 
change or movement. However, Ogden and Richards should not be taken to 
be denying that in human beings, expectations often take the form of 
cognitive awarenesses of the things expected. What they are trying to 
do is to show that these cognitive awarenesses can be analysed in the same 
way as the non-cognitive adaptations made by animals.
So the process of thinking is caused by what happened in the past,
* P 52
8,
and is directed towards the future. Ogden and Richards say that without 
recurrent contexts (a context is a set of events, mental or physical, 
which comes to be related in some way) there would be no such thing as 
thinking. Thinking itself occurs when a psychological context is 
triggered off by sOiae sign which has in the past come to be associated 
with that contexts
To say that I recognise something before me as a strawberry and 
expect it to be luscious, is to say that a present process in me 
belongs to a determinative psychological context together with 
certain past processes (past perceptions and consumptions of 
strawberries). These psychological contexts recur whenever we 
recognise or infer. Usually they link up with... external 
contexts... When they do not, we are said to have been mistaken.*
Thus, for a conditioned dog, a gong sound had often recurred in conjunc­
tion with a savoury odour, longing for food, being given food and 
gratification. This was the external context. When he hears the gong 
again, his present hearing links with the memory traces of the past 
savourings, longings, etc. This is the psychological context, as a 
result of which he runs into the next room. If the psychological context 
is fulfilled by the presence of the correct external context - in this 
case, food being there - then we say that his belief i3 true. An 
external context which a belief looks for is known as the referent of 
that belief. Ogden and Richards see universal beliefs arising because 
of the tendency of thought to a 'wider scope and range'. ** After a 
series of similar verified interpretations, in the absence of a falsified 
interpretation, a universal belief might arise. The difference between 
a universal and a particular belief is simply one of degree.
Ogden and Richards finally try to show that there is no qualitative 
difference between ideas which are merely entertained and those which are 
believed. Although this i3 a departure from Hume, they seem to be correct 
in thinking that a causal account of mental activity must say that all
• p 57
** P 64
9mental references must be caused by some present stimulus reviving some
memory from the past. All ideas arise in the mind because of stimuli,
for example, words one hears. To take a simple idea, the idea 'green'
is 'of' any sensation similar to the sensations which previously
accompanied the sign which brings up the idea of green. The idea refers
to the same set of occurrences as will verify the indefinite belief
symbolised by the statement 'There are green things'. Ideas, especially
when it is seen that complex ideas can be broken down into simple ones,
can thus be covered by the contextual theory of reference, and so 'the
distinction between an idea and a belief is... one of degree, although
through symbolic conventions, it can sometimes appear insuperable'. *
Ogden and Richards, however, admi+ an 'affective-volitional' quality
in belief. In fact, they speak of belief being the volitional aspect of
the cognitive state; so the blurring of the idea-belief distinction is
presumably meant to refer only to belief qua cognition. When they deal
with the non-cognitive adjuncts of belief, they come close to Hume once
more. This comes out clearly in Appendix A.,** especially pp 257-260.
’That is usually called 'belief' is the 'affective-volitional' aspect of
a cognitive state, and theoretically separable from the strictly cognitive
content, which is an idea or a collection of ideas, for
any word... comes to be, qua symbol of a reference to some state of 
affairs, capable of truth or falsehood; and in this respect it 
differs in no way from a sentence used symbolically for purposes 
of statement. ***
Ideas then are what are true or false, and this is irrespective of whether 
they are accompanied by belief-feelings. The assertion of an idea or a
complex of ideas in a sentence has the conventional purpose of informing 
others that the speaker has the belief-feeling himself concerning the 
ideas, and of stimulating the hearers to similar feelings. So to believe
* P 71
* * 'On Grammar*
*** p 258
10
is to take an emotive attitude to an idea, and it is this emotive 
accompaniment that distinguishes beliefs from ideas. Ogden and Richards 
are correct in thinking that it is not being believed that renders an idea 
true or false, for many ideas are either true or false independently of 
anybody believing them. But does this mean that the only way of 
distinguishing an idea from a belief is in terms of some non-cognitive, 
emotional element? As we shall now see, there are some major difficulties 
in this view.
Part lc - Criticism of Hume -¡nd Ogden and Richards
Both main prongs of these theories, the idea of a specific belief­
feeling and the associationist account of mental activity, are open to 
criticism. To take the idea of a belief-feeling first, it would be 
wrong to deny that sometimes belief is accompanied by emotional adjuncts. 
These adjuncts because of their connection with belief may be thought of 
as feelings of belief. But is it plausible to think of belief as 
constituted by feelings? Assuming that we were convinced that belief 
was always accompanied by a feeling, abstracted from the belief-context, 
could we discriminate a belief-feeling from sane other feeling, say of 
fear, similarly abstracted? Would there be anything more than a general 
heightening of metabolism and tautening of gut or muscles? In fact, 
even this sort of general feeling seems to arise mostly in cases where we 
are emotionally involved in the matter; plenty of beliefs we hold with 
absolute conviction, for example 2+2=4, produce little or no emotive move­
ment when we reflect on them. Even if we were to maintain that nonetheless, 
there was a feeling of belief, it becomes extremely difficult to identify 
these feelings except as those feelings which accompany ideas we believeo 
Hume's exposition breaks down at this points
it is impossible perfectly to explain this (belief) feeling or manner 
of conception. We may make use of words which express something near 
it. But its true and proper name0.. is belief; which is a term that 
everyone sufficiently understands in common life. *
EHU, 40
11
Although it is undoubted that belief is a term which everyone under­
stands in common life, it could be argued that Hume's account would render 
such a common understanding impossible. (in so far as Ogden and Richards 
hold that belief is the volitional as well as the affective aspect of a 
cognitive state, they avoid this objection. "'.Thether it i3 in fact 
possible to regal'd belief as a disposition to act on an idea will be 
considered in Chapter 2). If belief consisted essentially in a private 
feeling, how would we know that we were correct in saying that we had it, 
or that other people had it? As far as public criteria were concerned, 
there would be no difference between having it and not having it. There 
would be nothing to point to to show that the feeling we had at time tl 
was the same as the feeling we had at time t2, or that either of these 
feelings were the same as the one someone else was currently having, except 
to speak of them as belief feelings. But, as Antony Flew puts it,
if the criterion of belief were indeed the occurrence of a peculiar 
feeling or modification, then unless that feeling or modification 
were, as apparently it is not, one which could be adequately 
identified by a description containing no reference to belief, it 
would be in principle impossible to teach the meaning of the word 
belief. *
As it stood, the concept of belief would have no grip on our public 
language. As a consequence of the uncertainty regarding the concept, we 
would never know for sure whether we had the belief feeling at any given 
moment. This would be absurd, as it is senseless to say that we can be 
wrong about whether or not we believe what we are currently thinking about; 
moreover, in recognising the feeling, we would presumably have to say we 
believed we had it, and so the way would be open for an infinite regress 
of beliefs about beliefs. In the case of other people, we do attribute 
beliefs to them, but in so doing, we do not mean that they are having 
certain feelings; neither do we have the doubts about whether or not 
belief is the same thing for others as it is for us that would be endemic 
if belief were constituted by having a privixte feeling.
* A. Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief. London, 19°1, p 101
- I
12.
The epistemological objection just raised to identifying belief 
through a private feeling can also be made in an oblique sort of way 
against the causal or associationist account of belief. The solution we 
propose to the problem of how belief becomes a public concept will be 
through postulating a logical connection between what we believe and what 
is true.* The associationist account makes it at the most a happy 
coincidence that there is any connection between belief and truth; Hume 
actually has to introduce 'a kind of pre-established harmony between the 
course of nature and the succession of our ideas',** to explain the 
connection. (He thus foreshadows Peirce's idea of abduction, that 
'man's mind has a natural adaptation to imagining correct theories of 
some kinds'). But clearly there would be no necessary connection of 
this sort; theoretically the associations made by some or all men could 
be out of step with nature, owing to the waywardness of their experience.
At this stage, however, we need not put too much weight on this point; 
it is merely mentioned here for the sake of completeness.
More straightforwardly, associationism has a number of questions to 
answer from a common-sensical point of view. In the first place, it is 
not clear that we always do believe in accordance with habitual experience, 
if we have good reasons for thinking our experience is misleading us. 
Certainly people often think that they should not be 'misled' by appearances 
or impressions when they are judging other people, even though their 
experience of other people might suggest that in most cases the impressions 
people give are ultimately correct. They might do this because they want 
to think the best of other people. However misguided this might be, it 
does suggest that habitual experience is only one of a number of possible 
reasons for coming to a belief. In ordinary life, although beliefs are 
often caused on the basis of recurrences in the past experience of the
* c.f. below, Chapter 3
** EHU, 44
13.
believer, when people say that they believe something they do not mean 
simply that this is what has often or usually happened to them. Further 
if belief is simply a matter of mechanical association, it would make no 
sense to say to someone that he should make sure that he always believed 
what was true, because he would not be able to help believing whatever 
he had to believe. Associationists presumably would not find this an 
objection to their theory, convinced as they are of the possibility of a 
causal explanation of all mental activity. However, the models so far 
presented fail to account for several features of mental activity.
In the first place, apart from any factual implausibilities in 
Hume's theory, there is a theoretical objection, raised by K. R. Popper, 
to seeing belief as caused simply by the frequent repetition of similar 
experiences:
The kind of repetition envisaged by Hume can never be perfect; the 
cases he has in mind cannot be cases of perfect sameness; they can 
only be cases of similarity. Thus they are repetitions only from 
a certain point of view. (What has the effect upon me of a repeti­
tion may not have this effect upon a spidex'). But this means that, 
for logioal reasons, there must always be a point of view - 3uch as 
a system of expectations, anticipations, assumptions or interests - 
before there can be any repetition; which point of view, consequently, 
c.innot be merely the result of repetition. *
So belief cannot be seen as the result of purely passive reception of
experiences. The believer has an important factor to contribute -
some hypothesis or interpretation according to which he can recognise
repetitions as such and which is logically prior to them. No doubt once
he has framed some hypothesis, which need not be an explicit process on
the part of the believer, repetitions of the relevant event will help to
strengthen and solidify the belief, but the repetitions themselves depend
on interpretations and expectations by the believer.
J . W. N. Watkins** points out an interesting passage in Hume himself
* Conjectures and Refutations. London, 1969, pp 2*4-5
** In 'Hume, Carnap and Popper' in The Problem of Inductive Lo^ic 
(ed. 1 . Lakatos), Amsterdam 1968, pp 271-282
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where he seems to admit that constant conjunction is not a necessary
condition of belief-formation. Indeed, only a little reflection is
needed to show that, as a matter of fact, we often form beliefs without
even once having experienced the effect in question. Hume's answer to
this problem is a revised theory of belief which, apart from the residual
dogma that we need one example of a type- 1 event being followed by a
type-2 event before believing that type- 1 events cause type-2 events, is
not unlike the hypothetico-deductive method. After we have formed the
belief-forming habit itself, we become able to
build an argument on one single experiment, when duly prepar'd and 
examin'd. What we have found once to follow from any object, we 
conclude will forever follow from it; and if this maxim be not 
always built upon as certain, 'tis not for want of a sufficient 
number of experiments, but because we frequently meet with instances 
to the contrary. *
This looks like an abandonment of the theory of belief by constant 
conjunction.
Of course, neither Popper's point nor any of the other objections 
we are about to make tell against an ultimate explanation of belief in 
physical terms, but only against the type of theory offered by Hume and 
Ogden and Richards. Both Flew and Price point out that associationism 
explains at most general empirical beliefs (and Popper's objection shows 
it cannot even do that). Belief in singular probable occurrences, whose 
grounds are not based on numerical correlations are clearly not covered 
by this type of explanation; neither can it show how we could arrive at 
the idea of a genuinely universal belief - no amount of examples of 
particular dead men could take us to the idea of all men being mortal, 
unless the idea of 'all' were surreptitiously introduced.
Ogden and Richards speak of stimuli sparking off mental activity; 
this is presumably intended as a scientific refinement of Hume's impression 
causing its accompanying idea. Even if it were plausible to think of
THN, p 131
belief in terms of discrete mental acts and happenings, the introduction 
of the word 'stimulus' should not deceive us into attributing to the account 
a rigour it simply lacks. The assumption is that there is a stimulus 
either in the environment or in the subject himself which produces an 
idea or a belief as its response. But the point about stimulus-response 
vocabulary is that it is abstracted from experiments in which the stimulus 
is objectively and independently identified and lawfully related to the 
response. But, as Chomsky shows in connection with verbal behaviour, in 
normal speech situations, it is impossible to identify the stimulus 
independently of the response, and so 'we cannot predict verbal behaviour 
in terms of the stimuli in the speaker's environment since we do not know 
what the current stimuli are until he responds'. * A fortiori with mental 
associations. The probability of any particular verbal or mental response 
arising from any given situation is so slight as to be null, as a little 
introspective experiment might verify. One is forced to the conclusion 
that in any scientifically analysable sense of the term 'stimulus', human 
thought and language is stimulus-free, unless of course ai^ r physical event 
impinging on the organism is taken to be a stimulus, in which case human 
behaviour ha3 not been demonstrated to be lawful.
A full discussion of the idea that belief consists mainly in mental 
occurrences must await the conclusion of this chapter. This will be 
another objection to the associationist account, in so far as they assume 
that believing is an introspectible experience. For apart from the 
objections we have already considered to the particular descriptions of 
the belief-experience given by Hume and Ogden and Richards, there are 
general objections to any theory that thinks of belief as something taking 
place in the believer's mind. But these objections apply to Brentano's 
account as well, so we will see what he has to say fir3to
N. Chomsky, Review of Skinner's Verbal Behaviour, in J. Fodor and
J. Katz (editors), The Structure of Language. New Jersey, 1964, p 553
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Part 2 - Brentano: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt
The theory of belief and judgment which is to be discussed in this 
section is that proposed by Franz Brentano in his Psychologie vom 
empirischen Standpunkt*. especially in Book 2, Chapter f . One of the 
problems in interpreting Brentano is that it is never clear whether he is 
doing logic or psychology, and this is particularly true of his discussion 
of the act of judgment. He himself thinks that the cornerstone of his 
method is the inner perception of psychic phenomena, although he is willing 
to take into account the extemalisation of the psychological life of 
other persons. Yet he does not, in discussing judgments, embark on a 
&alton-type enquiry*’1, and many of his observations pertain to the logical 
analysis of judgments, rather than to anything in them that we experience. 
Hi3 underlying assumption, however, is clearly that belief is a psycholo­
gical experience or act, on a similar level to loving or hating, and 
intrinsically different from merely having an idea. Yftiat he says may be 
true, but he gives no indication of what it means to speak of judgment as 
a psychological phenomenon or state of mind. Kven less convincing is his 
suggestion that each object, about which we judge, 'is taken into 
consciousness in a double manner, as represented (i.e. as a mere idea), 
and as affirmed or denied'.*** In so far as what he says is of value, it 
is because of what he suggests regarding the logical structure of belief 
and the emotions.
Brentano thinks that the difference between understanding an idea and 
believing it is to be explained in terms of two fundamentally different 
modes of consciousness of an object. He rejects Bain's behaviouristic 
explanation of belief on the grounds that there must be something more to
* 2 Vols, Leipzig, 1924-5
** Sir Francis Oalton, in his Inquiries into the Human Faculty. London 1907, 
asks people what sort of things go on in their heads when they remember 
and imagine things. His method i3 simply to get people to write down 
as accurately as possible all that they are conscious of when remembering 
or thinking.
*** P3.yoholof;ie, Vol 2, p 38
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belief than its simply being a conception we are prepared to act on; 
there must be something in our manner of conceiving the idea which explains 
why we are prepared to act on some ideas rather than on others. Brentano 
then discusses associationist accounts of belief, in the form in which 
they are proposed by James Mill and Herbert Spencer. Brentano in fact 
takes over the criticisms levelled at his father's theories by J . S. Mill, 
to the effect that while association of ideas is often sufficient to cause 
a belief that the objects or events represented in the ideas are 
associated in the world as well as in the mind, association of ideas is 
not sufficient reason for so believing. To say that it is the cause of 
all beliefs is to imply that belief or judgment is simply a matter of habit 
or accident, and to nib out the distinction between the belief of the wise 
and the foolish. Brentano adds to these criticisms, the objection that 
the habitual association of ideas is not an act of thought, but a mere 
disposition, which itself requires some explanation. This criticism is 
significant in its emphasis on the need for an act of thought here. As 
we shall see, even if we could do what Brentano fails to do and give an 
adequate characterisation of the acts in question, it is not clear that 
they are a necessary condition of belief.
Although Brentano is looking for a difference between the modes of 
consciousness of having an idea find believing it, he correctly rejects 
two possible characterisations of the difference. The first of these is 
that judgment differs from a simple idea in the degree of intensity with 
which the object is represented. But this is clearly wrong. An idea 
would in this case be a feeble judgment, while it would be very difficult 
to explain what a negative judgment consists in. It is quite obvious 
that we can very clearly apprehend things we do not believe in, while we 
can just as well assent to something we hardly understand, let alone have
18,
a very clear idea of. Another suggestion which might be made is that 
there is some difference in the respective contents of judgments and 
ideas. As we have seen in connection with Hume*, this is not tenable, 
and iirentano rejects it; there is nothing in the content of an idea which 
shows whether it is being taken for real or imaginary.
Before coming on to his own theory, Brentano discusses the view 
proposed by J. S. Mill, who speaks of an ultimate and primordial distinc­
tion between merely having an idea and believing it. This Brentano 
fully accepts, but he disagrees with Mill when he goes on to say that in 
every act of belief something is predicated of something else. Mill 
writes in his System of Logic?* that 'every proposition asserts, that some 
given subject does or does not possess some attribute; or that some 
attribute is or is not... conjoined with some other attribute'. Brentano 
maintains that l) this account, in insisting that all propositions are of 
the subject-predicate form, fails to cover existential propositions of 
the form 'A is', and that 2) all categorical judgments are reducible to 
this existential form. His reason for l) is that
if we say 'A is', this proposition is not a predicative one... in 
which existence is joined as a predicate to A as a subject. It is 
not the union of an attribute 'existence* with A, but A itself which 
is the object we affirm.***
On the other hand, when we affirm a genuine predicate (e.g. 'blue') of A, 
we are doing more than affirming A. Moreover, in complex negative 
judgments, (e.g. 'No bird is learned') we do not deny each part of the 
judgment (in the example, we still admit there are such things as birds 
and wisdom), but we deny the union of the two. But when we say 'A is not',
A alone is the object of the rejected judgment; there is no difference
*
between the denial of A and the assertion that existence is not to be 
predicated of A. Brentano's own interpretation of the 'is', as in 
'(Jod is', is that it is not a predicate, but a sign of the act of judgment.
* PP 3-4
** 9th edition, London, 1875, Vol.l, p 180
*** Psychologie. Vol. 2, p 49
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In fact, he tries to reduce all categorical judgments to affirma­
tions of existence, showing that the copulative 'is' in such a judgment 
has the same function as the 'is' of existence:
some man is ill = there is a sick man (or, a sick man is)
no stone is living = there is no living stone
all men are mortal = there is no immortal man
some man is not learned = there is an unlearned man
Brentano concludes from this that the 'is' of existence is l) equivalent 
to the copula, 2) not a predicate, and 3) in itself meaningless. The 
subject-predicate form of the categorical judgment is said to be merely 
a linguistic formula. Brentano's account gets some plausibility from 
M s  examples, but there are sentences which bring out the inadequacies of 
the theory - for example, 'Zeus is the king of the gods', 'Jupiter is non­
existent' or 'Unicorns are possible creatures'. If the copula and the 
'is' of existence are equivalent, Brentano seems to be committed in these 
examples to asserting the existence of non-existent and possible beings.
P. T. Geach suggests that some motivation for saying that all categorical 
judgments are basically existential probably comes from the attempt to 
maintain an over-rigid correspondence theory of truth, according to which 
a true judgment says that something IS as it IS, laying an unnatural stress 
on the 'is'.* Brentano ultimately abandoned this view of the categorical 
judgment because of the inflated ontology it committed him to.
In his criticism of J. S. Mill, however, he is correct in thinking 
that judgment does not consist essentially in uniting a subject and a 
predicate. For predication can be used non-assertively; in the proposi­
tion 'F is &', G is predicated of F whether the proposition is asserted or 
used in some other way, as part of a disjunction or as the protasis in a 
conditional sentence, for example. Mill certainly does not distinguish 
clearly between predication and assertion. In his note on p 162 of Vol. 1 
of Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind by his father James Mill,**
* C.f. 'Assertion', Philosophical Review. Vol. 74, 1965, pp 449-465
** London, 1869
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J. S. Hill writes 'the characteristic difference between a predication 
and any other form of speech is, that it does not merely bring to mind a 
certain object... it asserts something respecting it'.
But Brentano is himself wrong in his analysis of 'A is'. Strictly 
we do not here affirm an object, A, but the existential proposition which 
says that A exists. This is certainly about A, but logically only a 
proposition or a sentence can be the object of a judgment, for judgments 
are either true or false. But as Brentano admits* a judgment can add no 
content to what is judged, so what is judged must itself be either true 
or false, whether it is judged or not. But a thing or event on its 
own is neither true nor false. What is true or false is the sentence 
or proposition that says something about it - that it is the case, for 
example. How the proposition 'A is' is to be analysed need not detain 
us here, but we should note that the realisation of the fact that we can 
use such propositions unasserted should have saved Brentano his vain 
effort to analyse all categorical judgments ill terms of some existential 
element. The concept of existence has no special relevance to beliefs 
or assertions; existential propositions need not be asserted (without 
being any the less about existence), nor need judgments that propositions 
are true assert the existence of anything (without being any the less 
categorical judgments).
After this discussion of the logic of judgment, Brentano investigates 
the similarities and differences between what he thinks are the three 
basic types of psychic phenomena, having an idea, having an emotion and 
making a judgment. The second and third of this trio both presuppose the 
first, as they are seen in terms of taking up an attitude to an idea.
Having an idea is taken to be having some content before the mind, though 
not necessarily a self consistent content. (A square circle is a possible 
idea). Once again what Brentano says is of interest in suggesting logical
above p 10
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aspects of mental attitudes, but he does not give much clue as to what i3 
going on in our minds when we believe or love and hate; and in so far as 
he does, he seems to be wrong - he talks, for example, of the same content 
being before the mind in two ways, as an idea and as an object of belief. 
As far as mental activity is concerned, it seems to be a simple mistake 
to suggest that asserting or judging consists in two acts, although of 
course, it is possible to divide a judgment logically into entertaining 
and asserting.*
Brentano's discussion of psychic phenomena opens by saying that 
while mere ideas cannot be contradictory because they do not assert any­
thing of their objects, of the pairs love and hate, belief and disbelief, 
a person may take up only one member with regard to the same object at 
the same time without contradiction. Ideas may show the identical object 
in contradictory lights, but because nothing is asserted in a mere idea, 
there is no contradiction involved on the part of the person naving 
contradictory ideas, so long as he merely entertains them.
Brentano's second point centres on the fact that in the actual 
reference to the object by an idea there can be no difference of intensity. 
The idea may be more or less vivid, but it cannot refer more or less to 
an object. Love and hate, as well as conviction (our feeling of belief) 
have variations of intensity, which have nothing to do with the vividness 
or clarity with which the subject of the emotion or belief is presented 
to us. One may doubt the validity of this argument. The fact that I 
am thinking of p cannot vary in intensity, but then neither can the bare 
fact that I assent to p or love p. However I can be more or less aware 
of something, even half-aware of something in the background, as well as 
having stronger or weaker ideas of objects, in a similar way to having 
stronger or weaker beliefs and emotions. It does not seem that Brentano
c.f. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. transl. &. E. M.
Anscombe, Oxford, 19b7, p 1 1
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has succeeded here in pointing out a genuine difference between ideas 
and the attitudes we take up to them.
The third difference between having an idea merely crossing one's 
mind and the other mental states discussed by Brentano is rather more 
substantial than the spurious difference in intensity. It boils down 
to this, that while the transitory contents of consciousness do not 
involve us in being right or wrong, both beliefs and emotions involve 
and commit us to being right or wrong. This is because in believing 
and loving or hating something we are saying that it is true and worthy 
of love or hate respectively. Even if emotions do not commit us morally 
as actions do, to love someone is certainly to act or feel towards him 
as if he is worthy of love. This is doubtless why we disapprove of 
obsessive loves and hatreds bestowed on people regardless of their true 
worths. As a result of this new dimension of assessment, Brentano is 
able to conclude that while it may be possible to discover psychological 
laws according to which ideas proceed and develop, there will always be 
another range of questions to be asked about beliefs and emotions.
Although Brentano improves on Hume's account relating belief and 
emotions to the activity of the subject, and although he says some 
important things about them being attitudes we take up to ideas, he does 
little to show that belief and emotions are discrete acts of mind, or that 
what we believe is present to consciousness in a twofold way. Indeed, 
as far as belief is concerned, there is no sign that he recognises a disposi­
tional sense of belief at all, and this accounts for the use of the words 
'judgment' and 'belief' as equivalents in this exposition of his theory.
In criticising Bain, Brentano insists on an act of judgment before a man 
can be said to be acting on a belief. But how plausible is it to think 
of belief as seme kind of peculiar conscious activity and how far can 
belief and thought be distinguished as different aspects or modes of
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cognitive consciousness? In order to answer these questions we must 
consider general objections to the idea that belief is a mental act or 
occurrence.
Part 3 - G-eneral Criticism of Occurrence Theories of Belief
A first and obvious difficulty with which theories of belief which 
see belief solely in terms of mental activity must contend, arises from 
the fact that a man may be said to believe things he is not currently 
thinking about. A man who is asleep is said to believe whatever he 
believes when he is awake, while when he is awake, he is said to believe 
things that he is known or thought to assent to as a rule, even if he is 
not actually thinking about them at the time. Indeed, the firmness with 
which a man holds his beliefs is often assessed according to how much he 
is influenced by them, even when he is in situations where he is not 
consciously adverting to then.
In a sense, occurrence theories of belief might be able to accommodate 
a dispositional sense of belief by saying that a man is to be held to 
believe those things he has at one time or another assented to without 
later withdrawing this assent. The onset of a belief would then still be 
measured in terms of the supposed mental occurrence or act. But even 
this is going to run into difficulties. There are a great number of 
assumptions we make in everyday life which we probably never advert to, 
because they are so obvious, or the contrary would be so outlandish. Thus 
it might be said that the paper I am writing on is white, while I do not 
believe that the house next door is inhabited by a family of gorillas. 
Judging the surprise I would feel if either of these beliefs turned out 
to be false, I hold them very strongly indeed. Neither would it make any 
sense to 3ay that I began having these beliefs only when I reflected on 
them for the first time. Wittgenstein gives a good example of such a 
belief, which brings out clearly the fact that the strength of the belief
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consists precisely in my not actually thinking about it: 'When I sat
down on this chair, of course I believed it would bear me. I had no
thought of its possibly collapsing'.*
Of course, there is such a thing as the onset of a belief, either when
I changed my mind on some issue at some dateable moment, or when I am
consciously forming my view on some new subject, and there are occasions
when I reflect on an old belief without changing, but it would be wrong
to think of all beliefs as depending on such mental acts. Where
occurrence theories of belief break down is that they see all belief
solely in terms of thoughts or experiences currently occupying our minds.
But even when we do think about our beliefs, how plausible is it to
think of belief as an experience which occupies our mind in the same sort
of way as a pain or a feeling of excitement? In Philosophical
Investigations. V/ittgenstein writes:
Misleading parallels: the expression of pain is a cry - the 
expression of thought, a proposition. As if the purpose of the 
proposition were to convey to one person how it is with another: 
only, so to speak, in his thinking part and not in his stomach.**
Although Wittgenstein is surely wrong in denying that one's purpose in
uttering a proposition can be to let someone know how it is in one's
'thinking part', in saying sincerely 'I think (i.e. believe) p', if not
'I think (i.e. entertain) p', one is logically making a judgment about p,
and not, as in the case of expressing a pain, referring directly to one's
inner state. We shall deal more fully with the fact that the expression
of a thought (=belief) is only indirectly about the state of the believer
in Chapter 5» ’out perhaps more important for us here is the fact that in
expressing thoughts one either believes or entertains, in contrast to
expressing pains or excitement3i**where the truth of the expression depends
on the actual existence of the occurrence in question, it is extremely
' Philosophical Investigations. p 152 
** p 104
examples of mental states given by Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations, p 59n
difficult to isolate any occurrence 'behind' the expression of the thought.
Hume himself admits this in the case of belief, where the associating of
the past experience with the present expression 'may operate on our mind
in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of'.
In fact, if we follow Wittgenstein in examining phenomena like the
speed of thought, how a thought goes through one's head like lightning,
how problems become clear to us in a flash, ¿nd 30 on, it becomes clear
that the model of thought as an occurrence like a pain is mistaken. What
actually occurs in the moment of thinking the thought is often no more than
a mental shorthand for the thought as a whole. If I want to express the
thought verbally, I have to fill this out:
The lightning-like thought may be connected with the spoken thought 
as the algebraic formula is with the sequence of numbers which I 
work out from it.*
The criterion of success - of having the thought - is not simply that a 
mental event took place, but also that I can fill out the whole context 
and meaning which the event stands for. If I can do this, the event seems 
irrelevant; if I can't, what does it mean to say that I have had a 
thought?
If the actual moment of thinking a thought is difficult to see simply 
as a particular occurrence unrelated to a whole context of dispositions 
before and after, it is equally hard to apply to the act or moment of 
thinking the sort of description we can normally apply to experiences that 
occupy or colour our consciousness. If someone said that he thought that 
the film started at nine o'clock, and we asked him what his thought was 
like in terms applicable to experiences such as having pains, depressions 
or mental images ('stubbing?' 'continuous?' 'vivid?' etc.), in all 
probability he would not be able to answer.
There are then problems involved in identifying and describing 
occurrent thoughts solely in terms of actual mental events, apart from 
Philosophical Investir tions. p 105
their wider meaning-contexts, their antecedents raid their effects. The 
language appropriate to the examples Wittgenstein gives of mental states 
seems inapplicable here. This is not to deny that thoughts can be dated, 
but to suggest that what happens in the dated moment is not to be thought 
of as an experience which is complete in itself, and which we 'express' 
by saying the thought out loud.
The difficulty of thinking of belief as simply an occurrence that is 
complete as and when it happens is of course even greater than that which 
arises from thinking of occurrent thoughts in this way. It is clear 
that in saying that a person a believes a proposition p, we are not saying 
that certain mental processes are going on in a. A will probably not be 
reflecting on p when we make the statement about his belief, and indeed 
he may never have done so, without our statement necessarily being f; lse. 
Kven if we could say all there is to be said about thoughts that actually 
are crossing our minds in terms of what goes on in our heads at the 
precise moment of thinking, it is clear that we will have to say more 
about belief. Could it be that what makes a belief that p into a belief 
is not that p is present to consciousness in some peculiar way, but simply 
that we are prepared to act on p? If the inner process of belief receives 
its outward criterion through dispositions to act, we will easily avoid 
the problems inherent in occurrence theories of belief. We turn to this 
suggestion in Chapter 2.
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Belief as a Disposition to Act
Introduction
Having failed to analyse belief satisfactorily in terms of occurrent 
mental acts, we now turn to a completely different account, namely that 
which attempts to locate belief primarily in our actions. In the first 
part of this chapter, we will consider the behaviourist theory of belief 
in the account given of it by R. B. Braithwaite, and ask whether his 
account gives conditions which are either necessary or sufficient for a 
definition of belief. In the second part of the chapter, we will make 
some suggestions concerning the assumption underlying behaviouristic attempts 
to l'ind a logical connection between belief and action. 
rt 1 - a, Braithwaite: Belief -3 ■ disposition to Act
In this section, two papers by R. B. Braithwaite, in which he attempts 
behaviouristic analyses of belief, will be discussed. They are 'Nature 
of Believing'* and '3elief end Action'**. In the first of these, belief 
is actually taken to be a propensity to action, while in the second, a 
propensity to action is not part of the concept of belief, but is a test 
of the sincerity of given beliefs. '"e will concentrate on the first 
paper, as it embodies the more radical thesis.
Braithwaite says that his analysis applies only to belief in proposi­
tions which are the object of indirect knowledge. By this move, he 
intends to exclude belief in propositions which are seen to be logically 
necessary and belief in propositions about my present sense-data. This 
is because he thinks that once we understand the meaning of such 
propositions we assent to them in the same act. They are, for Braithwaite, 
directly known, and are not, strictly speaking, believed, because belief
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Belief as a hisoosition to Act
Introduction
Having failed to analyse belief satisfactorily in terns of occurrent 
mental acts, we now turn to a completely different account, namely that 
which atte ;pts to locate belief primarily in our actions. In the first 
part of this chapter, we will consider the behaviourist theory of belief 
in the account given of it by R. 3. 3raithwaite, and ask whether his 
account gives conditions which are either necessary or sufficient for a 
definition of belief. In the second part of the chapter, we will make 
some suggestions concerning the assumption underlying behaviouristic attempts 
to rind a logical connection between belief and action. 
rt 1 - I, p, oraithwaite: relief .s - I os iti or. to Act
In this section, two papers by R. B. 3raithwaite, in which he attempts 
behaviouristic analyses of belief, will be discussed. They are 'Nrture 
of Believing'* * and '3elief and Action'*'. In the first of these, belief 
is actually taken to be a propensity to action, while in the second, a 
propensity to action is not part of the concept of belief, but is a test 
of the sincerity of given beliefs. ™e will concentrate on the first 
paper, as it embodies the more radical thesis.
Braithwaite says that his analysis applies only to belief in proposi­
tions which are the object of indireot knowledge. By this move, he 
intends to exclude belief in propositions which are seen to be logically 
necessary and belief in propositions about my present sen3e-data. This 
is because he thinks that once we understand the meaning of such 
propositions we assent to them in the same act. They are, for Braithwaite, 
directly known, and are not, strictly speaking, believed, because belief
* PAS. Vol.33, 1932-3, pp 129-1A-6, quoted here as reprinted in Knowledge 
and Belief, edited A. Phillips Griffiths, Oxford, 1967, PP 28-40
** SPAS V0I.20, 1946, pp 1-19
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consists in understanding the proposition concerned plus something else.
It might be possible to challenge the view that to understand a simple 
logical proposition was at the same time to assent to its truth. Short of 
assenting to direct contradictories, there seem to be almost no limits to 
what people can believe under certain conditions.* Neither is it clear 
that, even if sense-data themselves are directly and infallibly apprehended, 
propositions about sense-data are themselves similarly direct and 
infallible. However, Braithwaite's views on direct knowledge are of only 
secondary interest here.
Belief in propositions which are indirectly known is analysed as 
follows: 'I believe p', where p is such a proposition 'means the conjunc­
tion of the two propositions:
1. I entertain p..., and
2. I have a disposition to act as if p were true' **
2 is a hypothetical proposition 'about my physical behaviour', to be 
analysed without recourse to intentional language, and is the 'objective' 
aspect of a man's belief, that which distinguishes it from mere imagination. 
Braithwaite in this article takes 2 to be not only a criterion of belief, 
but 'part of the actual meaning of believing'. In holding that 2 alone 
is enough to distinguish believing from entertaining or imagining the 
proposition, he is proposing an analysis which is able to stand without 
talk of mental acts of assent or judgment, and which goes much further 
than the unquestionable assertion of some as yet undefined connection 
between belief and action. The attractiveness of Braithwaite's view is 
that a) it gives U3 a neat definition of the connection between belief and 
action, and b) we can often say that a man believes a proposition without 
being able to point to any act of assent. The content of the thought 
that p is so is the same whether a man actually believes that p is so, or 
whether he is merely reflecting on the possibility of p being so. When
* See below, Chapter 6
*« p 30
he actually believes that p is so, he need not first entertain p and then 
assent to it. Psychologically, belief does not consist of two separable 
components. Braithwaite is suggesting that the only difference between 
entertaining and believing p is that in the latter case the thought has 
effects on one's behaviour.
In this, he follows Alexander Bain, whom he quotes approvingly:
Belief has no meaning except in reference to our actions... no 
mere conception that does not directly or indirectly implicate our 
voluntary exertions can ever amount to the state in question 
(belief). *
This view has the strange consequence that I come to know what I believe, 
not by reflecting on the grounds there might be for or against the proposi­
tion proposed, but by asking whether or not the proposition is to have an 
effect on my behaviour. According to Braithwaite, I discover this 
inductively, by inference from my past behaviour, or from imagining myself 
in a hypothetical situation relevant to the proposition, or from considering 
my feelings on the matter. **
It might be objected immediately that the same act (thinking that p)
cannot have different consequences, as is here supposed, in that sometimes
it will lead to action and sometimes not. Braithwaite mentions this
objection, but says that it can be safely ignored as it rests on the
deterministic hypothesis that different events always have different causes
and that this hypothesis may be false, and so cannot be part of the meaning
of belief. He argues further that even if the hypothesis is true, all it
shows is that the total state of myself, including no doubt my disposition
to act on the proposition, must be different when I believe p from when I
merely entertain p, but that it does not show that there must be a
difference in the act of cognition between thinking that p and believing p.
&. Ryle*’11' and H. H. Price also maintain that mental dispositions may
* A. Bain, The Emotions and the Will. London, 1859, p 5^8
c.f. his p 57; knowledge of one's beliefs will be discussed further 
in Chapter 5
Concept of i.iind. London 1949, P 43
thinking ¡¡nd Experience, London, 1953» P 322
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be postulated without any implications regarding any categorical basis.
Jut as D. ]>1. Armstrong, who quotes ityle and Price, points out,* this leads
to difi'iculties, particularly in the case of non-manifested dispositions.
Braithwaite admits, of course, that not all beliefs are in fact put into
action. But we are entitled to speak of a disposition apart from its
manifestations only if we assert that there is a non-contingent connection
between categorical properties and the disposition. Otherwise there is
of- a m  Kjuaij* t U*
no reason for assuming that because the categorical properties will alsoA
follow as before. In fact,
It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to ’categorical 
basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical 
oasis' that we can speak of dispositions... Thus if belief... is a 
disposition, then it is entailed that while I believe p my mind is 
in a certain non-dispositional state, a state which in suitable 
circumstances gives rise to 'manifestations of belief that p'. The 
fact that we may not know the concrete nature of thi3 state is 
irrelevant.
Of course, if we do not know the nature of this state of mind, it could 
be that Braithwaite's analysis shows us how we learn and use the concept 
of belief. What we now want to show is that Braithwaite's analysis of 
belief does not give us either necessary or sufficient conditions for 
using the concept of belief. '.Ye will concentrate on his second condition 
because we have already suggested that entertaining p might not be a 
necessary condition for believing p, ** and it is the second condition - 
acting as if p were true - which is the specifically behaviouristic element 
in the analysis, and is to be found in some form or other in all behaviour­
istic accounts of belief.
(i) A disposition to act as if p were true is not a necessary 
condition of uelievin,; p
Braithwaite explains a disposition to act as if p were true as follows:
My disposition to act as if strawberries gave me indigestion means 
that, under relevant external circumstances... and my needs being to 
preserve my health, I shall behave in a manner appropriate to the 
indige3tibility of strawberries, namely, I shall refuse them.
Under similar external circumstances, if my need is to have
it Materialist Theory of the ■ ind. London 19o8, esp po 85-8
** pp 23-4
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indigestion... I shall accept the strawberries. And my belief 
that strawberries are, to me, indigestible... consists of such a 
disposition to action.*
(Need is taken to be 'the relevant internal circumstances of my body and 
my mind'). Are we to imply from this that every time a man eats some­
thing he knows to be indigestible, he has a need to have indigestion?
Suppose a man's need were partly to preserve his health, but further to 
eat something enjoyable, and the latter need over-ruled the former, 
Braithwaite's criterion would not allow us to say whether he believed 
strawberries were indigestible, but only that he believed that they were 
enjoyable. A man oould surely believe that strawberries were indiges­
tible without ever refusing them when offered, even given an explicit 
need to preserve his health, which he simply ignores.
What Braithwaite will have to do is to say that 'a believes that 
strawberries are indigestible' means that, given relevant needs and 
circumstances, he will act appropriately to their indigestibility, provided 
that hie need to preserve his health is not over-ruled, aid also that he 
is not bluffing, play-acting, paralysed, being unserious or schizoid** etc. 
But even if we could give a complete list of all the cases where belief 
would not manifest itself in action - that is fill out the 'etc' - it is 
not dear that some of the defeating conditions relating to the agent's 
sincerity etc., could themselves be defined without reference to what a 
believed. How, for example, could bluffing be defined without some 
mention of s'a beliefs? Unless we are sure that we could delimit in 
advance and without ciroularity all the possible exceptions to the straight­
forward working of the proposed analysis of the meaning of belief, we 
cannot claim to have given necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of the concept.
Even if a full list of exceptions could be given without circularity,
* loc oit pp 31-2
** J. N. Findlay in Values and Intentions (London, 1961, p 95) speaks of 
schizophrenics who have no wish to adapt themselves to situations 
normally thought of as most urgent.
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There will still be beliel‘3 which never have an influence on conduct owing 
to the relev mt circumstances never arising. Although the behaviouristic 
analysis does not say that the criterion of belief is a set of actual 
ctions, there is an epistemological problem here. ¡Sven if we accept 
Brtithwaite's account of how we come to know our beliefs*, he seems to 
assume th.t I always know what it would be like to act on any given belief, 
nd could always imagine myself in the appropriate circumstances. But 
it does not seem to oe impossible that I could have some beliefs, about 
the shape of molecules, for example, which, as a non-scientist, I simply 
h ve no conception of what it would be like to act in or out of accord 
with, apart from saying that I oelieve them.** According to the 
behaviouristic analysis, it is hardly possible to say I have such beliefs. 
But, a3 Price puts it,
actually we know very well that we believe them. How do we know 
this? Is it possible that we just know it by introspection, as 
the traditional theories of belief maintained?***
A further difficulty in draithwaite's theory, which he does recognise, 
is that one of the factors in the analysis is that acting on the proposi­
tion believed must in some way fulfil the agent's need; but this cannot 
'.tself involve a belief on the part of the agent, or the analysis would 
be circular. This difficulty is answered by a simple denial that any 
element of belief enters into the satisfaction of a need:
The appropriateness of my action consists in its satisfying my 
needs, and the satisfaction of needs is something into which no 
element of oelief, or indeed any mental element need enter. For 
I am me nin, b needs more than conscious desires: I mean the 
instinctive tendencies (whatever these may be) which are the motive 
forces of my lii’e, find it is agreed that these do not alw ys 
manifest themselves directly in my conscious wishes.**'*
So needs need not be consciously recognised by the believer. They are to
* above p 29
*- le will deal with the appeal to verbal behaviour to answer difficulties
in the behaviourist theory below, on p 35 
■ Belief, p 265
loc cit P 32* V ■»
be discovered by analysing what a man does and the states of quiescence 
or restlessness resulting from his activity. While talk of unconscious 
needs and the motive forces of life frees Braithwaite from the difficulty 
it was introduced to solve, as well as from having to talk about needs 
which are not in fact acted on (like the ineffective 'need' to preserve 
health which the strawberry eater ignores, which is not the actual motive 
force of the action, and so cannot be a genuine need either), the identifi­
cation of the appropriateness of an action with the actual satisfaction of 
a need suggests a further problem.
A psychiatrist might say of a patient, 'Smith's need (that is the 
motive force of his life) is to kill his father'. Assuming Smith has
plenty of chances to kill his father, do we have to say that he does not 
really believe the proposition 'Mr. Smith is Smith's father'? We could 
reply to this that the psychiatrist must have found that some of Smith's 
acts were occasioned by this need, and were in that way appropriate to it. 
But an act occasioned by a need is not necessarily one that satisfies it. 
Wondering whether strawberries were indigestible might be occasioned by 
the need to preserve one's health, but wondering will not satisfy the 
need. Neither would an act which was 'occasioned' by a need in this way 
be enough, on Braithwaite's criterion, to test the sincerity or reality 
of my beliefs. He is suggesting that it is only in the actual satisfac­
tion of my needs, or in full-blooded attempts to do so, that my real 
beliefs appear. (incidentally, in the second of his articles, the truth 
or falsity of my beliefs is decided by whether or not they tend to satisfy 
'my springs of action').
It is possible that some more detailed analysis of satisfying and 
tending to satisfy needs could get round these problems. Certainly 
Braithwaite could reply to an objection of R. M. Chisholm* in which an
on p 138 o f 'Sentences About B e l ie v in g ',  PAS V o l .  56, 1955-6, pp 125-48
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example is given of how a true and sincere belief can frustrate rather 
than satisfy our needs, that he does not really require that a true 
belief actually fulfil a need, but that, other things being equal, it 
tends to satisfy the need. But there may be considerable difficulty in 
establishing the nature of a man's needs without making certain assumptions 
about his beliefs. If we did not assume that Smith believed Mr. Smith 
to be his father, how could we say that his needs were of an oedipal 
nature, rather than caused by some other form of jealousy or dislike?
Or that if he killed Mr. Smith, his crime was parricide rather than 
homicide? Even the nature of a man's instinctive motive forces can be 
assessed only with some reference to his actions, and any description of 
human action will involve some description of what the agent thinks he is 
up to. In oases of voluntary needs, chosen and apprehended by the agent, 
this is even more clear. We could not say of a robber who broke into a 
house that his need was for the jewels he wrongly thought were there, 
unless we knew he had this false belief. Even then, it would be circular 
to test the sincerity of his belief by the fact that he did break in.
The unreliability of such a test would be apparent if we suspeoted that 
he wa3 really a spy, looking for certain documents in the house.
What Braithwaite is clearly looking for is behaviour characteristic 
of given beliefs. Our efforts to define such behaviour have indicated 
that given certain defeating conditions, almost any act could be consistent 
with a given belief. Moreover, the criteria which Braithwaite insists on 
before allowing a man to have a belief are impossibly high. As well as 
suggesting that Smith must set about killing Mr. Smith before the former 
really believes the latter is his father, these oriteria prejudge the 
question as to whether I can fail to act on my moral beliefs.* Finally, 
the needs through whioh we are to disoover a man's beliefs themselves
* On this, see below p 44
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presuppose other beliefs of the agent. One line, however, remains open 
to Braithwaite, and that is to say that my verbal behaviour basically 
depends on my beliefs. This would, for example, solve the problem of 
the beliefs I do nofcknow how to act on, because acting on them would 
consist in making the appropriate replies when asked about them.
One might be inclined to agree with C. S. Peirce that the whole 
point of behaviouristic analyses would be 'completely volatilised if you 
adnit that sort of practicality'*, but a disposition to verbal behaviour 
is still in some sense a disposition to act. Braithwaite does not take 
this line because he does not wish to attempt to define public meaning 
behaviouristioally, which would have to be done if verbal behaviour were 
to be offered as an adequate behaviour characteristic of belief. Chisholm 
raises what may be an insuperable objection to any such programme, unless 
we were prepared to say that a person makes a certain verbal response not 
only when he actually is stimulated by what is conventionally named by 
what he responds, but also when he thinks (i.e. believes) he is being so 
stimulated:
"The German word Ricse means giant" does not mean merely that 
people in Germany - however w*i£may qualify them with respect to 
their desires - would call a thing cin Riese if and only if the 
thing were gigantic. It means at least this much more - that 
they would call a thing by this name if and only if they took the 
thing to be gigantic or believed it to be gigantic or knew it to 
be gigantic.**
Unless some way could be found round this, the whole procedure of giving 
a behaviouristic account of belief through verbal behaviour would be self- 
defeating.
Unless it were possible to give a behaviouristio acoount of public 
meaning, when the behaviourist says that belief is a disposition to verbal
Collected Papers V .33 
* loc olt p 143
behaviour, the mentalist will simply reply that when someone puts his 
belief into words 'not parrotwise, but with consideration', what he is 
doing is precisely to make up his mind or to make an act of judgment.*
If he later proceeds to act on the judgment, we may have corroboratory 
evidence as to his sincerity, but a hypothetical future action cannot 
be a necessary condition of his milking the judgment or having the belief 
in the first place.
(ii) A disposition to act as if p were true is not a sufficient 
condition of belief
This need not detain us long. Apart from oases where I pretend 
that a proposition is true and act accordingly - an exception Braithwaite 
admits** - people often have to act on hypotheses they do not believe.
As Bertrand Russell pointed out, scientists have to test hypotheses they 
do not believe.*** In every day cases, like betting or gambling, we 
sometimes have to take one course of action out of two or more alterna­
tives, where we would be unwilling to say that we actually believed in 
what we had chosen. In such a case, when the alternative does fulfil 
our purpose - and we win the pools - we would probably say that, on 
making the choice we hoped, rather than believed that our choice was the 
right one. It should, in other words, be possible to say of someone, 
that he is disposed to act as if p is true, although he does not believe 
p, or perhaps even believes p to be false;**** *but, as D. J. O'Connor 
points out, on a scheme suoh as Braithwaite's, to say such things would 
be to contradict oneself.****♦
* c.f. P. T. Ceach, Mental Acts. London 1957, p 9. The behaviourist 
should not object to Ceaoh's qualification about putting one's belief 
into words with consideration; we have already seen the need to inolude 
in the behaviourist account some stipulation as to the sincerity of the 
notions proposed to test a given belief.
** c.f. 'Belief and Action', p 8
*** in 'Pragmatism', in Philosophical assays. London 1966 esp p 84
**** K. R. Popper, in The Logio of Scientific Disoovery. London 1968, p 92, 
speaks of scientists using statements known to be false to derive 
results adequate for certain purposes.
***** in 'Beliefs, Dispositions and Actions', PAS. Vol. 69, 1968-9, pp 1-16
So a disposition to act as if p were true has been shown by 
Braithwaite to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
believing p. In the rather more moderate account in 'Belief and Action', 
possible action is introduced not as the differentia of belief, but as a 
criterion of a sincere belief.* Thus, he is not now saying that to make 
a statement about someone believing p is the same as to make a hypothe­
tical statement about his overt behaviour, but that to give reasons for 
accepting or rejecting such statements will involve making some statement 
about possible actions.
But how are we to know which beliefs are to be tested? Presumably 
in the last analysis by asking the subject what he believes. And when 
he replies, the mentalist will once again say that he is making an act of 
judgment. However, even as a criterion of the sincerity of beliefs, a 
test involving hypothetical behaviour is open to problems. In the first 
place, the subject might have reasons for concealing his beliefs. Once 
again, it would be difficult to give without circularity a list of all the 
possible cases where a test might not be conclusive, and even to decide 
whether the subject was really lying or bluffing in his behaviour. More­
over, as we shall see below**, there may be cases where there is no reason 
to expect people to act on their beliefs. Further, many beliefs seem 
likely never to be behaviouristically tested, while others, the believer 
might not know how to act on. It is difficult to see how, except by 
verbal behaviour, such beliefs could be tested.
One final move, made for example by C. S. Peirce, in his paper 'Belief 
and Judgment' *** is to admit that some beliefs have no effect on our action, 
and to treat them simply as expectations of future experience. While this 
might avoid some of the problems involved in saying that belief is a habit
* p 10
** pp 39-AO
*** Collected Papers. V.538-54B
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of action, it is in the end a somewhat desperate move. For, as A. J. Ayer 
points out, it could be objected that expectation itself is nothing but a 
form of belief.* Some non-intentional analysis of expectation would be 
required before this circle could be broken, and whatever Ayer might hope 
in tiiis direction, we are at the moment far from being able to interpret 
any but the most rudimentary of goal-seeking expectations as 'sets' of the 
organism to future experience which fulfils or disappoints the set, for in 
any more complex situations a relevant factor is what the subject takes 
the experience to be. For fulfilment or disappointment of an expectation 
depends not only on whether what is expected actually occurs, but also on 
whether the subject realises (perceives or believes) that what is expected 
is occurring, and this re-introduces intentional terminology.** Until
this can be done, analysis of beliefs as if they were physiological sets 
to future experience cannot be said to further the dispositional account 
of belief.
Part 2 - The Behaviouristic Assumption
In our discussion of Braithwaite, we 3aid that being disposed to act 
on p could not be taken to be a necessary condition of believing p because 
of i) difficulties of finding behaviour characteristic of given beliefs, 
ii) difficulties in giving an account of all the possible exceptions in 
a subject's behaviour, iii) the problem of knowing what it would be to act 
on some dispositions, iv) the difficulty of knowing a subject's needs with­
out making assumptions about his beliefs, v) the connection between a 
correct description of his behaviour and his beliefs, and vi) the unnaccept- 
ability of taking verbal behaviour as the type of notion required hereo 
But there is an assumption at the root of this discussion, which has 
been left unquestioned, and which gives the behaviourist account of belief 
much of its intuitive plausibility. This is the assumption that a subject
* The Origins of Pragmatism. London. 1968, p U8
** c.f. R. M. Chisholm, Perceiving. Ithaca, New York, 1957, PP 181-5
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will act according to his beliefs, even if we cannot in advance specify 
what this will entail. Further, even if we do not think that belief can 
be defined in terms of dispositions to act - and so reject an account 
such as Braithwaite's - we might still hold that if a person can be shown 
actually to act against his professed belief, he thereby gives up his 
belief. The notion of an acid test, in which a man may give up his 
belief when faced with putting it into practice, is sometimes invoked 
here.
But unless we have an a priori reason for disqualifying 'beliefs'
we fail to act on in relevant circumstances, can we really hold this?
In Gambling With Truth.* Isaac Levi gives the following example:
Recently certain medical groups temporarily suspended dispensing 
the birth control pill, Knovid, pending further examination of 
evidence regarding its safety. Several physicians endorsed this 
policy, even though they acknowledged that they believed the pill 
to be safe.
Levi concludes
If moral considerations demand greater insurance against possible 
harmful side effects of use of the pill than our cognitive scruples 
demand against possible error, the available evidence could render 
it quite reasonable to predict the safety of the drug and still not 
to recommend its use.
Levi goes on to point out that we can specify situations in which a
rational agent would not act as if a proposition p were true unless he
had an infallible guarantee of its truth.
Kvidence might warrant acting on the proposition relative to some 
objectives; owing to the seriousness of error, however, the same 
evidence might justify acting as if the proposition were false 
relative to other objectives. This situation cannot be avoided 
except by evidence that entails the proposition in question. Thus 
an action analysis of belief that Braithwaite at one time advocated 
entails the requirement that a rational agent believe only those 
propositions to be true that constitute evidence. This would imply... 
that rational belief will tend to be restricted to the evident.**
Once we realise that different criteria for decisions are applicable for
theory and practice, and indeed for different practical decisions, the
i
* New York and London, 1967, p 10
** pp 13-14
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'put up or shut up' model, as Levi describes it, looses much of its force. 
So too does the notion of the acid test; a football supporter may believe 
with good reason that his team will win, without thereby wishing to put 
all his money on the result.
Interestingly enough, the idea that an excessive risk should cause us 
not to act on our beliefs is one that is discussed in Catholic moral 
theology. An example is given of a man who is out shooting wild animals, 
and sees something moving in the undergrowth. He has every reason to 
think that it is a bear, but there is just a faint possibility that it 
might be a man. Although for many purposes, he might be prepared to act 
on his belief as far as shooting the object is concerned. 'My very 
probable conviction that it is a wild beast will not, as a fact, safeguard 
the man, if a man happens to be there, and every man has the right that I 
should not take the risk of injuring or killing him.*
It is open to the behaviourist to object that unless a man is 
prepared to act on p in every oase, he believes p only to a limited degree. 
Certainly there is some indefiniteness in the use of the term 'belief1, 
which covers mental attitudes from ill-formed and hasty opinions which we 
renounce almost as soon as we have made them right up to judgments we are 
absolutely and unshakeably certain of. The behaviourist might wish to 
equate the degree of confidence we have in a certain belief as far as 
acting on it is conoemed with degree to which we believe it. However, 
to believe p to a positive degree requires as a necessary and sufficient 
condition belief that p.
A man who declared that he believed to a positive degree that Lyndon 
Johnson would be eleoted President in 1964 but said that he was 
agnostic as to Johnson's prospects in 1964 would have to be accused 
either of a misuse of language or of an irrational system of opinions. 
If Jones is highly confident that Johnson will be eleoted, and Smith 
is inolined to the same belief but with less confidence, they neverthe­
less both believe that Johnson will be eleoted; one is simply less 
certain of that than the other is.**
* H. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology. London, 194-6, Vol. 1, p 99
** Levi, op cit. pp 122-3
uAs Levi remarks, belief is not a matter of degree any more than striking 
a match is - though, of course, there are vast differences in what we are 
prepared to do with our beliefs.
At this point the Lockean notion of degrees of assent will probably 
be invoked. Looke held that the degree of assent we give to a proposi­
tion should be proportionate to the probability of that proposition.*
To a proposition that was probable rather than certain, we should give 
less than full assent. The idea of a limited assent seems perfectly 
reasonable in its suggestion that we should not fully commit ourselves to 
something we are not certain of. It was, nonetheless, attacked by 
Cardinal Newman in his Grammar of Assent, on the grounds that assent as 
such is unconditional. Newman had various theological reasons for wanting 
to say that assent is unconditional, which we need not agree with, but 
we can note he is not trying to say that we should assent to what we do 
not have good grounds for. He thinks that we should speak of an opinion 
rather than of a belief (or an assent) when we do not take the proposition 
in question to be true unreservedly. He explains his position on matters 
in which we are less than fully convinced as follows:
There is only one sense in which we are allowed to call such acts 
or states of mind assents. They are opinions; and, as being such, 
they are, as I have already observed, when speaking of Opinion, 
assents to the plausibility, probability, doubtfulness, or untrust­
worthiness, of a proposition; that is, not variations of assent 
to an inference, but assents to a variation in inferences. When 
I assent to a doubtfulness, or to a probability, my assent, as such, 
is as complete as if I assented to a truth; it is not a certain 
degree of assent. And, in like manner, I may be certain of an 
uncertainty; that does not destroy the specific notion convened in 
the word 'certain'. **
Although the Locke-Newman dispute may seem purely verbal, the side we 
come down on will make quite a difference to our interpretation of statis­
tical probability statements. Failure to realise that assent to 'probably p' 
should not be thought of as equivalent to limited assent to 'p', has given
* An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk IV, Ch XV-XVI
** New York, 1955 edition, p 1/+7
plausibility to the so-called subjective interpretation of probability
statements, according to which the degree of probability of a statement p
is the measure of the trust (or assent) it is proper to accord to p, in
the light of the information we are able to get from the available
evidence supporting or giving 'probability' to p.
Among other problems, this view of probability leads, directly as
a result of its making assent to 'probably p' equivalent to a limited
assent to 'p', to what Popper calls the paradox of ideal evidence. He
explains the paradox in appendix1'ix to The Logic of Scientific Discovery
by means of the following example:
Let z be a certain penny, and let a be the statement 'the nth 
(as yet unobserved) toss of z will yield heads'. Within the 
subjective theory, it may be assumed that the absolute (or prior) 
probability of the statement a is equal to that is to say,
(1 ) P(a)* = i
Now let e be some statistical evidence: that is to say, a 
statistical report, based upon the observation of thousands or 
perhaps millions of tosses of z; and let this evidence e be 
ideally favourable to the hypothesis that z is strictly symmetrical - 
that it is a 'good' penny, with equidistribution... We then have 
no other option concerning P(a,e)* than to assume that
(2) P(a,e) = i
This means that the probability of tossing heads remains unchanged, 
in the light of the evidence e; for we now have
(3) P(a) = P(a,e)
But according to the subjective theory. (3) means that e is, on 
the whole'. (absolutelyT irrelevant information with respect to a.
Now this is a little startling; for it means, more explicitly, that 
our so-called 'degree of rational belief' in the hypothesis, a. ought 
to be completely unaffected by the accumulated evidential knowledge, e; 
that the absence of any statistical evidence concerning z justifies 
precisely the same 'degree of rational belief as the weighty evidence 
of millions of observations which, prima facie, support or confirm 
or strengthen our belief. **
The paradox of ideal evidence suggests that belief in probabilities 
should be carefully distinguished from limited assent. In fact, in the 
example of penny tossing, what we are doing could be interpreted as
* P(a) means the probability of a; P(a,e) that of a given e .
•* pp 407-8
assenting to the probabilistic hypothesis h that the chance of the penny 
turning up heads on any given occasion is 5 . We might, though with some 
reservations*, wish to say that as a result of e, h becomes more 
corroborated, but from start to finish our assent, which is always a 
complete assent is to h rather than to a. A rational person will not 
believe a at all, even in a 'limited' fashion, whatever that might mean. 
Popper sums ups
A 'rational gambler' always tries to estimate the objective odds.
The odds which he is ready to accept do not represent a measure of 
his 'degree of belief' (as is usually assumed), but they are, 
rather, the object of his belief. He believes that there are, 
objectively, such odds: he believes in a probabilistic hypothesis h.
If we wish to measure, behaviouristically, the degree of his belief 
(in these odds or in anything else) then we might have to find out, 
perhaps, what proportion of his fortune he is ready to risk on a 
one-to-one bet that his belief - his estimate of the odds - was 
correct, provided that this can be ascertained. **
So we should distinguish degree of conviction (what we are prepared
to bet) from the misleading degree of assent - misleading because it fails
to distinguish less them total conviction from assent to probabilistic
hypotheses. For this reason, we must support Newman against Locke. The
behaviourist might still wish to say that we have full belief, properly
speaking, only when we are prepared to act on the belief in any circumstances.
But, as Levi showed, to have any, even a small degree of confidence in a
belief that p requires as a condition belief that p, and it makes no sense
to speak of degrees here. If the behaviourist still wishes to favour the
model in which belief is totally subsumed in practice, he may go on to say
with, for example, F. P. Ramsey that judgments about the strength of
beliefs are really judgments about how we should act in hypothetical
circumstances. *** But to assume even this is to see the ultimate end of
all enquiry as aotion and to think that enquiry is to be evaluated solely
in terms of possible action. To think this is to ignore the faot that
many people find something 'alleviating, soothing, gratifying and giving
* c.f. Popper, op oit. p 418
* * P U 5
*** The Foundation» of Mathematics. London, 1931* P 171
a feeling of power' as Nietzsche puts it* 3imply in tracing something 
unknown back to something known. Scientific researches indeed often 
have no practical objectives and the right of science to free enquiry 
regardless of what may result is one that has been jealously fought for.
However, these rather exalted considerations apart, it is undoubtedly 
true that in its ordinary use there is often no direct logical connection 
between some beliefs and actions. In addition to the oases where the
risk of acting on one's belief is too great to warrant it, there are 
obviously cases where people simply do not live up to their beliefs. No 
doubt some of these cases are simply hypocrify, but it would be presumptuous 
to say that they all were. In the case of moral beliefs in particular,
the model of an acid test seems to be of only limited value<> Can we say
the rich young man did not believe he ought to follow Christ? But loss 
of courage can clearly occur in non-moral situations as well: does the 
fact that an inventor is reluctant to test his own machine necessarily prove 
that he believes that it is unsafe?
One might still wish to 3ay that people ought to act on their beliefs
or that we will talk about a belief only when they do act on what they
think. To say the first may be reasonable enough; if people never acted 
on what they believed, we would lose the concept of action, for nobody would 
have any idea of what he was doing. At the same time, we might think it 
socially desirable that some people refrain from acting on some of their 
beliefs. As to the second, to say that we believe only what we act on 
would be to change the meaning of the word 'believe', which as it is refers 
primarily to what we think is true rather than to what we think we should 
do. It is perhaps significant that much of the impetus to define belief 
in terms of aotion has come from the philosophy of science, for science is 
more directly concerned with observable results than is poetry, for example.
* Twilight of the Idols. Harmondsworth, 1968, p 51
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As one commentator puts it of Rilke, 'the beliefs of such a poet... may­
be of so subtle, esoteric and even eccentric a sort that it would be 
unwise to try to live by them. But he is not necessarily less 'trust­
worthy' as a prophet of truths than any other -type of prophet'. * Neither 
should we say that his beliefs are necessarily any less beliefs than 
those of any other type of believer.
* E. Heller, The Disinherited Mind. Harmondsworth, 1961, p 136
CHAPTER. 3
Belief aa an Attitude of Mind
Introduction
Having found difficulties in the accounts of belief which see it in 
terms either of mental occurrences or of dispositions to act, we will now 
try to give a positive account of how belief might be analysed. Part 1 
of this chapter will clarify the sense in which belief is an attitude of 
mind. It will open by examining again reasons against thinking of belief 
primarily in terms of mental occurrences. This will lead us to distinguish 
broadly between two different types of state, both of which can be 
characterised as 'mental', and we will show how belief fits into one of 
these categories. We will suggest that both types of state, however, 
share a certain degree of epistemological privacy, and that this leads to 
certain problems in the public application of the relevant concepts.
Part 2 of this chapter, which carries our analysis of belief rather further, 
can be seen as an attempt to answer the question as to how the concept of 
belief, though referring to an attitude of mind, is yet publicly applicable. 
Part 1 - Mental Concepts and Belief
In Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein gives as examples of 
what he calls mental states or processes, depression, excitement and hearing 
sentences or tunes.* At least one of the conditions for the truth of 
the ascription of any of these concepts to someone would seem to be that 
that person is currently undergoing some experience, or that there is some 
mental event that he is conscious of. (We take it that Wittgenstein has 
in mind here the aotual moments of excitement or depression one has in 
playing a game, for example, rather than the dispositional sense of being 
excited or depressed about some long term project). We might be said to 
realise that we are in one or other of these states by some 3ort of intros­
pection; some mental occurrence is going on. Belief, on the other hand
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is not essentially a particular colouring of our thoughts; though we 
may, on occasion, experience what we call a feeling of conviction, such 
a feeling is not necessary to believing. As we have seen it is legitimate 
to say of someone that he believes something at times when he is not 
consciously adverting to the proposition concerned, and sometimes even 
before he has consciously reflected on the belief.* Belief is not so much 
a particular occurrence or colouring of our thoughts as a long-term disposi­
tion like knowledge or understanding, though of course, belief does not 
have to be correct in the way that knowledge or understanding do. 
Wittgenstein 3ums up the negative thesis about belief:
We say "I am expecting him", when we believe that he will come, 
though his coming does not occupy our thoughts. (Here "I am 
expecting him" would mean "I should be surprised if he didn't come" 
and that will not be called the description of a state of mind). **
What is to be oriticised is the idea that belief is like having a pain
or an occurrent thought, the model that sees belief as a matter of
introspecting some sort of feeling or of having something before one's
consciousness in a particular way. Having made this point, however,
Wittgenstein can say:
"I believe..." throws light on my state. Conclusions about my 
conduct can be drawn from this expression. So there is a 
similarity here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc... ***
He adds, correctly, that if 'I believe it is so' throws light on my state,
then the bare assertion 'It is so' does as well. In fact, it is
relatively unusual for a man to preface his assertions with the words
'I believe'. We normally assume that a man believes what he says, while
if we are suspicious of his sincerity, his adding of the words 'I believe'
will not necessarily reassure us.
At this point, we must distinguish what we are saying from another 
thesis which links 'I believe p' with an assertion of 'p'. It is that of
* c . f .  above p ^3
** op c i t ,  p 152
*** p 191
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J. 0. Unnson in 'Parenthetical Verbs';* Urmson argues that when someone 
says 'I believe p', what he is doing is to indicate the degree of 
certainty with which he holds p - on a 3cale, believing comes lower than 
knowing, but higher than suspecting. So to qualify p with 'I believe' 
is equivalent to 'probably p'. While there is an idomatic use of 
'I believe' which is like this, this is not the sense of belief that we 
are dealing with. Even when applied to ordinary speech, what Unnson 
says is by no means always true; the man who says 'I believe in God' 
does not mean that God probably exists. We are discussing belief in the 
sense in which what a man believes, he takes to be true without qualifica­
tions of the sort Urmson suggests.**
If then 'I believe p' does throw light on my state (a point Urmson's 
thesis overlooks, by the way), how precisely does it do this? Clearly 
I am not reporting on or expressing ray inner state in the same sort of 
way as I do when I say that I am in pain. 'I believe p' is like my
assertion 'p' in that it directly refers to p; to put it boldly, I am 
looking at p, rather than at myself in making these assertions. Neverthe­
less, it is clear, as Wittgenstein says that when we know what someone 
believes, it will be possible to draw conclusions about his conduct - and, 
we would add, about his thoughts. Conclusions might also be drawn about 
the physical state of his brain, but as yet, it is not clear what these 
might be, nor whether these conclusions are discoverable independently of 
correlations with the 'surface' aspects of belief. What we will look at 
now is the perfectly obvious and uncontroversial way that 'I believe p* 
throws light on my state, which has nothing to do with states of my brain, 
nor with anything that I am currently experiencing; it is, that along with 
other psychological attitudes, such as hoping, wishing, intending, respecting, 
choosing goals and so on, belief makes up my way of looking at and approach­
ing the world.
These psychological attitudes are different in important respects
* Mind. Vol 61, 1952, pp 480-496
** c.f. also p 1J1 below
49
from Wittgenstein's examples of occurrent states of mind, and other similar 
phenomena, such as having an after-image or a feeling of conviction, which 
all involve us in more or less passively attending to current experiences. 
With the psychological attitudes, to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the attitude, there is an element of conscious direction of intention 
or purpose involved in taking them up explicitly; as we show in Chapter 5, 
this is especially true in the case of belief, where we become aware of 
our beliefs precisely in assenting to them. Because of the element of 
intention or purpose in the psychological attitudes, they can up to a point 
be controlled or at least assessed by rational considerations, as Brentano 
suggests in his comparison of belief and disbelief with love and hate.
This is not to deny that there are implicit and unformulated beliefs 
and desires; nor does it mean we are always conscious of what we are said 
to believe. As we have seen, the existence of a dispositional sense of
belief - and this goes for the other psychological attitudes as well - is 
one of the way3 in which belief is to be distinguished from occurrent mental 
states. Nevertheless, for a being who is capable of explicitly formulating 
his beliefs and goals, we speak of his having implicit beliefs and goals on 
analogy with his having explicitly formulated these attitudes. As we 
shall show in Chapter 5 in more detail, to say of a man a, that at time t 
he believes proposition p though he is not aware of this, implies that at t, 
a would assent to p if he reflected on p. This follows partly from the 
fact that behaviour alone does not finally reveal a man's beliefs, and 
partly from the nature of explicit assent.* The question of conscious
* We predicate beliefs of animals by means of similar, though more distant 
analogising, as there is no clear cut case of an animal giving assent. 
Because a dog, for example, behaves in certain ways, we say he has oertain 
beliefs. If he jumps up and down on hearing his master's voice outside, 
we may say that he believes or judges that his master is coming. This 
can be characterised as a rudimentary form of belief. But in addition 
to the fact that we have only non-linguistic behaviour to go on here, the 
absence among even the more highly developed animals of, for example,
i) any belief-expressing behaviour which cannot be thought of as a 
response to some stimulus in the animal's environment, ii) stimulus- 
free thought and language, so characteristic of human mental activity, 
iii) the rational and conscious development and criticism of their 
beliefs, and iv) any manifestations of beliefs not connected with what 
we take to be their desires and not concerned with the present and 
particular, we should perhaps be wary of speaking of the belief of 
animals except as what J. N. Findlay has called 'a low-grade analogue 
of (human) belief' - which is the main subject of this thesis, (c.f. 
Values and Intentions, p 102. On point iv) above, c.f. Jonathan 
Bennett, Rationality. London, 19&4* esp pp 86-9). Psychological talk 
of desires etc which are in principle unconscious works at an even 
greater distance of analogy. For the question here is not of the 
subject being unable physically to express his desire, but, of his 
being in a deep sense unwilling to do so. Still, there remains some 
degree of analogy with talk of conscious desires, for in attributing 
unconscious desires to someone, we are saying that he is acting just 
as he would if he consciously desired whatever is being suggested.
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reflection or purpose is clearly not involved when we say that someone 
is in pain, for example; pain requires us to attend to it; it forces 
our attention, usually against our wishes. Of course, the distinction 
between the occurrent experiences we passively undergo and what we are 
calling the psychological attitudes is not absolute. There are mid-way 
cases like long-term infatuation, and the psychological attitudes them­
selves can be both short term and over-laid with gut reactions of one 
sort and another. Nevertheless, a broad distinction between occurrent 
mental experiences and the (ideally) more rational and intentional 
psychological attitudes can be drawn on the lines we suggest. If we do 
so, the occurrent experiences play a comparatively small part in making 
up our general picture of the world, and our emotional and conative 
relationship to it, which has traditionally been thought of as the charac­
teristic function of the mind. On this traditional view, someone who 
tells us about his psychological attitude, about his beliefs and ambitions, 
for example, tells us about his mental state in a deeper and more far- 
reaching way than if he were simply to tell us the experiences of percep­
tion or pain which he was currently undergoing. (indeed, there is some­
thing a little odd about saying that pain is a mental state at all).
Analysis of expressions of belief seems to further the idea that 
there is some sense in speaking of belief as a mental attitude. Again 
following suggestions of Brentano, it is possible to distinguish the
meaning of what is said from the assent - the mental attitude - we give
Frege's assertion sign:
Of course we have the right to use an assertion sign in contrast 
with a question mark, for example, or if we want to distinguish 
an assertion from a fiction or a supposition. It is only a mistake 
if one thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertain­
ing and asserting... and that in performing these actions we follow 
the propositional sign roughly as we sing from a musical score. *
Were there no such assertive force in expressions of belief, it would
make no sense to speak of being sincere or lying in our speech, for it is
only in terms of our attitude to the proposition that the sincerity of
our belief statements can be judged, given the inadequacy of action
criteria.
But these considerations about belief being usually thought of as a 
mental attitude do not take us very far, unless we can give some account 
of what this mental attitude is0 In the first place, can any reason be 
given for talking about it as 'mental'? Does it share any features with 
pain and the other occurrent experiences which Wittgenstein speaks of as 
states of mind?
At the outset, we must emphasise that, although as Russell once put 
it, believing is the most mental thing we do, we are not suggesting that 
it is something that is done by the mind as opposed to or apart from the 
"body. Indeed, Aristotle's warning that it is better not to say that the 
soul (or mind) pities, learns or thinks, but that the man does these things 
with his soul, could well be noted here. ** A possible suggestion is that 
what is common to those concepts which, at least since Descartes, have been 
thought of as mental, is not that they can be applied to disembodied minds, 
nor that they can necessarily be applied, even in their first person use, 
with an infallible degree of certainty, but that we can at least sometimes 
apply them correctly to ourselves without having to imply in any particular 
case the satisfaction of the publicly determinable criteria which are
* Wittgenstein, op cit. p 11
** be Anima. 408bl3
required to make a correct application of them to others.* In other 
words, with a mental concept we are inwardly aware when it can be applied 
to ourselves, and in so applying it, we make no necessary claim that the 
public criteria for the concept are satisfied in any particular case.
Vie thus exclude concepts of physical activity (walking, running, etc.), 
which we might also apply to ourselves without making use of the sort of 
observation we need to apply them to others, but whose correct application 
presupposes the satisfaction of the public criteria in every case.
It might be objected that this view would make knowing and under­
standing non-mental, because to claim correctly to know or to understand 
implies that at least some of the public criteria are in fact satisfied 
in every case; in knowing that p, p has to be the case, while to under­
stand something means that I must actually have the ability to carry out 
successfully whatever exercises might be involved in understanding it. 
Although it might be possible to object in turn to this view of under­
standing, it would hardly be relevant to the present disoussion, as we 
are quite prepared to admit an extra-mental and non-subjective element in 
both knowledge and understanding, although they share some of the inward­
ness of mental concepts.
The problem of other minds in fact has centered very largely on 
how concepts which we apply to ourselves inwardly and without implying 
the satisfaction of the public criteria in any particular case can also 
be public concepts. This perhaps explains why pain and sensation have 
played so large a part in the philosophy of mind, despite the strangeness, 
already noted, of thinking of pain as something mental. If this analysis 
of mental concepts in terms of private awareness is not acceptable, it
* What follows in this chapter is based on 'On Belief' by A. Phillips 
Griffiths (PAS Vol. 63, 1962-3, pp 167-186) here quoted as in 
Knowledge and Belief.pp 127-143* Our idea of mental concepts 
derives from Griffiths' b-concepts, which have their peculiar 
epistemological status because the subject may be said to know them 
in his own ca3e immediately.
should not matter substantially, as no great weight is being laid on the 
use of the word 'mental'. But it is precisely here that the problem 
about these concepts is located - if they can be applied without recourse 
to publicly identifiable criteria, how are they concepts in our public 
language at all?
Before attempting to answer this question with reference to belief, 
we must first suggest how we might justify the claim that in predicating 
belief of ourselves we do not have to imply in any given case the existence 
of the type of evidence necessary to predicate belief of others. A 
full discussion of my knowledge of my own beliefs must await Chapter 5» 
in which we discuss the relationship between the attitude of belief and 
the mental acts connected with it. However, it is clear enough that in 
order to establish our own beliefs, we do not have to listen to what we 
say, or look at what we do, or think about what we might do. These are 
the main ways of getting at the beliefs of otherso It is just possible 
that in coming to a cognitive decision, we might occasionally do some of 
these things, but as a rule we do not; we either know what we think, or 
else we simply weigh up the various possibilities about the state of 
affairs in question and come to some conclusion. There is usually nothing 
like applying the sort of tests we make in getting at the beliefs of 
others; to do that would be like observing one's own states and actions 
from the outside and would have the inherent absurdity of a man saying 
in all seriousness 'Judging from what I say, this is what I believe'.*
Of course, if belief and the other psychological attitudes share a 
certain epistemological property with pain and other mental occurrences, 
we should not minimise the differences between the two types of thing. 
Mental occurrences are introspectible processes or events; we have 
stressed here and in Chapter 1 that it is wrong to think of belief simply
c.f. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p 192
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in terms of discrete events, while in Chapter 5 we will show that we are 
not aware of our beliefs by passive introspection. Further there is no 
reason to think that we have public concepts for these various mental 
occurrences for the same reason that belief is a public concept« If 
Wittgenstein is right in thinking that pain, for example, is a public 
concept because of its connection with pain behaviour, we should not 
think that belief, being a public concept, must have a similar connection 
with behaviour. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the attempt to identify 
our beliefs solely through our external behaviour cannot be sustained. 
Having given an account of what it might mean to speak of a concept as 
mental, and what sort of mental concept belief is, we must now consider 
the epistemological problem which arises over belief - how it is that the 
privately apprehended mental attitude of belief is at the same time some­
thing public and common.
Part 2 - Analysis of Belief
To believe something is to see it sub specie veri. As Brentano puts 
it, 'everyone who believes or rejects something, believes of himself that 
he believes or rejects correctly; if he did not believe this of himself, 
he would not be judging at all1.* Moore's paradox, which originally 
referred to philosophers who believed one thing in their theories and 
another in ordinary life, was later given in a version relevant to our 
purposes:
'I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did' 
is a perfectly absurd thing to say, although what is asserted is 
something which is perfectly possible logically.**
The absurdity arises not because a man cannot believe something which is
false, but because he cannot consistently believe something which he at
the some time also thinks is false. As Wittgenstein remarks, apropos of
* The True and the Evident, edited by R. M. Chisholm, London, 1966, p 85
** From The Philosophy of C. ■). Moore, edited by P. A. Schilpp, New York, 
1952, p 543» More on the absurdity of this type of locution in 
Chapter 5 below.
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Moore's paradox, if there was a verb 'to believe falsely', it would have 
no significant first person present indicative.* To put this another way, 
to believe something is to take it to be true. Therefore, we can say 
that belief is proper only when what is taken for true (believed) is in 
fact true. As Griffiths puts it:
The connection between belief and truth is that belief is appropriate 
to truth; it is proper only when it is of what is true, and only 
intelligible, therefore, when it is of what could be true. **
(As we shall see in Chapter 4, it is because of this last consideration
that we shall insist that belief has as its object a truth bearer of some
sort).
Griffiths goes on to show that people who 'believed' only what they
took to be absurd could not be using the concept in the same way as us;
either they would mean by 'I believe p' that they thought that p was
ridiculous - in which case the meaning of the word would have changed - or,
if they denied that they meant that p was ridiculous, we should have to
conclude that their standards of appropriateness for the assertion of
truth were simply different from ours:
And if so what are they standards of - are they standards of truth 
any more? To say such things makes it impossible for us to say 
not only that they accept the standards of appropriateness that we 
accept, but what it is that they are accepting or thinking. Tie 
certainly have no right to speak of belief in their case. The 
acceptance of such standards of appropriateness, then, by others, 
is a necessary condition of the propriety of our attributing the 
concept of belief - let alone belief itself - to them. ***
In other words, belief is possible as a concept at all only because we
have a common understanding of the type of grounds that can be given for
counting something true. Our framework of truth gives us an idea of
what we are implying when we believe something. To believe something
is to imply that the grounds we have for holding something true are, in
* Philosophical Investigations, p 190 An apparent refutation of this is 
given by Benson Mates in his Elementary Logic (London 1965» p8). But 
the 'belief' which the subject of the example admits to be false is not 
in fact sincere.
** loc cit. p 140
*** Griffiths. p 141
this case, in some way satisfied — though not necessarily that we oan 
actually show how they are. The grounds may not in any particular case 
be satisfied, nor may we in fact have any good reason for supposing them 
to be, but this is what, from the nature of the concept, we imply when we 
say we believe something.
It is because of the connection between belief and truth, and because 
we have a common understanding of the fundamental criteria of truth, that 
belief is possible as a public concept. Both the connection and the 
common acceptance of the criteria are necessary to the use and application 
of the concept of belief. As far as cultures and groups which differ 
somewhat from our own in fundamental standards of truth are concerned, 
we do not say that in order to speak of belief in their case we need total 
agreement on these standards. ’¡7ith some common ground showing that 
their standards of truth are at least basically commensurate with and 
intelligible in terms of our own, it would still be possible to show that 
belief for them was at root the same attitude as it was for us.* But 
without the basic connection the attitude of belief has with criteria of 
truth held in common, even though not every belief by any means satisfies 
these criteria, there would be no means of knowing that the concept was 
being used in the same way when we applied it to others, or even to 
ourselves on different occasions. The concept would then become elusive 
in its applications, and ultimately, no doubt, would disappear altogether.
Griffiths' account of how belief is a public concept has been 
criticised by Bernard Mayo** on the grounds that it implies a conceptual 
gap between the same man thinking that something is true and his believing 
it. As Mayo correctly points out, to open a gap here is absurd, for when 
a man thinks something is true, he believes it by this very fact. (As a
* More on this, and also on whether it is possible to conceive a 
community with standards of truth totally different from ours, 
c.f. Chapter 7, esp PP 176-7
** in 'BeHef and Constraint', PAS, Vol 64, 1963-4, pp 139-136; here 
quoted as reprinted in Knowledge and belief. pp 147-161
matter of fact, Griffiths himself makes this point on p 13U of his
article, where he says that 'there can be no distinction between believing
something and believing it to be true')» However, Mayo takes exception
to the following passage by Griffiths:
It is wrong to believe what is false and right to believe what is 
true. Whatever else one does with a truth, believing the proposi­
tion which expresses it is the first and most fitting thing to do 
with it - before we 3tart deploring it or trying to alter it, for 
example. * *
Mayo seems to take this to mean that a man can see a truth and then 
decide whether to believe it or not, but if 'what is true' and 'truth' 
are taken in an absolute sense, as referring to what actually is true, no 
such conclusion need follow, for then what the passage says is that belief 
is the attitude which should be taken up when and only when there is a 
truth, in the absolute sense of truth. The same man cannot think some­
thing is true and fail to believe it, but he ought not to think something 
true (i.e. believe it), except when it in true.
We do not in the end wish to quibble about what Griffiths actually 
meant, but the theory as outlined here implies no gap of the sort objected 
to by Mayo. What it says is that to believe p is necessarily to take p 
to be true, and because we have\area of agreement concerning the basic 
conditions within which something may be asserted to be true, so we have 
a common understanding of what it means to believe something. This is 
not to say that people, even from the same culture, always agree on these 
conditions or on their application in every detail,*"' but if they did not 
have a basic measure of agreement in their most central beliefs, 'belief' 
would start to mean different things for different people, and the concept 
disappear. If there had never been any agreement about truth, then it is 
difficult to see how the concept of belief, not being reducible to
* p l40
** In Chapter 6 Part 3, we will show that there are areas where the 
criteria for the assertion of truth are less fixed, and where there 
is more room for individual variation.
interpretation in terras of external behaviour or dispositions to such 
behaviour, could have arisen in the first place.
Mayo also criticises Griffiths' theory for saying that one ought 
to believe what is true because this seems to him to allow a man to be 
free to believe or not to believe as he chooses. Although, as we shall 
see in Chapter 6, the idea of freedom in belief is not to be rejected 
out of hand, it is clear that there is no possibility of someone having 
freedom to refuse assent to what he himself sees to be true, if only 
because there are not two distinguishable moments here. However to say 
with Griffiths that belief is appropriate to truth and that one ought to 
believe what is true certainly need not be interpreted in any such 
objectionably voluntaristic sense; what is meant here is simply that 
before making a judgment, one ought to make sure that one has all the 
necessary evidence. In fact, on this point, Mayo himself seems to be 
wrong when he says that to say 'I ought to believe p' is 'straightfor­
wardly incompatible' with 'I do not believe p', because 'I ought to 
believe p' is sincerely assertable only when one actually does believe p.* 
It is possible to think of cases, particularly when people are perplexed 
and emotionally involved, when they admit that objectively the evidence 
goes against their belief that p, but that for largely emotional reasons, 
they cannot help still seeing p as true - i.e. believing p. Be this as 
it may, there is no need to derive the conclusion that one is free to 
believe whatever one likes from the premise that one ought to believe only 
what is true.
To sum up, we have attempted to show that belief is a public concept 
through its logical connection with taking something to be true, together 
with the fact that we have basic common standards for the assertion of 
truth. In saying that a believes p, we are saying that a does (or would, 
if he has not actually adverted to p) put p along with those propositions
* loc cit, p l60
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which are publicly acceptable. The fact that a might have no right on 
occasion to do any such thing means that his belief is a bad belief - but 
this is still what is being implied when it is said that he believes p, 
unless 'belief' is being used in a quite idiosyncratic way.
Wittgenstein in an elusive but, at this stage, suggestive passage 
connects belief in a proposition with the search for public proof of that 
proposition:
Ask yourself: What does it mean to believe Soldbach's theorem?
What does this belief consist in? In a feeling of certainty as 
we state, hear, or think the theorem? (That would not interest 
us). And what are the characteristics of this feeling? Why,
I don't even know how for the feeling may be caused by the proposi­
tion itself... I should like to ask: how does the belief 
connect with this proposition? Let us look and see what are the 
consequences of this belief, where it takes us. "It makes me search 
for a proof of the proposition". - Very well; and now let us look 
and see what your searching really consists in. Then we shall 
know what belief in the proposition amounts to. *
Of course, we may have beliefs which we are unable or unwilling to
produce any justification for, or to indicate in any way why we think
they might be acceptable to others. But these 'bad' beliefs are possible
only given that we have a foundation of 'good' beliefs to build on;
suppose someone never believed things which were generally acceptable,
and could never produce any grounds for his 'beliefs', would we not have
to say finally that he did not know what belief was? This conclusion
follows from belief being the attitude people take to what they think or
would think of as true, and because it has to be grounded in a basic
consensus about the criteria for thinking things true.
Perhaps we should stress here that our analysis is not intended to
give a formal definition of belief; as such, it would be circular, in
saying, among other things, that the man who believes p, takes (or would
take) p to be true. In fact, given the failure of behaviouri3tic attempts
to define belief in terms of action, we are doubtful that a non-circular
* op cit. P 152
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definition of belief couia be given. The analysis avoids total circula­
rity, which it would not do were it to stop at saying that belief is the 
attitude a man has to what he takes to be true, because it goes on to 
show how belief is a public concept through its being rooted in the common 
standards of truth which prevail. This is illuminating as an answer to 
our original problem, which was to determine how a privately apprehended 
mental attitude could be something public and common. What we have tried 
to do is to show that individual belief is possible at all, only given the 
existence and use of publicly acceptable standards of appropriateness and 
evidence which link the mental attitude of belief with what is believed.
In other words, the private mental attitude is identified not because it 
i3 a special sort of feeling which the believer has, but because it is 
grounded in acceptance of a common way of understanding and interpreting 
the world.
It might be objected here that in avoiding one possible circularity, 
we have fallen into a more damaging one. Have we not simply analysed 
private, individual beliefs in terms of public attitudes to truth - that 
is to say, in terms of public beliefs? We would reply that, while in 
one sense, as publicly acceptable, our public standards of evidence 
and common sense can be represented as being important because they are 
public beliefs, or beliefs held in common by many individuals, in another 
sense although products of human consciousness, through their being a part, 
as it were, of our language, they have an important degree of autonomy 
with which they transoend at any given time the mental states of the 
individuals who hold them at that time. This autonomy manifests itself 
both in the way in which many problems and discoveries undreamed of by the 
individuals who hold them arise from the theories common sense presents 
us with and, more importantly from our point of view, in the way in which 
our individual mental states of belief are in large part formed (and made
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possible as beliefs) by the prior existence of what we have been calling
publicly acceptable standards of truth and evidence. Writing of what he
calls the 'third world' of objective knowledge - the system of ideas and
rational standards and problems within which we work - Popper says:
It is to be stressed that this world exists to a large extent 
autonomously; that it generates its own problems, especially 
those connected with methods of growth; and that its impact 
on any one of us, even on the most original of creative thinkers, 
vastly exceeds the impact which any of us can make upon it. *
These remarks seem particularly true of the central core of fundamental
standards and propositions we are suggesting that the very concept of
belief is grounded in. Although in Chapter 7 Part 2 we will show how
the system of beliefs of a community determine for that community the
limits of the believable, we mention here the autonomy of the 'third
world' in order to show that our attempt to root the inner process of the
beliefs of individuals in the outward criteria of public standards of truth
;ind evidence may avoid the imputation of circularity it would be open to
if all it did was to say that the epistemological problem of the private
beliefs of single individuals was soluble by an appeal to the private
beliefs of many individuals.
In saying that belief is the attitude a man takes to what he thinks 
of or would think of as true, we are saying that a man may be taken to 
believe various assumptions which he has not explicitly adverted to. For, 
as J. N. Findlay shows in Values and Intentions, our explicit beliefs tend 
towards indefinite expansion, so that we have a general readiness to 
accept what fits in with them« As he puts it 'a belief-attitude may be 
overthrown by untoward experience, but it cannot qua the attitude it is, 
look forward to such an overthrow'.** So a man may be taken to believe the 
contrary of what he himself would take as immediately overthrowing his
* 'Epistemology without a Knowing Subject' in Philosophy Today Ko.2 
ed. Jerry H. Gill, London .and New York, 1969, (pp 225-277), p 272
p 100
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explicit beliefs, even though he himself has not adverted to the implica­
tion - in many cases these implications would be too obvious to reflect 
on. This is not to say that a man is to be taken to believe everything 
that is implied by his beliefs, which is clearly false, but only whut 
he himself would take to be implied or assumed. The fact that we may 
not De able to 3ay with certainty just what any particular person would 
take to be immediately implied or assumed by his explicit beliefs does 
not detract from the point that we all have many beliefs of this sort, 
which we would not think began as beliefs only when we did explicitly 
reflect on them for the first time. Moreover, to maintain that we have 
implicit unformulated beliefs of this sort is not to contradict the 
thesis that when we do advert to them, we may be said to be immediately 
aware of them, in that we do not have to examine our speech or behaviour 
in the way another person would, in order to see that they one part of 
our complex of beliefs about the world.
To think of belief as the mental attitude appropriate to what is 
true, finally, brings out the strengths of both the associationist and 
the behaviourist theories. The associationist accounts we have examined, 
among other faults, make some quite implausible claims about the mental 
occurrences involved in having beliefs and making judgments, as well as 
failing to account for imtny types of belief. Their plausibility arises 
from the fact that, although they overlook the role of the subject in 
forming hi3 beliefs, it could be argued that because we are biologioally 
constituted in certain ways, we cannot help finding certain types of basic 
experience compelling. These largely physical realities coerce our 
attention; however much we may try to avoid admitting them, they finally 
force our assent by a system of checks and pains, to use the Jamesian 
images. And so I come to believe those things which have immediate and 
continuous connections and associations in my life, precisely because of
6 4*
the repeated hold they make on my attention, and because of the impossi­
bility of avoiding them. It could have been these fact3 which led Hume
to insist on the lack of freedom in belief. It is from this body of
basic realities which are the most forceful as well as the most universally 
available truths, that we form the basis of our common stock of truths 
and on which we base the concept of belief. For here all men must by 
and large agree. Of our more sophisticated nd less immediately physical
ideas, we must in the end ask how much they measure up to the basic
realities, whose compulsion we cannot avoid.
As f r s dispositions to aot are concerned, it has already been 
pointed out that the idea of intentional action makes sense only if we 
.ssume prior beliefs in the agent bout the consequences of what he does, 
oo intentional action must always take place in accordance with some belief 
or oeliefs in order to qualify as more than aere physical movement. As 
rril'i'iths put3 it:
if it is appropriate to believe p only when p, and if it is 
appropriate to do x when p, then it is appropriate to do x when 
believing p. This explains the connection between belief and 
action, and also the direction we normally think the dependence 
takes: action waits on belief, aid belief awaits on evidence.*
So the behaviourist theory is correct in postulating a general connection
between action and belief, as well as in stressing that belief is not
definable solely in toms of occurrent acts, but in Chapter 2 we showed
that it does not follow th it we believe only what we are prepared to act
on. To say thi3 not only reverses the normal order of dependence, and
so produces circularities of one sort and another in the behaviourist
account, but also ent ils the controversial conclusion that speculative
concerns are always identical with practical ones.
What we have tried to do in this chapter is to show what is being
implied when someone relieves some proposition, p, there bein ; no .external
op oit, p 140
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object to point to with belief. \7e have suggested that when a believes p, 
even though he may have no right to do this, he is treating p in the same 
sort of way as one treats what is publicly acceptable as true, belief being 
the attitude appropriate to and identified through truth. Believing p 
may not involve the believer in actually entertaining p, as p may be only 
a tacit or implicit premise or assumption in his thoughts and actions.
The connection between explicit and implicit beliefs will be further 
examined in Chapter 5* But before this, we will look in Chapter k at 
the various possible ways of thinking of the object of belief.
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CHAPTER k
Belief as a Propositional Attitude
Introduction
This chapter will be divided into three parts. Having decided that 
belief is intelligible only of what can be true or false, its object must 
be a truth-bearer of some sort. In the first and major part of the 
chapter, we will consider ways of thinking of these truth-bearers, and 
show why we think of them as propositions rather than as sentences or 
statements. The other two parts of this chapter consider attitudes 
whioh may contain elements of cognitive belief, but which also involve in 
some part non-cognitive attitudes. In the second part of the chapter we 
look at moral beliefs from the point of view of non-cognitive theories of 
ethics, and this leads us to point to an element in moral belief which 
transcends the cognitive belief we are dealing with in this thesis, while 
in Chapter 3 we comment on a distinction drawn by Professor Price between 
'belief in' and 'belief that', according to which 3ome beliefs seem to 
have persons or things as their objects, rather than propositions or 
sentences. Here we will look at expressions of the form 'Tom believes 
in Tim' and show that sometimes they may be reduced to cases of ordinary 
propositional belief, while at other times, they refer rather to an 
attitude of trust or affection. With the former type of case, as when 
in saying 'Tom believes Tim' one means that one believes what Tim says 
is true, the belief object is the same type of thing as that discussed in 
the first part of the chapter, while when belief in refers to trust or 
affection, we have - as with moral beliefs - an attitude somewhat 
different from the belief dealt with here.
Part 1 - Propositions as the Objects of Belief
We have attempted to show in the previous chapter that belief can be 
identified as the attitude which ought to be taken to what is true. It
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is, therefore, intelligible only of what could be true or false, and 30 
its object* must be thought of as a truth-bearer of some sort. In this 
section, we will examine the ways in which we might think of the objects 
of people's beliefs. Although most of what is discussed here may seem 
of primarily formal interest, our conclusions in fact give some quite 
important pointers as to how we should think of people's beliefs.
Given that the objects of belief must be truth-bearers of some 
sort, there seem to be two main possibilities as to how we might think 
of them. 7/e might think of them primarily in terms of the concrete 
sentences or statements a man might utter or assent to, or we might 
think of them in terms of some more abstract intensional or mental 
entities, which, for want of a better word, we may call propositions. 
Neither proposal is without its problems: the concrete sentences or state­
ments a man utters or might assent to will, as we hope to show, often 
give a misleading impression of what precisely a man believes, while 
propositions are obscure both in ontological status and in definition.
We will begin this section by examining some classical accounts of proposi­
tions, in order to show how what we understand by the term is rather 
different; then we will show the drawbacks involved in thinking of the 
objects of belief as concrete sentences or statements, and, finally we 
will suggest why we think that the objects of belief must be thought of 
as propositions. Perhaps at the outset it should be stressed that we 
are not asserting that beliefs cannot be expressed in concrete sentences;
* In this chapter, we follow normal philosophical practice in speaking 
of the expression which follows words of the form 'x believes that...' 
as the 'object' of belief. Mr. Robin Haack, who has kindly improved 
this chapter in several places, points out that if Tom believes, for 
example, that the moon is round, it might be more plausible to speak 
of the moon itself as the object of Tom's belief, although of course 
he needs to use a sentence or a proposition to express his belief.
So it might be better for us to speak here of the 'expression' of 
belief rather than of the 'object'. If this is so, 'expression* can 
be read, where appropriate, for 'object' throughout this chapter.
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indeed the fact that they must be true or false suggests that all our 
beliefs can be so expressed. What we are saying is rather that to 
think of the sentences a man assents to independently of his own under­
standing of them may lead us to false conclusions about his beliefs.
By thinking of the objects of belief as propositions, we are trying to 
preserve this irreducibly intensional element in belief.
Propositions - Classical Accounts
The sense of 'proposition' that we are arguing for is not the sense 
that has always been given to the term. What we are saying seems to be 
demanded by an analysis of belief, and has nothing to do with timeless, 
abstract entities which uniquely and non-ambiguously represent facts or 
states of affairs. (As will emerge, in our sense, propositions are 
subject to both time and ambiguity). As a prelude to our use of the 
term, however, it would be as well to say a little about the use previously 
made of the term in order to give a clearer idea of what is meant here.
At about the turn of the century, there was much discussion as to the 
ontological status of the objects of thought. Meinong, for example, 
thought that every expression had to stand for an object. It is well 
known that he was content to have negative facts, objective falsehoods, 
contradictions and the like as part of hi3 universe. Moore, though 
perhaps endowed with a more robust sense of reality, seems to have thought 
of beliefs naming the facts they refer to, and of the believer standing 
in some relation to what he believes. But what does a f a l s n a m e ?  
What is the believer related to in this case? It cannot be the object 
or state of affairs named by the proposition he believes in, because there 
is no such thing. But in that case, how can we say that true beliefs 
name anything either 'since there seems plainly no difference in mere 
analysis between false belief and true belief’? He concludes that though 
we have to talk of propositions in order to analyse beliefs, the status
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of propositions is totally obscure; in fact, they do not exist at all:
All that our theory compels us to say is that one part of this 
expression, namely, the words 'The proposition that 2 plus 2 
equals A', though it seems to be the name of something, is not 
really the name for anything at all, whereas the whole expression 
'The proposition that 2 plus 2 equals A i3 true' is a name for a 
fact and a most important fact; and all that our theory says is 
that we must not suppose that this fact can be analysed into a 
fact called 'the proposition that twice two are four' and a 
relation between this fact on the one hand and truth on the 
other. This is all that the theory requires. It does not 
require that we should discontinue the use of these expressions, 
which are not names for anything; or that we should suppose that 
sentences in which they occur can't be true.* 
The surprising thing is that Moore thought that propositions were the
names of facts at all. Russell, who criticised Moore for this, points
out that propositions could not name facts, because for each fact there
must be two propositions, one which corresponded to the fact (and was true),
and one which denied the fact (and was false).**
This is not the place to discuss Russell's various theories of
propositions in any detail, but it should be noted that the idea of every
fact having a pair of propositions corresponding to it is not the same
as our idea of propositions. Presumably, these propositions, if true,
would completely and unambiguously represent the fact, and so would not
suffer from the vagueness and indeterminacy characteristic of many of our
beliefs. Moreover, the notion of a fact is by no means clear - how are
facts separated off, one from another? How do we know when we have one
fact (and so two propositions) or two facts (and so four propositions)
and so on? The notion of a proposition proposed here is not tied down to
the notion of a fact, but arises through analysis of the content of beliefs.
Nevertheless, Russell's argument is conclusive enough against thinking of
propositions as the names of facts. It is interesting to note that in
his 1919 article 'On Propositions',*** Russell himself defines a
¥ Some Main Problems of Philosorhv. London 1953» p 266
* c.f. 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in Loric :md Knowledge.
London, 1956, esp pp lfi7 and 209
** Logic and Knowledge, pp 285-320
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proposition as the content of a belief. This would seem to avoid the 
difficulty of defining the notion through relationships to facts.
However, although in 'On Propositions', Russell is adajnant that 
'propositions are facts in exactly the same sense in which their 
objectives are facts'*, questions might still be asked about their 
ontologioal status. If they are thought of in terms of the beliefs 
people have, their status must be one of dependence on believers.
3rentano says many times in the posthumous supplements to the 1924 edition 
of his Ps.vcholorie. when we talk of an object of thought, we should take 
it as a kind of convenient shorthand for talk of a thinking subject. 
Certainly, to avoid a universe as overcrowded as. Meinong's, we must main­
tain that the contents of our individual beliefs or emotions depend for 
their existence on the person having the belief or the emotion. If this 
way of putting the matter has an old-fashioned ring, Quine seems to be 
making a similar point when he writes:
A final alternative that I find as appealing as any is simply to 
dispense with the objects of the propositional attitudes. We oan 
continue to formulate the propositional attitudes with the help of 
the notations of intensional abstraction... but just cease to view 
these notations as singular terms referring to objects. This 
means viewing 'Tom believes (Cicero denounced Catiline)' no longer 
as of the form 'Fab' with a = Tom and b = (Cicero denounced Catiline), 
but rather of the form 'Fa' with a = Tom and complex 'F'. The verb 
'believes' here ceases to be a term and becomes part of an operator 
'believes that' or 'believes ( )', which, applied to a sentence,
produces a composite absolute general term whereof the sentence is 
counted an immediate constituent. **
Bruce Aune in Chapter 8 of his Knowledge. Mind and Nature, *** suggests
on similar lines that we oan think of assertions, beliefs etc. not as
putting the subject in relation with some Platonic object, but rather as
complex activities of the subject; in his account we reduce 'Tom asserted
that snow is white' to something like 'Tom snow-is-whited assertingly'.
* P 315
’* Word and Ob.ieot. Cambridge, Mass. 1964, p 216
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Elsewhere''1 Aune had suggested that the objects of mental acts are purely 
nominal, having no more substantial reality than the objects of other 
activities such as skating, smiling or handshaking.
The trouble with proposals such as Quine's if - as they surely are - 
they are offered as analyses of the logical form of belief attitudes 
(rather than solely as indications of the subordinate status of the 
objects of propositional attitudes), is that they conoeal what may be an 
important aspect of the structure of belief, because each different 
belief will have to be represented by a different operator, it will not 
be clear that all the attitudes in question are attitudes of belief.
Such an analysis would not show how we could understand any sentence of 
the form 'a believes p' provided only we understand 'a believes (that)...' 
and any sentence represented by 'b' - not an unreasonable requirement for 
any analysis of belief.**
Aune's proposal might escape the above objection but both it and 
Quine' 3 can be criticised on the following grounds, developed by 
Davidson.* *''* In introducing semantically unstructured one-place predicates 
or operators as the objects of propositional attitudes, certain problems 
regarding these objects may be solved, but only at the expense of the 
theory of truth. If language, though consisting in an indefinitely large 
number of sentences, is comprehended by creatures with finite powers, we 
must be able to show how the semantic character (its truth/falsity) of 
each sentence is composed by a finite number of applications of a finite 
number of devices on a finite vocabulary. Davidson argues that this can 
be done by recursively characterising the truth predicate a la Tarski:
* Statements and Propositions', Nous, Vol.l, 1967, pp 215-229
** c.f. Geach, Mental Acts, pp 7-10 and 49
*** c.f. 'On Saying That' in ",'ords and Objections, edited by 
D. Davidson and <J. Hintikka, Dordrecht, 1969, pp 158-174
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For each sentence s, s is true, if and only if..... . The blank is
filled by the sentence in the metalanguage that is true if and only if a 
is true in the object language. In so far as proposals such as those 
offered by Quine and Aune give us an indefinite number of primitive terms 
they do not permit natural languages to be described by a finite theory; 
they obliterate rather than reveal the structure needed by the theory of 
truth. Tarski's convention barring any theory containing an infinite 
number of primitive terms, which is clearly broken in these cases was 
intended to prevent such abolition of structure.
Although there are formal reasons for rejecting the belief- 
constructions proposed by Quine and Aune, we can agree with the 
intuition that prompted them - that the objects of belief are dependent 
for their existence on believers. We shall attempt to show further that 
their interpretation has to be linked to the understanding of the 
believers. Nonetheless their interpretation is still based on the normal 
semantic structure of the sentences in which they are expressed. In 
fact, our insistence on saying that propositions rather than the concrete 
sentences or statements a man assents to are the objects of belief is not 
a claim that such sentences or statements do not have their normal 
semantic structure. It is, rather, a warning against drawing the normal 
extensional conclusions from this structure independently of whether the 
believer could or would do this himself, and thinking that we still 
thereby give a true account of his belief, as well as a reminder not to 
interpret the meanings of a man's beliefs independently of his conceptual 
background. But this is to anticipate; we must now show why we cannot 
think of the concrete sentences or statements a man assents to as the 
objects of his belief.
Sentences and Statements as the Objects of 3elief
At first sight, it would seem a good deal more attractive to think
of the objects of belief a3 sentences in direct speech. £ven though 
we would have to introduce a dispositional account of the sentences concerned, 
because a man does not actually utter all he believes, a sentential account 
of belief would avoid the problems raised elusiveness of propositions - 
for which there is no very clear criterion of identity. The notion 
of a proposition is presumably based on a putative abstraction of a 
'meaning element' from the sentences of direct speech (which is perhaps 
why Wittgenstein says that to assume a pure intermediary between the 
propositional signs and the facts is to set off on the pursuit of a 
chimera) .*
'tie might make a start by saying that what a man believes are those 
sentences which he does actually sincerely assent to, or would sincerely 
assent to if isked.** A problem arises immediately because a sentence 
sincerely uttered by someone may not include any mention of factors such 
s the time or pi .ce of utterance, the person oei.ig spoken to nd so on, 
aid these factors ere often integral to the belief. A man may assent to 
a p rticul .r sentence-token on one occasion of its utterance, end, without 
either changing his mind or being in any way inconsistent dissent from the 
same sentence-token on another occasion. In order to meet this difficulty, 
i , /. 0. ^uine once considered tc-king as the objects of belief eternal 
sentences 'whose truth value stays fixed through time and from speaker to 
speaker'; these sentences could include reports and predictions of single 
specific events »here these events ire 'objectively indicated rather than 
left to vary with the references of first names, incomplete descriptions, 
and indicator w o r d s ' . T h e  trouble with treating such sentences as 
the objects of belief is that as they give a complete, observer-independent 
account of the event or state of affairs believed in, they would leave no
' Philo s o^hjs ai_ ÏQYS § tic.iiag 3.» P h h
** though there may be problems in knowing just 
disposed to ssent to, c.f. below p 80
ford and Objeot,p 19>+
what a m .n would be
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room for many belief situations, where a man assents to something quite 
vague and indeterminate (and perhaps even fails to assent to it when a 
completer description is suggested). Thus I might believe that I saw 
a man who looked like the suspect leave the bank at some time yesterday 
afternoon, but be unable to say at precisely what time I thought I saw 
him. If one were to change the concept of an eternal sentence from 
that which gives an objectively complete specification of what is believed, 
to that which represents completely what is in the mind of the believer, 
there would be no difference between them and what we call propositions.
But as Quine's eternal sentences transcend what is in the mind of the 
believer, they cannot be regarded as the objects of actual beliefs, though 
they might be taken to be the objects of ideally specified and qualified 
beliefs.
Presumably, the objection to propositions that tells us not to 
look for some abstract meaning behind the spoken words applies to 
eternal sentences as well. It is obvious, however, that some means of 
including a reference to the context of the words must be devised in order 
that one should be able to think of the objects of beliefs as sentences 
the believer would be disposed sincerely to assent to. A move is made 
in this direction by P. F. Strawson's theory of statements. In 
Introduction to Logical Theory .^ Strawson points out that the same 
sentence token may be used at different times and places and by different 
people to express quite different states of affairs. The truth value of 
the sentence often depends on the circumstances of its utterance. He 
thus suggests that we think of truth-bearers as sentences actually in use, 
whose truth value depends on the context of utterance (person, time and 
place of utterance) a3 well as on the actual words used. These truth- 
bearers he calls statements: 'a particular statement is identified, not 
only by reference to the words used, but also by reference to the
London 1952
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circumstances in which they are used, and, sometimes, to the identity 
of the person using them', * We might then think of the objects of a 
man's beliefs as statements he is disposed to assent to, interpreting 
the context of utterance to be added to the actual words as strictly or 
as loosely as he himself would do. Assuming that this could be done 
(though delineating the context thought by the believer to be relevant 
might obviously involve us in intensional manoeuvres, which would defeat 
our present object, which is to give a purely extensional account of the 
objects of beliefs), there are still difficulties in thinking of the 
objects of a man's beliefs in terms of the sentences or statements he is 
disposed to assent to. For his own understanding and interpretation of 
the sentences or statements he is disposed to assent to are relevant to 
hi3 beliefs in two crucial respects.
In the first place, suppose that we find that a man is disposed to 
assent to a certain sentence or statement, p. How are we to think of 
the words of p? What we will now show is that even if the believer is 
consistent in his beliefs, we cannot think of the words of p obeying the 
normal rules of quantificational logic and undergoing the permitted 
transformations and yet continuing necessarily to give a true account of 
the man's belief. Certain logical consequences of the sentences a man 
believes are blocked by his understanding of his beliefs, but short of 
knowing everything that he thinks, there is no systematic way of knowing 
which consequences are permitted and which blocked. In particular, 
substitution of identicals may fail to preserve truth value of belief 
reports. The classic instance here is when Tom believes that Cicero 
denounced Catiline, he fails to believe that Tully denounced Catiline.
If normal substitution of identicals held here we should have to say that 
Tom was contradicting himself. But, as he is ignorant of the identity,
p A, c.f. also, pp 17A-6
there are no good grounds for saying this. All we can say here is that 
Tom believes that Cicero did denounce Catiline and that he believes that 
Tully did not; but that, though he does not realise it, the two are the 
same person. This is one way of bringing out what is called the 
referential opacity which attends belief statements.
Contexts are generally declared referentially opaque within which 
normal existential generalisation and substitution of identicals fail to 
preserve truth value. Belief sentences, as we have just shown, provide 
such contexts. However, as Quine 3hows in 'Quantifiers and Propositional 
Attitudes'*, totally to reject quantification in such contexts makes it 
impossible to distinguish between two sentences which are distinct in 
meaning in important ways:
(1) / (Ex) (Ralph believes x is a spy)
(2) Ralph believes (Ex) (x is a spy)
(2) is innocuous from a quantificational point of view, but is hardly 
urgent enough if it is intended to tell us that Ralph actually has 
someone in mind as a spy - for example, a suspicious type in a brown hat, 
whose name, unknown to Ralph, is Ortcutt. Ralph in fact knows this 
Ortcutt in other circumstances as a respectable man. (2) would be true 
of any one who believed that there were some spies in the world. (l)/ 
preserves the required sense of urgency, but must be considered as ill 
fonned (hence the /), because it fails to preserve truth value if we 
substitute as a value of x 'Ortcutt' (whom Ralph does not believe to be
a spy) for 'the man in the brown hnt'.
In order to salvage the sense of (l)/, which he calls the 
'relational' sense of belief, Quine proposes that we think of this type 
of belief as involving a triadic relationship between the believer, the 
object and an intension. (l)jrf then becomes:
(3) (Ex) (Ralph believes y (y is a spy) of x)
Quine thought that an idiom such as (3) would save the relational sense
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* Tlie ys of h ra iox. Mew York, 1966, pp 183-19R
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of belief because the crucial term is put in a purely referential 
position, but thst it would avoid the problems raised by quantification 
because the intention was to be regarded as opaque - that is, there was 
a rule against quantifying into it.
However, in addition to leaving us with ontologically obscure 
intensions, as Quine admitted*, this construction is open to the 
following type of objection, first proposed by R. Sleigh in 'On 
Quantifying into Epistemic Contexts', * that in Quine'3 system (3) could 
be derived from
(4) Ralph believes that the oldest spy is a spy
even though in this case, Ralph has no one under suspicion. For (4) to 
be true, it is necessary only that Ralph believes that there are spies and 
that no two births are quite simultaneous. If (3) can be derived from
(4) , and Quine admits that it can***, given that the intermediary
(5) Ralph believes of the oldest spy that he is a spy
follows from (4), then the difference in sense between (l)^ and (2) - just 
what our (3)-type construction was designed to preserve - is glossed over 
once more. One could of course block the move from (4) to (5), but if 
one does, then (3) will not follow from the sentence that Ralph believes 
some definite person is a spy.
David Kaplan**** *attempts to solve this problem by means of a 
construction which will block the type of inference from (4) to (3) via 
(5) in cases where the believer has in mind no particular individual he 
can specify as the object of his belief. His idea is that as Quine's 
proposal puts Ralph 'en rapport with an excess of individuals'**••* we 
must limit the names of persons on which we are allowed to base (3)-type
* op cit. p 191
** Hous, Vol I, 1967, pp 23-31
.* c<,f, '.7ord3 and Objections, pp 337-8
*"** in 'Quantifying In', in V<ords .-aid objections, pp 206-242
***** p 222
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constructions to  those with which the b e liev er  i s  genuinely en rapport
Kaplan diagnoses the fundamental weakness of Quine'3 proposal as lying 
in its failure to allot to Ralph's understanding and beliefs any signifi­
cant role in establishing the relation between the name and the object or 
person named. His solution in essence is to allow us to export as in (3) 
only when the name of the person or object named is a name of that object 
or person in some significant sense for the believer.
Kaplan turns his attention to restricting the sort of name on the 
basis of which we might export as in (3) so that we might derive a 
(3)-type construction from 'the suspicious man in the brown hat', but not 
from 'the oldest spy', assuming of course that the believer has no one 
in mind as being the oldest spy. Kaplan's proposal is to allow exporta­
tion just in case
(6) Ko (R ( tx , Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph believes « is a spy")
'R (<s , Ortcutt, Ralph)' symbolises 'a represents Ortcutt to Ralph'.
The name a. represents x to Ralph if and only if (i) denotes x,
(ii) d is a name of x for Ralph and, (iii) 0. is sufficiently vivid for 
Ralph.* In our story, a would be 'the suspicious man in the brown hat'. 
Condition (i) ensures that there is such a person, while conditions (ii) 
and (iii) ensure that he has made some mark on Ralph and that the mark he 
has made has given Ralph some quite solid conception of him. Y/hether or 
not these conditions can be made sufficiently exact, they are certainly 
quite reasonable requirements to make before we can say that there is 
someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy.
Kaplan's device of vivid names is of interest for us as it points to 
an irreducibly intensional element in belief statements. If it were 
possible to develop the device in any systematic way, it might be possible 
to say that in a system of consistent and rational beliefs if a believed 
phi of x, where x was for a a vivid name of someone or something (who 
in this case need not actually exist), and if y was for a a vivid name of
79
the same person or object, then a would, at least if asked, assent to 
phi of y. But though of interest, such a solution would hardly help 
an extensional account of the objects of belief, as to know if a is a 
vivid name of cc for a believer we will have to know what is in the mind 
of the believer concerning x and a .
It should hardly need pointing out that even if we can develop 
some sort of system for deciding what substitutions of singular terms 
are permissible in belief statements - given that this is possible by 
using some intensional notion like that of vivid names - this system would 
preserve the truth value of these statements only given that the believer 
was consistent and within the necessary limits, perspicuous. As regards 
what is psychologically possible, find what therefore might be true of a 
believer, a, Israel Scheffler is surely right when he points out that 
any suggestion that a must believe some sentence other than p, which he 
assents to, would be too wide for some cases, even though the new 
sentence p+i was clearly synonymous with or easily derivable in a small 
number of steps from p0*
Of course, we might want to show a that his belief that p is in fact
equivalent to a belief that p+i, and that there was thus a sense in which
he did indeed believe p+i, in order to get him to develop a better system
of beliefs.** However, the considerations outlined above should make
us careful of attributing beliefs to a man and of assessing the truth
value of reports of his beliefs without knowing what he actually thinks.
:’!e cannot assume that a man holds what follows even by relations of
synonymy or strict logical implication or substitution of identicals from
sentences he is actually disposed to assent to. At the same time, he
would take us to be very obtuse if we failed to attribute to him belief
in sentences which seemed to him to follow from or to be reasonably
* c.f. 'On Synonymy and Indirect Discourse', Philosophy of Science. Vol.22,
1955, pp 39-44
V¥ c.f. Chapter 7 below
equivalent to what he assented to. It would be wrong to think of the 
content of a belief statement as 'semantically inert' (to use a phrase 
of Davidson) and unrelated to any other sentence. We expect a man to 
assent to some of the consequences of the sentences he actually assents 
to, but there seems to be no logically rigourous way of predicting just 
which ones he will assent to. Given this and given that it is not 
possible for an individual to make explicit everything he believes, a 
Certain indeterminacy enters the notion of those sentences or statements 
a man is disposed to assent to. We may discover some of those he 
actually assents to and build hypotheses about what he would be disposed 
to assent to on the basis of these and what we know of his rationality, 
and other relevant factors, but unless we could read his mind, or check 
on his view at every point, which would not be even logically possible if 
he were dead, for example, we could not be certain what he would be 
disposed to assent to.
Referential opacity and the failure of the ordinary logical relation­
ships between sentences in belief contexts suggests that the objects of 
a man's beliefs are best thought of not simply in terms of sentences and 
their implications, but also in terms of the sense the believer reads 
into the sentences he uses and assents to because this sense does not 
follow necessarily the ordinary logical sense of these sentences. This 
is the first main reason why we wish to speak of propositions as the 
objects of belief, to focus concentration of the meaning intended by the 
believer over and above his actual words. Before giving an account of 
these 'propositions' we will turn to the second reason against thinking 
of the objects of a man's beliefs as the sentences he assents to. This 
is basically because there are many cases where giving the same words or 
agreed translations of the words used by the believer might to someone 
else at a different time and place actually distort the belief, if for
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the second person the words have different implications.
In order to give the true sense of what a man believes, it could be
necessary actually to depart from his words,, This explains why there
will often be a certain indeterminacy in assessing the truth of reports
of beliefs, which will not necessarily be resolved by insisting on a
slavish adherence to the words that were or which might have been used.
As Quine says, to give a report of what a man believes, as opposed to
quoting or translating his actual words (which can be done automatically
and without understanding them), involves an essentially dramatic act.* *
To a large extent, the value of reports about people's beliefs will
depend on how successfully they manage to reconstruct the believer's
state of mind. In the case of distant peoples, to repeat, even in
accurate translation, the words they use may convey little or nothing
of the sense of their beliefs, or may even be misleading about them. One
does not need to delve very deeply into anthropology to see this. To
take a case, well known to philosophers, Seneca is said to have believed
a sentence which translates into English as 'man is a rational animal'.
A modern understanding of these words would almost certainly take them
to imply some thesis to the effect that we can regulate our behaviour
according to rational norms. For Seneca, however, human activity was
determined, .and rationality seems to involve simply adopting the right
interior attitude to what has to be; Seneca may have been basing his
belief on the common classical conception of rationality as consisting
t*largely in fcAwe human ability engage in argument and make speeches. So 
A ^
here we have three different ideas, all conveyed by the same words. 
Concentration on what might be called the proposition intended by Seneca 
rather than on the dictionary equivalent of his words will enable us to 
avoid many possible errors in thi3 area.
T. S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific 'evolutions"* gives an
* c.f. Toad and Ob.ject. p 219
** Chicago, 1962
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interesting example of how a scientific concept, that of an element, 
despite being defined in the same terms, has had different meanings 
in different systems. Kuhn says that the definition found in contempo­
rary textbooks i3 found in Boyle'3 Sceptical Chymist. where in fact it 
was presented, correctly, as a paraphrase of the traditional concept, in 
order to argue that no such thing existed.
Boyle's definition, in particular, can be traced back at least 
to Aristotle and forward through Lavoisier into modern texts.
Yet that is not to say that science has possessed the modern 
concept of an element since antiquity.
Kuhn goes on to show that verbal definitions in science are little more
than pedagogic aids, and have no significance outside the scientific
context in which they play a part. Boyle
by changing the relation of 'element' to chemical manipulation and 
chemical theory, transformed the notion into a tool quite different 
from what it had been before find transformed both chemistry and the 
chemist's world in the process. Other revolutions, including the 
one that centres around Lavoisier, were required to give the 
concept its modern form and function.*
Of course, it is, according to Kuhn, the fact that the verbal form of the
definition has remained pretty constant through these changes that the
misleading impression can be given in scientific textbooks that chemistry
has constantly worked with the same concept, when in fact the concept has
undergone several radical changes.
It is commonplace that in interpreting literary passages too 'we may 
discover that in the context in question the words have an unusual and 
even a new meaning'.** As we shall show when we give a positive account 
of what we mean by 'proposition' we need here too to concentrate on the 
meaning rather than the actual words assented to. In suggesting that 
strict adherence to the words used to express beliefs may often give 
quite a misleading impression as to the content of the belief, we feel we 
have stronger reason for looking for a proposition or 'meaning' element
* pp lifl-2
** Quotation from Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p 379
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behind the sentence or statement assented to than the somewhat contrived
argument of Church to the same effect.* He says that we should not think
of concrete sentences as the objects of belief statements because of the
theoretical possibility that any quoted expression in one language might
be of the same form as an expression in another language which meant
something different. Thus we could not conclude that because Seneca
wrote with assertive intent the words 'Rationale enim animal est homo'
that he believed that man is a rational animal unless we had some
additional information about the languages being used. We might then
offer un analysis of 'Seneca said that man is a rational animal', (7) :
'There is a language S' such that Seneca wrote as a sentence of S' words
whose translation from S' into English is 'Man is a rational animal' '.
But, according to Church, even this is inadequate as the proposed
analysis because to conclude from it that Seneca thought that man wa3 a
rational animal, we have to make use of
the item of factual information, not contained in (it), that
'Man is a rutional animal' me.ins in English that man is a rational
animal.**
This inadequacy is highlighted if we translate (7) into German, for 
according to the convention whereby occurrences of quoted expressions 
in texts remain untranslated in translations of those texts, the quotation 
'Man is a rational animal' will stay in English, and the information given 
to a German who knows no English will not be the same as by the German 
translation of the original sentence of which (7) was offered as an 
analysis. So even if we were able to give an adequate characterisation 
of a language without covertly using notions such as the meaning of 
sentences, and so satisfy the implicit requirements of the first part of 
the argument, (as the general aim is to give a non-intensionul account of
* A. Church, 'On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief',
•s in Philosophy nd Analysis, ed. M. M; cdonald, Oxford, 1934, pp 125-8
** p 126
belief) the logical conventions relating to quotation would, in the 
second part of the argument block the attempt to analyse belief objects 
in terms of concrete sentences rather than in terms of propositions.
Two of the cornerstones of Church’s argument have been challenged 
by Geach.* First, once Church has admitted the possibility of the same 
words having different meanings in English and in some hypothetical 
other language, no means to eradicate such possible ambiguity could be 
theoretically sufficient, as all the expressions we may use to specify 
the languages concerned could themselves occur in another language with 
a different meaning, and so on in infinitum. So, as a theoretical 
objection, there is no answer to it; it need hardly be said that the 
danger of such ambiguity over very long expressions at least is not a 
very real one as far as actual spoken languages are concerned. Hence 
leach's conclusion, that to this alleged ambiguity, no provision is 
theoretically sufficient, nor any practically necessary. leach's second 
point is to question the refusal to translate quoted utterances.
Certainly, if such quotation were permitted, Church's argument would lose 
its force.
Church's .arguments have been discussed here at some length, because 
it is important to realise that the reasons advanced here against treating 
concrete sentences or statements as the objects of belief, although in 
part connected with problems of translation of beliefs are essentially 
different from his (and so are not touched by Geach's counter-arguments).
In Churoh's article, it is taken for granted that there is a reasonable 
equivalence between what we mean by 'Man is a rational animal' and 
Seneca's'Rationale enim animal est homo', and it is because of this that 
the discussion gets underway. What is being stressed here is that such 
an assumption is premature, even though by any ordinary theory of sentence 
translation, the two sentences are equivalent. For in order to understand
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Seneca's belief, we will have to get behind his actual words to discover 
just what he meant by the idea of a rational animal, and, in all probabi­
lity, this will not be possible by simple comparison of lexical entries.
The fact that the words used in expressions of belief may give a 
false impression of the sense of a belief, together with the failure of 
ordinary logical relationships in belief statements, which we have examined 
in detail in the case of failure of substitution of identicals, but which 
applies equally to substitution of synonymous sentences for the actual 
sentences used, seem to us conclusive against thinking of the objects of 
belief simply in terms of sentences or statements people utter sincerely 
or are disposed to assent to. Indeed, it could be argued that, failing 
a definite interpretation of the sentences actually assented to, which 
does not seem possible without bringing in the thoughts as well as the 
words of the believer, we can have no precise idea of what sentences or 
statements a man would be disposed to assent to. 'Ve will now make our 
suggestions as to how one should think of the objects of belief.
A Regulative kole for Propositions
The problem is, as Kaplan hinted, to relate the objects of belief to 
the believer's understanding. Of course, when a man says that he
believes that.... . what follows 'that' will be a sentence, end our
interpretation of the sentence will be the one demanded by our normal 
syntactic and semantic rules. The difficulties arise because applica­
tion of these rules may not, in many cases, give a completely correct 
impression of what the speaker is attempting to express by his words, even 
though he does not use the words in a bizarre or deviant fashion. Tie 
have already seen two important way3 in which the words of a belief 
expression although used and interpreted quite correctly, may fail to 
convey the sense of the belief. This is obviously a problem for the 
understanding of beliefs rather than that of language.
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’That we are suggesting in speaking of propositions rather than sentences 
or statements as the objects of belief is first, that whatever extra- 
linguistic information about the context of utterance is relevant to the 
belief should be added to the sentence or statement assented to. (This 
is probably already contained in the notion of a statement). But then, 
further, we invoke the notion of a proposition here to remind hearers that 
they should attempt to place same interpretation on the actual words 
assented to that the believer is giving to those words. 'He have seen 
how this interpretation can be something behind the words - that is, not 
made clear explicitly or even implicitly in the words. To think in this 
sense of the proposition that a believes rather than his actual words will 
act as a kind of regulative notion, particularly in giving reports of a's 
belief in times and in languages vastly different from his own.
Of course, there may be many purely factual beliefs which can easily 
be translated straight from one language or culture to another, but 
concentration on the sense and content of distant beliefs, rather than on 
their expression, may help to avoid gross misunderstandings of the sort 
perpetrated by some nineteenth century colonial administrators and 
missionaries. How successful one is in getting at the sense of the beliefs 
of other cultures will depend ultimately on one's ability to reconstruct 
a foreign state of mind. As Quine says of indirect quotation, where 
one attempts to give the sense rather than the exact words of another 
person's utterance
we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indica­
tions, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, and then 
we say what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us in the 
state thus feigned... Casting our real selves thus in unreal roles, 
we do not generally know how much reality to hold constant. Quandries 
arise. *
And we have no exact means of determining the exact solution to these 
quandries. Unlike the giving of direct quotation, there is in saying
" 'ord .nd Object, p 219
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what a man believes or thinks, no determinate standard which can be 
appealed to to settle ambiguities and doubts.
'.7e have been appealing to 'propositions’ precisely to keep a place 
for ambiguities of interpretation behind actual speech dispositions. It 
should not need saying that this is just about the reverse of the classical 
sense of 'proposition', which looked for an impersonal determinate meaning, 
rather than the possibility of an indeterminable or, at least, believer- 
dependent interpretation behind the words a man used. (7/e use the same 
term because of the importance of going behind the words). Propositions 
in our sense thus play a regulative rather than a constitutive role in 
translation and interpretation of beliefs. 7i’e are not suggesting that 
they are linguistically neutral, or fixed and timelessly non-ambiguous, 
expressible equally well in any language. Propositions in our sense are 
quite neutral as far as Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation 
is concerned, as we are not suggesting that meaning itself is non- 
linguistio, but only that the content of a man's beliefs cannot always be 
fully determined by the meaning of the words he uses to express his beliefs.
In fact, even though we are suggesting that we must attempt to go 
behind a man's words in order to understand his beliefs, we do not mean 
to imply that it will always be possible, even in theory, to give a final 
and determinate account of just what it is that a man believes in any 
particular case. This follows from taking the man's understunding of his
words into account as the believer himself nay have no very clear idea 
of what it is that he is assenting to. Indeed, as James F. Thomson points 
out* in the event of an ambiguity in the sentence assented to being 
noticed only afterwards by the person who assented to it, there is no 
reason to suppose that the person in question must be able to look back 
and say which part of the ambiguity he was intending to assent to. Someone
* in 'Truth-bearers and the Ti’ouble about Propositions', Journal of 
hhilosophy. Voi. 66, I969, pp 737-747
87
who believes that propositions are timeless and non-ambiguous truth- 
bearers will have to say that the man in the example assented to one of 
two propositions, Pi and Pii, though admitting that there is no way of 
ensuring which it was. 3ut, as Thomson argues, there is no need to
accept this description; there was nothing in or about the situation to 
make it the case that either Pi or Pii was asserted.
Such indeterminacy in a man's beliefs does not argue against our 
theory of propositions. Indeed, it is quite compatible with what we 
have Deen saying, which amounts to saying that we should try to under­
stand a man's beliefs just a3 he understands them, because his own under­
standing may be quite indeterminate between two possible understandings 
of his words. Our report of his belief in this case, far from saying 
that he must have believed one thing or the other, should try to reproduce 
the ambiguity.
In future, then, when we say that a believes p, 'p' must be taken 
to stand for the proposition intended by a. This is because, although 
p will always be expressed in a concrete sentence or statement and be 
based on the actual words, it does not always seem possible to give a 
fi ir or accurate account of a belief simply in terms of the concrete 
sentences or statements the believer actually used or might have used, had 
he expressed his belief in words. In particular, the phenomena of 
referential opacity and the subtleties required to give reports and trans­
lations of beliefs underline the need to base accounts of a man's beliefs 
on what he himself takes the words he uses to signify, over and above the 
standard interpretation and logical consequences of those words. It is 
this need which we hope to underline in saying that the objects of belief 
must be thought of as propositions.
Finally, in tying down the idea of propositions to actual beliefs, 
we at least put the problem about the criterion of identity of propositions
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one stage further back, for we can simply say that there are as many 
propositions as there are beliefs, and that two people believe the 
same proposition when they have the same belief. '.Whether two people in 
fact have the same belief con often be determined by seeing whether they 
assent to the same sentence or statement, but what we have tried to show 
here is that such a test is not infallible, because there is frequently 
some particular sense or implication behind the words in which a man 
might express his beliefs, which is not revealed by the words themselves, 
such that assent by two people to the same sentence or statement might 
not entail that they had the same belief.
Part 2 - Moral Beliefs
People often speak of their beliefs not permitting them to do certain 
actions, or of inducing them to think of certain acts as duties and so on. 
They say that they believe that it is right or good to do certain actions, 
wrong or immoral to do others. Probably together with religious belief, 
with which such attitudes are often closely connected, a man will think 
of his moral views us constituting his 'beliefs'. In a pre-reflective 
use of the term, there can be no objection to this. These attitudes are 
mong the most cherished a man hits, as well as the most personal. They 
are what he feels most responsibility for himself. Compared to factual 
belief's, which are often mundane and taken for granted, moral and religious 
attitudes alone qualify as beliefs with a large 'B'.
The epistemological status of moral judgments is, of course, a 
subject of considerable controversy. If, however, moral judgments are 
neither true nor false, us is asserted by non-cognitive theories of ethics, 
it is clear that we cannot speak of moral oellefs. in the sense in which 
we have been discussing belief, as the attitude appropriate to what is 
true. \'le will now look briefly at some non-cognitivist theories of 
ethics to see what becomes of the concept of a moral belief or of an
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ethical proposition, and then go on to suggest that even if there nay be 
a factual basis to value systems (including religion), non-cognitivist 
theories of ethjcs are correct to point to the fact that to adopt a certain 
system of values is to do something more than to assent to a number of 
factual propositions.
As we have seen in the first part of this chapter propositions are 
considered to be truth-bearers of some sort, such that if they are true, 
they describe what is empirically so. If we do not think that ethical 
principles are assertions of fact, then perhaps we should try to develop 
a theory similar to that proposed by W. H, P. 3arnes in an article 
entitled 'Ethics Without Propositions' . * dames thinks of ethical 
principles as affirmations of attitude, attempting to show that as they 
are arrived at neither by deduction nor induction, they cannot be factual 
assertions, (in fact, of course, a plausible argument can be given to 
show that it is impossible for any factual assertion to be arrived at by 
either induction or deduction), Barnes regards ethical attitudes as 
provisional and corrigible, but, perhaps perversely from our point of 
view, tries to make out a sense in which ethical statements can be called 
true or false. His point here is that in making a moral judgment, we 
claim that our decision will commend itself to anyone who considers all 
the relevant facts from a moral point of view, and allows them to register 
on his moral sensibility. So
In a somewhat special sense of verifiable or unverii'iable, I could
hold that the (ethical) statement was verified or falsified according
as this claim was verified or falsified. **
Assiuning that it is possible to determine the demands of moral sensibi­
lity, it would be ultimately a matter of fact as to whether on action was 
good or bad, and so ethics would not really be non-cognitivist; but the
* SPAS, Vol. 22, 19/fS, pp 1-3 0
** p 27
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problem is to determine the demands of moral sensibility, as not all 
people's moral sensibilities agree. But 3ames does not accept that 
mere disagreement must necessarily falsify the claim he makes when 
expressing a moral judgment, for the sensibility of his critic might be 
undeveloped. But what is the criterion of a developed moral sensibility? 
Either there is one, in which ca3e, morality is ultimately heteronomous 
aid factual, as its task consists in seeing whether moral judgments 
correspond to what the developed sensibility demands at the time in 
question, or there is no such criterion, in which case, Barnes has no 
grounds for talking about the truth or falsity of ethical judgments, 
even in a 'somewhat special sense'.*
Another non-cognitivist approach to ethics miles out talk of moral 
beliefs altogether. It is that proposed by C. L. Stevenson in his book 
ethics and L' .nguage.** In the first chapter, Stevenson actually discusses 
the nature of ethical agreement and disagreement by asking whether ethical 
disagreements should be thought of ns disagreements in belief. Although 
he concedes that ¿any cognitive matters - the proper objects of belief - 
are relevant to ethical decisions, he thinks that fundamentally disagree­
ments in ethics are not disagreements in belief:
In normative ethics, any description of what is the case is attended 
by considerations of what is to be felt and done about it; the 
beliefs that are in question are preparatory to guiding or redirecting 
attitudes. Moral judgments are concerned with recom...endin/; some­
thing for approval or disapproval... In this way, moral judgments 
go beyond cognition, speaking to the conative-affective natures of 
men.***
Thus, despite a practical interdependence between cognitive beliefs and 
ethical attitudes, in theory it is possible for two people to agree on all 
relevant beliefs and yet to have a major difference on the ethics of the 
situation. So Stevenson, accepting that beliefs always involve us in taking
* for another, though somewhat different, reason for not talking about 
'propositions’ of ethics, c.f. L. 'Yittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
PhJlosophious. London, 19 6 3, Section ->.42.
New Haven, 1944
*** p 13
something to be true, is prepared to rule out talk of ethical beliefs.
This is consistent with, and required by his theory, which maintains that 
ethical discourse is emotive, not cognitive.
One of the most highly developed accounts of moral discourse recently 
to appear is that given by R. M. Hare*. Hare does not explicitly discuss 
the question of moral beliefs, but we can infer that he would rule out 
the notion, oecause he holds that moral terms are characteristically 
'prescriptive'. Although this does not mean that moral language can be 
reduced to simple imperatives, it does mean that moral judgments entail 
imperatives, on which the holder of the judgment, if sincere, must in 
appropriate circumstances, act. His stress on the essence of moral 
judgments being to commit the holder to certain actions presents him with 
difficulties when faced with the problem of weakness of will, while his 
system seems to provide no possibility of refuting the fanatic who is 
prepared to act on his values, even when it goes radically against his own 
interests. Accepting or rejecting a moral judgment is, for Hare, being 
prepared to act on it or against it in relevant circumstances, and to 
require that any person in similar circumstances should do the same.
Ivan though my prescription may be formally inconsistent with your3, 
there is no sense for Hare in which one is true and the other false.
Hare holds this because he thinks that the realm of morals and values is 
ultimately divorced from the realm of facts, and that two different types 
of judgment are at stake here. Hence his attempt to give a completely 
.ostract characterisation of the moral judgment, in terms of its structure 
and logical properties, without regard for its content. Clearly talk of 
moral beliefs, in our sense of the word 'belief', is once more ruled out.
An interesting sidelight on Hare's ideas on ethics, which is 
relevant to this discussion of moral beliefs, and which will allow us to
* c.f. his Language of Morals. Oxford, 1952 and Rive com :.nd He 'son.
Oxford, 1963
consider value systems generally, is to be found in his contribution to 
the University discussion in the symposium New Assays in Philosophical 
Theology.* There Hare introduces the notion of a blik to explain how 
it is that people can agree on the relevant facts in a given case, and 
yet differ in their general beliefs about it. This is intended as a 
reply to Flew's challenge in the same discussion, in which he asks the 
religious believer to produce some fact which is entailed by belief in 
God and denied by disbelief.
Hare selects three beliefs as examples of bliks: l) a madman's idea 
that all Oxford dons are out to murder him, 2) Hare's own belief in the 
reliability of his steering wheel, and 3) a general religious belief. 
Although Hare subsumes all three examples under the general concept of 
blik. all this does is to obscure some rather important differences 
between the first two cases and the third. He seems to imply that in 
the first two cases, it is open logically to a man to choose the attitude 
he takes up to dons and steering wheels, and that abnormal attitudes are 
permitted because they may be compatible with any finite number of tests. 
Of the steering wheel, he says:
I just have a blik about steel and its properties, so that normally 
I trust the steering of my car; but I find it not at all difficult 
to imagine what it would be like to lose this blik and acquire the 
opposite one. **
The reason for this is that one can never be certain the steel is all 
right. But Hare cannot conclude from this that it is just as rational 
^  to believe that steel is a safe component of steering wheels, as to 
disbelieve it. He is playing on the idea that the hypothesis about the 
reliability of steel can never be conclusively verified (and may 
occasionally actually be falsified); but we can still take it as being 
rationally and empirically more acceptable than mistrust of steel because
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it is better corroborated and has survived a greater number of possible 
falsifications.
This being so, the bliks of both the madman and the man who does not 
believe in his steering wheel can be rejected on rational grounds, however 
strongly and consistently some individuals may hang on to them. Hare 
cannot conclude that adoption of these beliefs about the ordinary world 
is ultimately a matter of arbitrary choice, governed by no rational 
considerations, just because a complete justification of them i3 not 
possible, (in fact, as we show in Chapter 7, no factual belief can be 
completely justified; we attempt to show there that this need not lead 
to despair about rationality).
Hare's examples of bliks are supposed to concern cases where some 
sort of evaluation is concerned (though the sort of evaluation Hare has 
in mind does not seem to be involved in his first two cases). What he 
seems to be suggesting is that bliks - value judgments, by which he 
includes religion - cannot be discussed in cognitive terms, because they 
are compatible with any empirical state of affairs. The religious 
hypothesis that everything has a reason, like its contradictory, belief 
in pure chance, are beliefs with no assertions; not only do they not 
forbid anything, but they do not enable us to 'explain or predict or 
plan anything'.* What religious beliefs do, according to Hare, is not 
to say anything factual or empirical, but to produce an attitude or frame 
of mind in their holders. If there is no chance of them being true or 
false, clearly they are not beliefs in the sense we suggested in 
Chapter 3. To have a certain religious viewpoint (including, presumably 
atheism) is to take up a certain attitude to the world. Instead of 
believing thu.t certain historical or cosmological fact3 are the case, 
wlvt for Hare differentiates religious people from non-religious people
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is basically a difference of attitude to the world; there are two 
different systems of value here.
Although we do not share Hare's complete separation of values and 
attitudes from facts in either moral or religious systems, and although 
it might be possible to hold individual moral beliefs in isolation from 
a complete way of looking at the world, Hare's theory of bilks does 
suggest fin important aspect of belief in such systems or ideologies; 
for to believe in Christianity or Marxism or utilitarianism, for example, 
cannot be reduced simply to the acceptance of a number of discrete propo­
sitions or elements. Over and above the doctrinal core (whether or not 
this is factual), holding such systems involves accepting certain methods 
of looking at problems and criteria for judging and acting, a combination 
of thinking and active intervention as a means of shaping reality. Sven 
though factual beliefs can be thought of as forming a system or even as 
"elt- nsch. uunr. . which may pervade all our thinking, purely factual 
belief systems do not entail moral responses, in the way that accepting 
a system of values does. The reasons for accepting an ideology, which 
involve a personal moral decision, cannot be seen when we are making such 
■ decision in a totally non-subjective way, as we might wish to see the 
reasons for adopting factual beliefs. In a way, acceptance of an ideology 
is more like trust in a person than belief in certain empirical facts'*; 
to think of the adoption of such systems in the same sort of way as we 
arrive at ordinary factual beliefs is to trivialise the part they play 
in many people's lives. Part of the strength of non-cognitive theories 
of ethics irises from the stress they place on the elements of personal 
ev luation and commitment involved in ethical decisions. For our part, 
we can certainly admit that there is this additional element involved in 
accepting an ideology, or perhaps even a single moral attitude, even if
" c.f. Chapter 7 
' ' c.f. p below
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we would not want to rule out a factual basis completely} but a full 
discussion of this additional element of personal involvement would take 
us too far away from our analysis of belief as a cognitive attitude.
P rt 3 ~ relief in People and Things
In thi3 chapter, we have suggested that belief, as we have analysed 
it as the attitude appropriate to what is true, takes as its object a 
proposition. This fits in well with the cases where a man says that he 
believes that such and such is the case; what we now wish to examine is 
the extent to which the cases in which a nan says that he believes in 
something (&od, a friend, Ford cars, etc.) can be analysed in this way.
As H. H. Price has a chapter on this pointf we will use his remarks as 
our starting point.
Price begins by distinguishing between 'belief-in' and 'belief-that', 
more or less on the lines of ordinary speech. That is to say, 'belief- 
that' comes to mean what we would describe as believing a proposition, 
while 'belief-in' covers all the cases where people say that they believe 
in something. As we shall see, several different things can be meant 
by this mode of speech.
Price first shows that belief-in x is often reducible to belief 
that the x in question exists. This would be so where somebody said 
that he believed in Kin. Arthur, fairies or the Loch Ness monster. iven 
if people say that they do or do not believe in some general concept, 
like the supernatural, what they mean is that they do or do not believe 
that supernatural events occur or that supernatural beings exist. This 
type of reduction of what may be called existential belief-in statements 
is in line with what we said about judgments of existence in discussing 
Hume, * namely, that they are to be analysed as asserting the truth of
* Belief, pp 426-454 
:' p 3 above
I existential propositions.Another type of belief-in expression is where someone 3ays that he believes in an ideal, which has not yet been attained. (For example, I might believe in equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex). Here,
Price points out that the belief cannot be reduced to belief that such a 
state of affairs obtains, because ex hypothesi. it does not. He goes on 
to say that anyone who sincerely believes in an ideal must believe at 
least that it is practicable, and that there is in this way an element of 
belief-that in hi3 belief. Thi3 seems debatable. An idealist may be 
uncertain as to whether his ideal is practicable. He may simply hope 
that it is. In any ca3e, there is no need to analyse the expression in 
this ‘ay in order to get a belief-that sense out of it, for we can simply 
say that the proposition the idealist believes is that which gives the 
sense of his ideal. (in the example, I believe that equal pay for 
equal work, regardless of sex, is demanded by considerations of justice).
Ii.ving shown that two types of occasion in which people speak of 
believing in something can be expressed in terms of belief that + a 
proposition, we now come to the cases where belief in something or some­
one indicates that we esteem, trust or rely on the object of our belief. 
Here, it may be thought, we have a different type of attitude from propo­
sitional belief that. Certainly, there is no necessary connection between 
believing in the existence of someone and believing in his worth or 
reliability. Price says that the type of belief that one has in one's 
doctor, or its converse 'the disbelief in Mr. Gladstone which most 
contemporary British Tories had.... does seem to be a quite different 
attitude from belief-that and irreducible to it'.* Price speaks of this 
sense of belief-in as the 'evaluative' sense, and he is clearly right in 
saying that it is not reducible to belief-that the person or thing in 
question exists.
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However, he goes on to suggest that it might he possible to reduce
even this sort of belief-in to belief-that, provided that the relevant
value concepts were introduced into the proposition believed, and assuming
that v/e approved of the sort of activity which we say the person is good
at. Thus we might say that we believed in our doctor, because he is
good at curing people, and we approve of curing people, but we would
not say that we believed in the chief of the secret police because,
although we think he is good at extracting information from prisoners by
torture, we do not approve of this. Price also maintains that one of
the virtues of analysing my belief in my doctor as belief that he is
good at curing people, plus my approval of this activity, is that it
brings out the 'prospective' character of the belief:
If I believe in my doctor, I believe not only that it is and has 
been a good thing that he is good at curing my diseases, but that 
it will continue to be a good tiling and that he will continue to
ue good at curing them.*
In fact, this hardly serves to distinguish evaluative from factual beliefs. 
Price is prepared to 3ay that belief in Tacitus as a historian means that 
we expect that future .rchaeologiccl evidence will confirm what he says, 
whereas the simple factual belief in the existence of King Arthur is 
'concerned entirely with the p.'-st'.** But surely I can equally well 
say that my belief in the existence of King Arthur means that I expect 
future research to back up my belief, just as much as I do in the case 
of my belief in Tacitus as a historian.
But certainly my belief in my doctor may include attitudes which 
are not necessarily present in many factual beliefs; there is something 
personal and committed about this belief that is not present in my belief 
that the doctor exists, for example. However, on analysing just what 
this belief-in consists in, it does seem to be possible to analyse it 
t least as based on propositional beliefs-that. This becomes clear
$ pU-5 
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when I say just what it is that I mean by belief-in him. I believe that 
he is compassionate, but firm; I believe that he makes himself readily 
available; I believe that he is well abreast of recent medical develop­
ments ;md that he is not reluctant to consult specialists. The list 
can be extended, but my reliance on him appears to result from a number 
of factual beliefs, and if they proved to be untrue, I would lose my 
belief in him. If it is said that the trust I give him is something 
over and above these factual beliefs, and that this is what the belief- 
in .ssentiall:, consists in, I would reply that my trust is itself a 
belief in the trustworthiness of the doctor, find to be reasonable must 
itself be backed up by reasons and evidence, like any other belief. 
Moreover, the reasons I give will be of the sort that led me to the trust 
in the first place. Thus my belief in my doctor appears to be the 
cumulative effect of my belief that the doctor is good at fulfilling a 
certain role, together with my approval of the role. The attitude may 
seem different from factual belief because it is both immediately 
pr ctical and personal, but it certainly is based on factual beliefs and 
would be renounced if the beliefs proved false. This is why we talk of 
an attitude of belief here, even if the element of trust could be, in 
this c se where a man is concerned, partly a matter of affection too.
But if I say that I believe in ford cars, do I mean any more than that 
because I believe that a good service is provided by Fords, that their 
cars are well tested and well designed, etc., I therefore believe that 
they are reliable? There seems to be little more to my attitude than 
this: I do not love or esteem ray Ford car, I simply rely on my (hopefully) 
well founded beliefs, just as I rely on any other factual beliefs.
So where belief-in refers to the belief we have that a person or a 
thing fulfills some role we approve of can, in the case of things 
totally, .and in the case of people, at least to a large degree be
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analysed in terms of propositional belief s-th.t. But what about the 
affection or esteem that is part of our belief in the doctor? Although 
based on factual beliefs, it seems to transcend them. It is, in fact, 
like the belief Tom has in Tin, which might mean that Tom believes what 
Tim says (and can be therefore reduced to the propositional belief 
discussed in Part 1 of this chapter), but, more likely, it means that 
om is friendly with Tim, and feels he can trust him. Price discusses 
this sort of belief in friends as an attitude which expects nothing from 
them in the way of role-fulfilment."' Belief-in a friend is simply a 
regard for his individual personality, perhaps rather like the non- 
cognitive 'assent to Jesus' spoken of by Barth. This assent to Jesus 
is clearly non-cognitive, as it seems to be consistent with flexible and 
even contradictory factual beliefs; in this and in its entailing of a 
whole moral attitude, it is rather like one of Hare's bliks. v *
Price is clearly correct in thinking that this type of belief-in is
not reducible to belief-that. No doubt it is linked to belief-that, as
we can think of both attitudes in terms of trust - trust in a person, md 
trust in a proposition - while it is also quite common to think of friends 
>*s 'true'. It is presumably because something of this type of belief-in 
enters into our attitude to our doctor that we are reluctant to think of 
the attitude us simple belief-that. Prom our point of view, the simplest 
thing to say about belief-in a friend is that we have here a different 
attitude from the cognitive belief we are dealing with. It is an 
fi'ective attitude, something between love and trust, no doubt with its
own logic. dLl we can do here is to note its existence as a fact of
language, and to resume our analysis of cognitive belief.
* op cit. pp 447-450
On the Barthian assent to Jesus, and its lack of cognitive content, 
c.f. Y. "I, Bartley HI, The ketre t to Commitment. London, I964.
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CHAPTER 5
How bo I Anew V.'hv.t I Believe?
Introduction
We have emphasised that belief must be regarded as an attitude which 
usually extends over a period of time, sometimes over years or even a 
lifetime. Compared to the tine span of the belief itself, the moments 
spent in thinking of it may be brief and infrequent. Indeed, it may be 
said that we can attribute some beliefs to a man, who has never explicitly 
adverted to the fact he has the attitudes. The question now arises as 
to the connection between what we have so far called 'adverting' to a 
belief and the long term attitude. ’Yhat is the nature of this act of 
adverting? As we shall 3ee, the two questions are closely connected.
7e shall rgue as promised in Chapter 3 when distinguishing beliefs from 
occurrent mental states that when I advert to my own beliefs, I am not 
performing an act of passive introspection, but that in so doing I cm 
actively committing or re-committing myself to a belief I already have, 
or initiating a new belief. Y/e will bring out the active aspect of 
adverting to a belief partly by an examination of the act itself, partly 
by comparing it to the explicit formulation of an intention in an 
intentional act, and partly by showing the difficulties involved in 
thinking of it as purely passive. 'Yhat we say will lead us to the 
conclusion that it is not possible for a man to be mistaken about his oto 
current beliefs, but we will show that he may still unwittingly give 
mistaken accounts of his beliefs and stress that this possibility is not 
to be overlooked. The chapter will close with replies to two possible 
objections to the view here proposed.
In Chapter 1,* we stressed that it was not possible to analyse belief 
simply in terms of occurrent mental acts of assent; in the first place,
* PP 23-6
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we have beliefs we never advert to, let alone assent to. jJven when we
do actually think that something is the case, analysis of what hapoens at
the actual moment when we would say that we had the thought, reveals that
it requires in many cases a whole context of meaning and dispositions,
not present at that moment, to fill out what we would say the thought is
about. That is to 3ay, the mental event in abstraction might well not
make pi' in what the belief was. All this argues against making a
mental event a necess: ry condition of belief, a3 well as against thinking
that when we do advert to a belief, its whole content is encapsulated by
what is going on in my head at that moment.
However, it is quite clear that there are moments when I think or
say that something is the ca3e, even if the whole thought is not present
in what crosses my mind at that moment. I might have believed the
matter for a long time, and simply advert to its being the case, or a new
solution to a problem might suddenly strike me, and I think to myself
'Yes, th.t's it'. There need be nothing dramatic about these events:
I could simply be aware that it is raining or think that it is snowing.
Or T might be .sked '7,’hat do you think of him?' and run through my ¡mswer
in my mind. Before saying how these events are to be thought of, let us
be cle- r that they do take place. Price, for example, writes
There certainly is a mental event which can be quite naturally 
described as assenting to a proposition. Moreover, it is often 
a purely inward event. It need not necessarily be ejq>ressed by 
means of bodily behaviour, for instance by saying 'Yes, I think so' 
or 'I am sure it is so', or writing a sentence down on paper and 
underlining it in green ink. *
Geach, in Lental Acts says that
Anybody nerforms an act of judgment at least as often as he makes 
up his mind how to answer a question; and acts of judgment in this 
sense are plainly episodic - have a position in a time series.
We will follow these terminologies in speaking of these events as acts
* belief, p 296 
London, 1957, p 9
of assent or judgment, though in so doing, we do not wish to imply that 
there need be any special feeling or act above the simple thought or 
awareness that something is the case. Their role, at first sight, seems 
to be that of manifesting beliefs I already have, and of marking the 
start of new beliefs. This is how Price thinks of them, and although he 
takes them as very important symptoms of belief, he does think that a man 
can sometimes attend to a proposition and not assent to it - i.e. not to 
think it is true, and yet be said to believe it. * Tie will argue against 
Price that a necessary condition of believing p is to assent to it when 
p is entertained and that this follows from taking seriously the idea 
that '/.’hen I think of or verbally make a judgment, I am not siaiply 
observing my inner state, but rather perforating an act in which I commit 
or re-commit myself to a belief.
Undoubtedly a source of confusion here is the tendency to see my 
own words or thoughts on analogy with the way I look at the words or 
thoughts of somebody else. To find out what someone else believes, I 
observe his behaviour, physical and verbal, and drav/ the appropriate 
conclusions. But is there anything like this in the way I come to a 
knowledge of my own beliefs? How do I find out what things I myself 
take to be true? Braithwaite thinks that I come to a knowledge of my 
own beliefs inductively, and that one of the means of doing this is to 
make a 'direct induction from my knowledge of my behaviour in the past 
to knowledge of my behaviour in the future'.** But there is something 
very strange about this, as if a man were to look over his own actions and 
to say 'From the way this person has been going on, it must be that he - 
that is to say, I - believes that p; therefore I do believe p'.
Surely I come to a knowledge of my own current beliefs by asking myself 
whether some proposition, p is true, or by simply thinking that p is
* p 3 0 0
* 'The Nature of Believing' loc cit, p 37
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true, and this, as we shall see, is a different sort of thing from 
analysing my words or my behaviour from what might be called a third 
person point of view. It is true that I might discover that I have been 
acting as if I thought that p were true, but the question still has to be 
decided as to whether I think here and now that p is true, and this is the 
moment at which I give or withhold assent from p.
Ryle1* writes that beliefs 'like aversions and phobias... can be 
unacknowledged'. Certainly a sense can be made out in which I can be 
said to have beliefs that I have not adverted to, which I do not think 
of as beginning as beliefs only when I actually do advert to them for the 
first time. If I am told that I have an unacknowledged belief that they 
do not keep elephants next door, and this (that they do not keep elephants) 
is in fact what I think about the people next door, I would not want to 
say that the belief began only when my' attention was drawn to it. Some 
proof of this would be given by the surprise I would have felt if I had 
at some previous time discovered elephants in a small suburban bungalow.
In this sense, I can say that I had a belief that I did not acknowledge, 
until I actually thought about it.
But a lot hangs on how we think of 'unacknowledged' here. I might 
have a mole on my back, which I did not know about. When it is pointed 
out to me for the first time, I acknowledge its presence; there is nothing 
else I can reasonably do. But when I am told that I have a belief, which 
I have never adverted to, the process of acknowledgement is not a simple 
matter of recognising the fact and accepting it as beyrond my powers to 
change, at least without resorting to surgery. There i3 a difference 
between my reaction to a man saying to me 'Although you don't know at, 
you've always had a mole in the small of your back' and my reaction to a 
man saying to me 'Although you've never said it to yourself in these 
■ords, you've always believed in a communist conspiracy to disrupt industry';
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in the first case, my acknowledgement or otherwise of the unacknowledged, 
mole will make no immediate difference to its continued existence, but 
with the belief, saying sincerely 'Yes, I have this belief' or 'No, it 
might have seemed as if I believed this, but in fact I don't now', makes 
all the difference in the world to the continued existence of the 
supposed belief. In the one case, the belief continues, while in the 
other case, it does not even if it did exist in the past. My words, if 
they are sincere, or at least my inward thoughts on the matter are consti­
tutive of the belief, in a way that my words or thoughts, however sincere, 
can never be constitutive of the existence of the mole at the parallel 
orient of acknowledgement.
In other words, adverting to the fact and sincerely acknowledging it 
are irrelevant to the existence of the mole, but when I advert to the 
possibility of my having a belief, whether I acknowledge it or not at 
least to myself is essential to it. There can be no question of a belief 
being unacknowledged after I have thought about it. So the possibility 
that I have a belief and simply not agree that I have it, which is possible 
in the case of the mole, cannot arise. 7>re thus rule out talk of beliefs 
which are essentially unconscious or unacknowledged, such as a psychiatrist 
might wish to speak of. He might say of a man, that he really believes 
p, but that his psyche makes it impossible for him to admit it, even to 
himself. However, one wonders what is meant by saying that a man 
unconsciously believes p, when the man himself thinks that he believes 
not - p, particularly if we are right in thinking that a nan's explicit 
thoughts about a subject are constitutive of his belief on that subject.
To put this in more concrete terms, the psychiatrist might tell the man 
'You believe your father is a threat and a rival', and the man might reply 
that he believes no such thing, as his father has always behaved very well 
towards him. It may still be open to the psychiatrist to say that an
unconscious fear of his father is at the root of the man's actions, but 
can he say any more about the man's beliefs than that he has been acting 
as if he believed, that his father is a threat and a rival?
Just what is involved in talk of essentially unconscious beliefs is 
brou ht out clearly in a recent article by Arthur Collins.* Collins 
points out that for me to say that I have an unconscious belief is to 
use evidence I would use in ascribing a belief to others to ascribe a 
belief to myself. In doing this, I will not be saying that I actually
accept the belief. Indeed, to say this will be to make the belief 
conscious; in the end then, an unconscious belief must be one which, 
when I reflect on it, I deny having, but which is ascribed to me, either 
b. myself or by someone else, through psycho-analytic inference.
nconscious beliefs are thus clearly distinguished from implicit or 
unformulated beliefs, whose existence depends on the fact that I would 
accept them were I to think of them.
Vie argued in Chapter 3 that there is a sense in which saying 
sincerely 'I believe p' throws light on my state. However, it does this 
not because it reports on some occurrence or process I am currently under- 
goin ,, but because it is itself constitutive of my attitude to p. Jhe 
normal logical order of things here is that 1 look at p, rather than at 
myself, or at myself only in so far as my own 3tate provides evidence for 
p, in deciding that I believe p. This order is clearly reversed in the 
case of unconscious beliefs. Collins himself explicitly denies that in 
saying 'I believe that p' one is stating a belief about one's state as 
well as about p. This would of course involve an infinite regress of 
beliefs *, as well as entailing that one could still perversely claim 
a measure of success in one's belief if it turned out that p was false.***
* 'Unconscious Beliefs', Jourir 1 of Philo3onhy. Vol.66) 19^9» pp S67-60O
** c.f. below, pp 111-115
Collins, loc cit, p 679
Despite the fact that in saying that I unconsciously believe p, I am 
commenting directly on my own state, and in so far as I am speaking about 
p at all, actually denying it, Collins still thinks that it is sometimes 
legitimate to predicate such unconscious beliefs of myself and others. 
Whether or not such talk is helpful in psycho-analysis, it does seem a 
most implausible use of 'belief'.
Price, too, accepts such talk, saying that sometimes ''A believes 
that p' can still be true, even though A does not assent to the proposi­
tion p when he entertains it and attends to it'.* We wish to rule out 
talk of unconscious beliefs not because of what Price calls a narrow 
insistence on terminological rules, out because of what we are doing 
when we think about our own current beliefs, and reach a conclusion about 
something. In doing this, we actually form our beliefs, or expressly 
re-commit ourselves to them, if we reach the same conclusion as ve have 
done before. In order to prevent misunderstanding here, we must stress 
that we are not saying that either belief itself or the act of assent 
ore performatives in the sense that term has been used of promises. For 
hen I verbally make a free promise, I am morally bound by what C have 
promised, even if I am thinking all the time that I do not really mean it 
and have no intention of honouring it. Making the appropriate verbal or 
other external responses is what constitutes my promise, but with belief 
it is not the external enaction of any words or signs that is constitutive 
of the belief, but the inner assent that I give to the proposition. So 
'1 though we might say that there is a performative element in belief in 
that in thinking about our beliefs we are also doing something about them, 
belief cannot be considered to be a performative concept in itself.
In fact, there are close parallels between my knowledge of my beliefs 
and my nowledge of \y intentions, a discussion of which may help to 
make clearer what we are trying to say about belief. When we act
belief, p 300
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intentionally, we always act under some aspect; we know what we are doing 
because we decide the aspect under which e are acting, while observers 
can see only our physical movements, and have to infer from them what our 
intention is. Given that two possible intentions could both be served 
b the same set of physical movements, the agent is the final authority 
on what he is actually doing. Of course, there are certain restrictions 
on what intentions can be effected by a given set of physical movements, 
and the intentional description of the act can be given only within those 
limits. How far the agent knows what physical movements he is making 
without recourse to some sort of observ tion is a matter of dispute, 
but even if descriptions of actions are dependent on observation in this 
respect, there is no parallel need for a similar observational limitation 
on oelief3, where, as we have seen in Chapter 2, there is no necessary 
connection between what a man believes and what he does0 (This is not 
to deny that a man's profession of belief can be questioned in terms of 
his sincerity in making it, if his actions seem wildly divergent from the 
implications of the profession).
Given that there are certain limits on the intention with which I 
can be said to be doing a given set of physical movements, how do I know 
what the intention is? It should be clear that I do not discover this 
by passive introspection, or by a re3trospective examination of the 
physical Movements, because if I ask myself whether in doing an act I 
have such and such an intention, I will be able truthfully to answer that 
I have only if I am currently intending in the appropriate way. In other 
words, to know that I currently have an intention cannot be separated from 
an explicit committing of myself to it. I cannot passively look and see 
whether I am actually having it now, because to be passive about it is 
not to have it.
The point here is not that a man cannot be said to be doing an
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intentional action without adverting to his intention, even inwardly.
Just as unformulated beliefs, we can have unfomulated intentions; this 
is particularly apparent in the case of habitual actions, like driving 
to work. My intention to drive to work does not begin when someone 
asks me what I am doing, and I reply that I am driving to work; it could 
be said that I was (intentionally) driving to work even if I never 
adverted to the fact that this is what I was doing, providing that this 
is what I would count as a correct description of what I was doing if I 
were asked about it. The point is that once a man does advert to what 
he is doing, providing he is not under some internal or external compulsion, 
he has to make an explicit reco;Tiition of his intention concerning his 
ction, or refrain from doing the action, and so perform a contrary 
intention. If someone asks me what I am doing, in my reply I do not 
3imply report on my intention as if it were something I undergo like a 
pain, but I assent to the fact that this continues to be my intention, 
thereby renewing the intention. It is because we ourselves are respon­
sible for our intentions that it would be inappropriate for a man, on 
eeing asked to say what he was doing, to reply 'Let me see, what is this 
body bringing about?'* In the end, I say what I am doing without looking 
to see, because I am doing it.
'.That is to be taken from this comparison with our knowledge of our 
intentions in our intentional actions is that in saying what he believes, 
a man is not giving a report on somethin he is undergoing either. In 
both cases there is an element of present commitment which I am conscious 
of. To return to belief, if I sk someone what he believes about p, 
if he is sensible he will consider the relevant evidence and come to a 
conclusion. ,'ven if he does not proceed in this rational way, his answer,
Example from Miss G. K. II. Anscombe, Intention. Oxford, 1957, p 51. Note 
that in taking the intention to be the way the agent would describe 
what he is doing, we avoid talking of it as something existing apart 
from the physical movements.
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provided _t is sincere, will be taken as a present assent to or dissent 
from p. If he answered that he did believe p, and on being asked why,
said that he had examined his mind and found that he had often assented 
to p in the past, we would not take this as an excuse for his unjusti- 
i iibly committing himself to p now. Tie would probably say to him,
'Yes, you may have done that in the past, but do you believe p now?', 
i. e would thus be trying to show him that his present views on the matter 
are something he is now responsible for.
So to say outwardly or think to myself what I believe is not a 
matter of reporting on a mental state. Somebody who claimed that this 
was all he was doing when he spoke about his beliefs, and said that 
therefore he could not be held accountable for the truth or falisity 
Of his beliefs would not have understood what belief was. .’hen I o 
that I believe p, I am talking about myself only indirectly, only because 
T J.r. committing myself to the truth of p. I have the belief because p 
seems true to me, not because I introspect a certain mental state or 
experience. Peirce, for example, is misleading when he says that in 
making , judgment we are giving 'a representation to ourselves that we 
h.' ve a specified habit of this kind', namely a belief.He himself seems 
to realise the inadequacy of this account when he goes on in V.2 9 to talk 
of a judgment in terms of its being an assertion to myself, as indicated 
by the expression 'I says to myself'.
'Yhat is being suggested is that when I reflect on my belief on some 
.tter, I actually make a judgment about that matter. In making the 
judgment or act of assent, I cannot but know what conclusion I come to.
This follows from the fact that my own relation to my own words or thoughts 
is wholly different from other peoples. If proof of this is needed, 
consider the bizarre consequences that follow from the opposite assumption:
Coll'-cted P p.-'rs. III. 1^ 0
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If I listened to the words of my mouth, I might say that 
someone else was speaking out of my mouth.
"Judging from what I say, this is what I believe." How, it is
possible to think out circumstances in which these words would 
make 3ense.
And then it would be possible for someone to say "It is raining 
and I don't believe it", or "It seems to me that my ego believes 
this, but it isn't true." One would have to fill out the picture 
with behaviour indicating that two people were speaking through 
ray mouth.1'
'.That Wittgenstein says about my words applies equally to my thoughts.
I know what I believe by believing it - that is to say, by expressing 
my belief verbally or mentally in a judgment; and to think that I could 
be mistaken about a current judgment about a proposition p would be to 
assume that I could at the same time, find under the 3ame respect be 
thinking  ^that p was true -ind that p was false or uncertain. For if I 
said that I judge that p, then I would be saying that p was true; if 
someone objected that I might not be right about my judging that p, I 
. ould reply that I could be wrong about judging that p only if in fact 
I w .s judging that p was false or uncertain. So the possibility of 
being wrong about my . udgment arises only if I assume that I could believe 
p, and at the same time believe that this judgment was false - that is to 
say, to say seriously and sincerely of myself in the first person singular 
of the present tense, 'I am believing falsely that p', which is a contra­
diction in terms, as can easily be verified by asking what conditions 
could possibly make it true.
What we are saying amounts to this: that where 'a' is a knower or 
a believer, 'p' is a proposition known or believed, 'Bap' = 'a believes p' 
and 'Kap' = 'a knows that p', it is not the case that 
(l) 'Bap -- ) KaBap'
because a might never have adverted to hi3 belief that p. 3ut, once a 
does advert to his belief, he must be aware of it. It would, as 
J. Hintikka points out, be self-defeating for a man to utter 'I believe *
* 'ittgenstein, Fi.ilogopliio-’-l Investigations, p 192
that p, but I don't know that I believe it', although no such frustration 
of purpose attaches to his utterance concerning some other person, that 
'lie believes p, but he does not know that he believes it'.* Following 
Wittgenstein, ilintikka finds a logical necessity in normal circumstances 
of being aware of what one is saying, and, by analogical extension, of 
v/hat one is thinking tooj •v assuming this the absurdity of the person 
referred to by 'a' uttering of himself a scheme. such as
(2) 'Bap & -KaBap'
is due not to the form of (2), which might be perfectly acceptable when 
said of a third person, but to what is implied when it is uttered in the 
first person. Beliefs, then, are not necessarily transparent or self- 
intimating, but when I actually judge that p or assent to p, outwardly or 
inwardly, I :ust know what I believe that p; in denying that this was 
so, I would effectively be asserting (2) of myself.
’.7e are maintaining that iy knowledge of my beliefs arises because 
when I ask what my belief is on any subject, there is a sense in which I 
can be said then to initiate or re-commit myself to that belief. ve 
reject ccounts which would make knowledge of our beliefs similar to that 
knowledge of things or events, internal or external, which is gained by 
passive observation. Some of the difficulties involved in such accounts 
are brought out in considering the views of G-ustav Bergmann, as expounded
in 'he_et .physics of Lo.;ic 1 Positivis::. (Madison, 19^ 7), in which
her l; ..nr. tries to admit mental acts into his positivistic universe. The
-1 c.f. J. Hintikka, Knowledge :nd Belief. Ithaca, New York, 1962, pp 84-8 
Although we agree with Hintikka in his analysis of what sort of implica­
tion there is between 'Bap' and 'KaBap', we should point out that his 
reasons for rejecting the immediate implication of 'KaBap' by 'Bap' are 
not the same as ours. (c.f. his pp 51~5) Moreover, other conclusions 
of hintikka in the some area are not consistent with ours. 'That he 
says about one's belief about one's knowledge and belief seems correct 
only if the knowledge and belief one is having beliefs about does not 
include ony knowledge or belief that one is not conscious oi. (c.f. his
pp 50 and 1 2 3).
problen which arises in thi3 account is that if mental acts are admitted 
t all into the positivistic description of the world, as elements of 
that world, on a level with sense data, there is a danger of an infinite 
regress in order to explain how these mental phenomena are themselves 
encountered. Are further mental acts necessary to know that we are 
encountering a knowing, a believing or a willing? According to Bergmann,
'I do sometimes encounter Rowings and, similarly, the otherjropositional 
attitudes, as the cts are now also called'.4 He goes on to say that 
lthough these mental acts are port of what he encounters in the world, 
he finds no such thing as an agent, a knower or a believer. Two questions 
suggest themselves immediately: first, do accounts of first-person type 
agency depend on finding agents In the same way that one finds objects? 
Pri-i'X facie, gents which were reducible to third-person type descriptions 
would not seem to be agents in the sense required by those who wish to 
phold some degree of first-person agency, so the fact that Bergmann 
c nnot find any 'objective' agent is hardly surprising, nor doe3 it argue 
gainst the first-person thesis. Secondly, is it true to say of ourselves 
that we encounter the various propositional attitudes as if they were 
physical objects? Is it not rather that we take up these attitudes?
'c don't find them as facts or experiences, which are out there, to be 
looked at. It is true that we are observers of other people' 3 mental acts, 
but we .re not observers of our own.
Jergmann, however, insists that he is not discussing the acts or 
states, as he calls them, of other people, when he tries to show what
j'j . . .  ^there is in such states which ?^e^ not reducible to behaviourastic analyses, 
'here Bergmann finds such analyses inadequate is precisely in the fact 
that in willing, knowing, etc., one is aware of certain mental states; 
the important point is that
2B_cit, p 1A9, our italics
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problem which arises in this account is that if mental acts are admitted 
t all into the positivistic description of the world, as elements of 
that world, on a level with sense data, there is a danger of an infinite 
regress in order to explain how these mental phenomena are themselves 
encountered. Are further mental acts necessary to !mow that we are 
encountering a .nowing, a believing or a willing? According to Bergmann,
'I do sometimes encounter ;oiowing3 and, similarly, the other propositional 
attitudes, as the acts are now also called' . * He goes on to say that
.-.lthough these mental acts re part of what he encounters in the world, 
he finds no such thing us an agent, a knower or a believer. Two questions 
suggest themselves immediately: first, do accounts of first-person type 
agency depend on finding agents in the same way that one finds objects? 
Prima facie, gents which were reducible to third-person type descriptions 
would not seem to be agents in the sense required by those who wish to 
uphold some degree of first-person agency, so the fact that Bergmann 
cannot find any 'objective' ¿.gent is hardly surprising, nor doe3 it argue 
gainst the first-person thesis. Secondly, is it true to say of ourselves 
that we encounter the various propositional attitudes as if they were 
physical objects? Is it not rather that we take up these attitudes?
7e don't find them as facts or experiences, which are out there, to be 
looked at. It is true that we are observers of other people's mental acts, 
but we are not observers of our own.
Bergmann, however, insists that he is not discussing the acts or 
states, as he calls them, of other people, when he tries to show what 
there is in such states which ***e^ not reducible to behaviouristic analyses. 
Where Bergmann finds such analyses inadequate is precisely in the fact 
that in willing, knowing, etc., one is aware of certain mental states; 
the important point is that
op cit. p 149, our italics
Q" olt. p 222
...'p is willed', 'p is doubted', 'p is remembered', can all be
analysed into (states that havej texts of the form '... is known'.
To gdve a schematic illustration, I propose to analyse 'p is willed' 
into 'it is known that p and it is known that q', where 'q' is the 
text of those muscular and feeling states that occur as partial 
states in the classical analysis. *
From the point of view of an observer, this might be what another man's 
willing looks like, but can we ever see our own willing in such a light 
as and at the time we are willing it? 'That we see as our willing is not 
factual conjunction of a proposition with a bodily state, because v.e do 
not see that we will at all; we will. If willing were a matter of knowing 
p and q, even if q were the physical expression of our willing, it would 
still be open to us to refuse to went p and q, and so the spectre of an 
infinite regress looms.
Similarly with belief; if in order to know whether I believe some­
thing, I h vo to now whether p and q obtain, I con always ask whether I 
believe that this is the case. But when I am ictually believing some­
thing, no such question can arise - I know what I am believing because I 
m assenting to it there and then. While it is possible that there is, 
in belief, something like an awareness of p and q, attempts to analyse my 
own states simply in terms of such awarenesses miss the central point about 
my own relationship to them; that these states are constituted by being 
taken up, nd th t I become aware of my beliefs,hopes, fears and intentions 
precisely in taking them up or accepting them. If belief does, as 
Bergmann suggests, consist partly in having certain muscular and feeling 
states, is far as my own beliefs are concerned, having the states must be 
dependent on my belief; I must accept the belief before I have the states, 
and so I know I have the belief before I know that have the states. I 
do not learn about my beliefs as might le;irn about mental or physical 
experiences I undergo; I am aware of ay beliefs in so far as I explicitly
113.
assent to them
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Cook Wilson seems to have implied that we could be wrong about 
knowing whether we had an attitude of belief on a given matter, because 
he thought that we should speak of belief only when certain psychic 
processes have taken place, which is a view somewhat similar to Bergmann's, 
.t least in its presupposition, as we shall see. '.v'riting of occasions 
hen ve simply accept a proposition without reflection or thought, he 
s ys 'I don't think ¿.bout that (i.e. that there could be some altern; tive 
state of .f: 'irs) at .11, .nd so the processes of judgment, belief and 
opinion re impossible'.- This Is a rather strange requirement, ruling- 
out, ;.s Cook V/ilson admits, a common use of 'believe', that in which I 
make an assertion based immediately on some perception. He is anxious 
to give precise meanings to 'perception', 'opinion', 'oelief', 'judgment', 
'apprehension* and so on, but in making the use of 'believe' subject to 
.n examination of one's internal state, he is laying himself open to 
similar objections to those we made against the account given by Bergmann.
Do I, on these accounts, need a further psychic act in order to know 
whether I have reached ; state of opinion, or whether I actually know 
what I am asserting, or whether I m merely taking it for granted?
Can I be certain that ,uy evidence really counts as evidence, or is this 
matter of belief ¿is well? The difficulty with Cook Wilson's account 
is that he wants to say that we can say that we are believing something 
only when what he calls the thinking process is 'fully awakened'. Apart 
from the theoretical difficulty about how we re supposed to ..now this, 
we often attribute beliefs to other people without knowing whether any 
thinking processes have gone on in them, while when we speak of our own 
beliefs, we concentrate on looking at whether the matter in question is 
true rather than on the mental processes involved in coming to this 
conclusion. As Griffiths points out'"' we can (and do) identify a state
B L tement nd Inference. Oxford, 1926, Vol.l, p 110 
'" 'On Belief', loc cit. p 133
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of belief without knowing how it is acquired, whereas on Cook Wilson's 
account we could not say that we or someone else believed something with­
out discovering how we or he came to be in this state.
CCrroUaty
A »liiiiMiii.nn^ to the view of belief being proposer’ in this chapter 
is that the believer is the final authority on v.hat he believes. Although 
c ¿n n; nifest tendencies in my speech and behaviour that could allow 
others to predict with considerable certainty wh t my beliefs would be 
in given circumstances, so that they cun speak of my having beliefs th t 
I am not aware of, when I am actually talced what I believe, and so 
vert to the matter in question, my word, if it is sincerely given, 
h s claim to be final. In f ct, the truth of attributing to me beliefs 
I do not know about must be in terms of whether, at the time concerned,
I would assent or would have ssented to them. The reason for saying 
this should by now be familiar, that in bringing a matter to consciousness 
and precisely because it is brought to consciousness, I make up my mind 
(either for the :irst time or as a repetition of my previous judgments) 
hut I am to think about it: I oan ..ccept it aa true, I c n reject it -.s 
falsa or 1 c -n suspend judgment on it. .Sven this last is to take up 
an attitude, namely th t my response to the matter in question is not 
to think of it as positively true or false, out simply to leave it 
undecided owing to my lack of evidence or lack of interest. I cannot 
think bout a proposition without making up my mind about its truth in 
one of these ways.
The occurrent act theory of belief as consisting essentially in 
thinking of a propositi n as true at least has the virtue of making clear 
the connection between what a man believes and wlnt he thinks. Although 
we have constantly said that a man must be taken to believe what he would 
take to be true a3 well as what he actually thinks of as true, when he is 
thinking bout the truth or f l3ity of any matter, he must be aware of his
beliefs about it, because in so thinking about it, he is forming his
beliefs on it. Though we might feel that a man's behaviour belies his
professed beliefs, for example that the wicked will be punished, if he
insists that this is his belief and he seems in other ways to use the
concept in its usual connection with public standards of truth and
evidence, short of openly accusing him of hypocricy or insincerity, have
we any right to say that this is not his belief?
Phillips Griffiths sums the matter up succinctly:
One knows what one believes in so far as one knows what one 
thinks...* Ho convincing case con be found of being nistaken 
about whether one here and now believes something that one is 
currently thinking. The cases all seen to be one(s) of mis- 
reporting beliefs, or of mistaking whit one would believe on 
most occasions or in one's better moments; or of believing 
something at one time and not at others.
It will be worth spending a little time on ulle ed counter-exemples to
the thesis that we cannot be wrong about our beliefs when we are actually
thinking about them. To take the case of mistaken expressions of beliefs
first: .ran can give a false expression of what he thinks, but is this
the same "3 being mistaken about what he thinks, s fi r ns his knowl-
of hi3 belief is concerned? The very fact that he might admit that his
expression was mist; ken itself suggests that it is not. To take on
example, Jones could most vehemently assert that he w- s an atheist, all
the time thinking that this meant that he did not believe in the Christi;in
God, but when asked if he did not believe in a transcendent world spirit
replied that of course he did. Such would obviously be a case of a
mistaken expression of a belief, as Jones was in no doubt as to what he
believed, but he had confused the meaning of words in a rather confused
re.” of discussion. The .importance of errors like this is not to be
minimised; the characteristic philosophical move of asking a man just
* Griffiths adds here that one believes only in so far as one thinks.
*."e have often suggested reasons for thinking this to be false.
*" loc cit. p 131
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beliefs about it, because in so thinking about it, he is forming his
beliefs on it. Though we might feel that a man's behaviour belies his
professed beliefs, for example that the wicked will be punished, if he
insists that this is his belief and he seems in other ways to use the
concept in its usual connection with public standards of truth and
evidence, short of openly accusing him of hypocricy or insincerity, have
we any right to say that this is not his belief?
Phillips Griffiths sums the matter up succinctly!
One knows what one believes in so far as one knows what one 
t h i n k s . N o  convincing case con be found of being mistaken 
about whether one here and now believes something that one is 
currently thinking. The cases all seem to be one(s) of mis- 
reporting beliefs, or of mistaking what one would believe on 
most occasions or in one's better moments; or of believing 
something at one time and not at others. ■‘v
It will be wortli spending a little time on alleged counter-examples to
the thesis that we cannot be wrong about our beliefs when we are actually
thinking about them. To talce the case of mistaken expressions of beliefs
first: a on con give a false expression of what he thinks, but is this
the sane as being mistaken ."bout what he thinks, as far ns his knowledge
of hi3 belief is concerned? The very fact that he might admit that his
expression was .ist ken itself suggests that it is not. To take an
Jones could most vehemently assert th t he «as n atheist, all
the time thinking that this meant that he did not believe in the Christian
God, bat when asked if he aid not believe in a transcendent world spirit
replied that of course he did. Such would obviously be a case of a
mistaken expression of a belief, as Jones was in no doubt as to what he
believed, but he had confused the meaning of words in a rather confused
rea of discussion. The importance of errors like this is not to be
minimised; the characteristic philosophical move of asking a man just *
* Griffiths adds here that one believes only in so far as one thinks.
~.re have often suggested reasons for thinking this to be f”lse.
loc cit. p 1 3 1
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what he means when he says that he believes... has an important point 
to it.
An objection to the thesis that a man cannot be mistaken about his 
beliefs when he is currently thinking of them which seems prima facie 
more difficult to answer arises from occasions when a man thinks he 
believes something until he has to act on it, and then realises, the 
objection would have it, that he doe3 not believe it after all; and 
thinking over the matter, he concludes that he would never have been 
prep red to act on it • nd hence, that he never really believed it.
An example of this might be a teacher constantly telliiig people that x 
was the best student he ever had, until such time as he had to write a 
reference for x, when he realised th^t he did not, and perhaps never had, 
really thought of x in this way.
This objection implies that while previously I might have thought 
that I had e. belief, I can later come to realise that there was something 
missing from my earlier assent. out, what could be missing in this way? 
The objection as here set up would suggest that what had been missing wa3 
that the teacher w not in the end prepared to act on his belief. But, 
s we hive seen in Chapter 2, people can believe what they are not 
prep red to act on. In this case, the teacher had in fact acted on his 
belief up to a point: he had told people about it. We have already 
shown in our discussion of the assumption behind behaviouristic theories 
of belief that the fact people are not always willing to stake a lot on 
their beliefs does not mean that the beliefs in question are not really 
beliefs; even less can the fact that an acid test now makes someone 
revise an earlier belief imply that at some previous time he did not really 
have the belief.
What seems to be behind this objection is the idea that belief, 
properly speaking, is something peculiarly solemn and final. This
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attitude is summed up quite well in an incident in The Autobiography 
of Naloolra X .-* dlijah iluhammad, the founder of the Nation of Islam, 
writes of a defector from the religion: 'If you once believed in the 
truth, and now you are beginning to doubt the truth, you didn't believe 
the truth in the first place'. Perhaps our own use of the term 
'committing' oneself to a belief may have added to the impression of the 
finality of belief; all we intend to say, however, is that in thinking 
of something as true, one accepts it at least while one is so thinking, 
nd that this acceptance is something for which the believer is ultimately 
responsible. As Griffiths remarks*1, one of the joys and dangers of 
drunkenness is that it makes it far easier to come to difficult decisions; 
one thus evades one'3 responsibility. Beliefs can be solemn or final, 
but they can also be weak, shallow, transient. 'Ye may regret beliefs 
of the latter sort, out we do not solve the difficulty of the teacher in 
the example by saying that what he had was not really a belief. '.hat he 
should have said is that he ought not to have believed that x was the 
best student he ever had, not that he did not believe it. If that is 
what he thought at the time, then that is what he believed at the time, 
unless one wants to say that a man can, at one and the same time, think 
that p is 30 and yet not believe p. But what would be meant by 'believe' 
in that case? If we do not allow a man to say significantly and 
sincerely of himself 'p is so, but do not believe that p', by wh t right 
(ire others to say of him 'he thinks (without doubting it) that p is true, 
but he does not believe that p is true'?
People who say things like 'I believe she' 3  telling the truth* when­
ever I see her, but when she goes away, I don't believe her any more' or 
'I don’t believe it when I'm sober, but I'm convinced of it when I'm 
drunk' or 'I believe it when Smith presses me about it, but afterwards I
H<rmondaworth, 1968, p 283
have my douots' may, when they give their assents, be, as a result of 
drinking or being brow-beaten and so on, kidding themselves (or being 
kidded) about the evidence there is for what they assent to, but they are 
not wrong about their beliefs. As a matter of fact, even if we want to 
say th t a man believes only what he is prepared to act on, these men, 
owing to their heightened emotional or alcoholic states, might very well, 
at the time of their beliefs, act on them.
A second objection which could be raised against the thesis that I 
c?innot fail to know what I believe when I am adverting to the subject in 
question, ref ts not to the fact that my beliefs can be weak and inconstant, 
but to the he- rt-searching that some people undertake in order to find 
out what they believe. If belief is simply a m tter of asking myself 
whether p or not - p, why cm it be so gonising to decide what my 
beliefs are in some cases? Would people who spend a large part of their 
lives in finding out what they believe on a particular question agree that 
till they were really doing was asking whether p or not - p wu3 the case?
The reply to this objection should by now be clear: that there is 
an equivalence between 'I do not know what I believe about p' and 'I do 
not maw whether p is true or false'. Normally speaking, people concen­
trate on the more direct approach of sking whether p is true or false, 
nd this is how they come to realise what their belief on p is. Nven if, 
as in some important and emotionally involved matters such as a mother 
refusing to believe her son is dead, what looms largest in the mind is 
one's personal commitment or emotional reaction to the belief, rather 
than the fact of p being true or false, the commitment is still dependent 
on one's seeing p as true or false. This is not to deny that what is at 
st-Jce emotionally or personally c-n sway one's judgment, but in saying 
that one believes p, one is, as we have seen in Chapter 3» first -nd fore­
most asserting the truth of p. This is not to deny that particularly in
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matters of religion and personal relationships, one' 3 personal feelings 
:nd experiences might be counted as evidence for the truth of p; a .an 
might say to himself 'Can I believe in Cod?' and mean by this 'Have I 
myself had any experience of the transcendent, 3uch as believers speak 
of?' But even here, where what is apparently to count as evidence is of 
personal, existential nature, the man is still in the end asking himself 
whether the proposition 'Cod exists' is true. The fact that my own 
state of mind could be part of the evidence which leads me to make up 
my mind on the truth of p, should not obscure the fact that logically it 
is the truth of p which is the end of my enquiry as to whether I believe 
p, and my own personal experience is important only in so far as I am 
treating it s part of the evidence for the truth of p.
Perhaps lurking behind both the objections here discussed is the 
vie which we have come across ini rgued gainst in Chapters 1 and 3, 
that belief is some sort of special experience, and that vithout this 
particular mood or colouring of our thoughts, we c.\nnot be s: id fully to 
believe:
Do you believe that you will die? Yes: man is mortal;
I  aa  a man: ergo... No, thot's not it - I know tin t you know 
.11 th t. But wh t I urn asking is this: have you ever had 
occ .sion to believe in this, to jelieve it definitely, not 
with your uind but your body, to feel th t the fingers holding 
this very page will one day be yellow, icy -
There, of course, you don't believe - and that is why up 
to now you haven't jumped out of the tenth floor window to the 
pavement, that is why, up to uow, you keep on eating, turning 
pages, shaving, smiling, writing - *
This pas .age from Zamyatin's Vie brilliantly c ptures the notion of belief 
s a gut reaction. T.7e do not deny that such intensity of feeling may 
cco;. any beliefs, particul rly when they involve strong emotions, but 
such feeling is something pathological :md, to a large extent, beyond 
our control. As such, it is clearly not necessary to judging or 
believing th t one will die. Intense feelings c n help to produce and
* Yevgeny Zamyatin, YTe.transl "ichael Glenny, London 1970, p 228
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sustain assent, out they are not strictly neoessi ry to it qua assent, 
nd indeed are absent from it in the vast majority of oases. Zamyatin 
makes it quite clear that what he is talking about is something beyond 
belief itself, <nd that, from our point of view, is the beauty of the
p ;ss ge.
In conclusion, then, we can say that explicitly to ,udge that p 
is so is sufficient, but not a necessary condition of believing p.
When I sk self «hether I believe that p, mg .mower will be ay 
judgment on the truth or falsity of p, even though I would often need 
more than the moment of • ssent or judgment to fill out the total meaning 
n' implic tio:. of the belief. It follows from this analysis that 
lthough we can correctly predicate beliefs of people when they are not 
ctuall thinking about them, or even in cases here they have never 
thou -ht about them, we do this only on the assumption that at the time 
ill question were they to reflect or to have reflected on it. In other 
ords, with subjects who, like Lult people, can reflect and make 
jud isnta, the dispositional sense of belief is secondary." It is 
thought of in terms of ssents that would be given by the person the 
''isposition is predicated of.
The actual assent or judgment can, of course, take many forms - 
intern lly agreeing with -in argument of someone else, signing a declara­
tion, nodding one' 3 head and so on. All that is really essential to 
it is that the subject should think or be aware that something is the
I art not trying to make belief dependent on some peculiar type 
of interior act or feeling; our talk of 'acts of assent' . nd judgments 
can perhaps be interpreted s stressing that there is no dispositional 
sense of 'believe' in the first person singular of the present tense
* "7e obviously redic te beliefs of ■nimals, infants, etc. in an analogous 
way, inferrin ; from their behaviour what they would assent to (if they 
could). There seems no question of them actually reflecting, assenting, 
etc. c.f. above, pAStaon beliefs of animals.
indicative.* For in saying that I believe that p, I am not saying that, 
_n some hypothetical circumstances I would act on p, nor am I commenting 
on toy present, past or future mental states; I am simply judging that p 
is the case.
Of course, belief does not consist solely in such acts; it is an 
ttitude which persists at times other than during the performance of 
these icts, uid can also obtain .'ithout any such act ever having occurred, 
/hat we have tried to show is that when a man reflects on a topic, the 
judgment - or suspension of judgment - that he makes must be taken as 
constituting his belief on that tooic. Beliefs that re purely disposi­
tional and beliefs that h:ve been made explicit at times when we are not 
ctu lly thinking of them, are to be thought of in terms of the judgments 
that would be Bade, were the believer to think about them. It is bee-use 
our • ent thoughts ore constitutive of our beliefs in this way, that a 
an cmnot be wrong about his beliefs when he is currently reflecting 
on them.
However, the emphasis we h ve laid on the activity involved in 
forming our beliefs may le ve some readers uneasy* Does this mean that 
e cun believe what we like? This might seem to follow if belief is 
nrn to .ent 1 sots of reflection and judgment, as here Suggested, 
but surely we re constrai' ed in our beliefs. If, as we showed in 
Chapter 5, belief is the attitude appropriate to what is true, vie should 
believe only what is true; what is true is something largely outside our 
control, and so belief would seem to be ideally outside our control as 
ell. Are '.ve then justified in thinking of belief as dependent on wh :t 
e do, in the imoortcint way we re here proposing? These questions will 
be taken up in the next two chapters, ..here we discuss the place of 
freedom .nd rational control in our beliefs.
Ls thesis is -Iso nronosod bj Urnson in 'Parenthetical Wros', 
loc cit, p 489
CHAPT ER 6
Belief and the T7ill
Introduction
In this chapter, we will attempt to answer the questions raised at 
the end of the previous chapter concerning the sense in which we might be 
said to be ourselves active in forming our beliefs; in particular, we 
must sk to what extent we can be said to be free in believing what we 
ant to believe. It is clear that we ought to believe only what is really 
80, t least in so far s it lies in our powar to determine this, but 
reflection shows that, regrettably, we do not always believe only what we 
have evidence for, or always even in accordance with the evidence we do 
have. 3o, it is natural to conclude that non-intellectual factors may 
be at work here; such, at least, w s the view of Descartes, who 
ttributed our errors to the abuse of our will in leading us to assent to 
judgments which went beyond what was presented to it by the infallible 
intellect. This view has some initial plausibility when we think of 
cases where emotional considerations lead people to take up and genuinely 
believe things they have no evidence for, but it is not a view which has 
r oeive much support from modern philosophers, So in Part 1  we will
discuss the criticisms levelled against Descartes by J, L, a vans, and in 
Part 2 see how far Descartes can be defended. Our conclusions here will 
lead us to ive in Part 3 a general account of the influence of the will 
in beliefs. This means at least that WO -re always responsible for our 
explicit beliefs, even though it is not true that we can simply believe 
whet ae like. Thus we will reject the idea that a man can consciously 
!cnow something, and at the same time, by willpower, believe the opposite. 
Belief, then, is not totally free, in the sense that we can always believe 
what we like, but we will argue that someti es people do form beliefs 
"hich go against what they should believe, and that this can in a way be 
put down to the influence of the will. 'Ve will finally try to suggest
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some of the ways in which it is possible to influence our beliefs by 
willed acts over a long period of time, though this is not the way that 
we claim that the will can be said to play a part in every judgment we
make.
fart 1 - Descartes and hv.uns: urror and the ’Till*
Descartes thinks of the intellect as infallible, in essence assuming
the position of St. Augustine, who wrote:
Intellectualis autem visio non fallitur. Aut enim non 
intelligit qui aliud opinatur quasi est; aut si 
iutelligit continuo verum est.**
drror cannot, therefore, be attributed to the intellect, which cannot
see what is not there. Although really accepting, with the scholastics,
that the intellect is the 'facultas apprehensiva veri', Descartes
introduces his rnalin ;£r.ie in order to assure himself of metaphysical
cert -inty here. Could it be that, although we cannot think that what the
intellect clearly and distinctly perceives as true could be false, in
reality it is false?'" Assuring himself of the goodness of G-od,
Descartes reasons that the Cre tor could not be a deceiver (could not
be the nalin genie, in other words), and so the infallibility of the
intellect receives its met'.physical guarantee. But, given this, Descartes
is left with a problem concern.ing the source of error. Unlike Spinoza,
he regards error as a positive phenomenon and not simply as an absence of
’mowledge. But if God is good, and our intellect cannot be deceived,
how does it come about that we can be in error?
The solution is stated clearly in the Fourth Meditation;'** 3y the
understanding alone, I neither assert nor deny anything, but merely
Note: references to Descartes will be given to the two volume edition 
of h id ne and ;ioss, Cambridge, 19>9; J. L. Bvans' article, 'Brror 
and the '«Till' appeared in Philosophy. Vol. } 8 , 19o3, PP 13 ’“148 
“ De Genesl ad Litter.ua. lib 12, c p 14, no 29
For - discussion of the cogency of ouch a hypothesis, the reader i3 
referred to Leonard Gr. 'iller, 'Descartes, Mathematics and God', 
.•'h'losorhic 1 h.-v.icw, Vol. 66, 1957, PP 451~465 
c.f. U & R, Vol. 1, pp 174-9* •*#>{*
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pprehend the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment.
Judgment, then, requires the co-operation of the will, which chooses to 
affirm or deny or suspend judgment on what is put before it by the intel­
lect. I err because I judge that some state of affairs obtains when I 
have no dequacy of evidence. Jut thi3 does not mean that &od, who has 
iven me a will whose power extends to deciding about matters which are 
not cle rly comprehended by my finite intellect, is to be held responsible 
for my errors, for I have the power to restrain the will within the limits 
of what is clearly and distinctly perceived, -nd I ought so to restrain it. 
Error thus beco. es akin to ..oral failure, and is indeed, a species of sin. 
'7e shall see later why Descartes has no conception of excusable error, 
aid ..Iso consider some of the problems raised b; his rigid distinction 
between the will and the intellect, nut first his position will be 
defended against some of the criticisms raise.' by J. L. ’vans.
Descartes, of course, thought that he had an infallible criterion of 
truth, in clear and distinct ideas, and Evans paraphrases what he takes 
to be Descartes' position on error by saying that Descartes held that 
'if we persist in assentin^ to what we do not clearly understand the 
penalty is that we assert as true what is in fact false, and the responsi­
bility is wholly ours'.' This is in fact a slight over-simplification 
of Descartes' thought,because it seems to suggest that we realise we are 
failing to understand something clearly at the same time as we assent to 
it. In fact, in Principles of Philosophy. 1.XLXV,** Descartes 3ays that 
'it happens but rarely that we judge of a matter at the 3ame time as we 
observe that we do not apprehend it'; mors often, we think that we have 
t one time reaohed an adequate understanding, when in fact we have not. 
Evans goes on to interpret Descartes as saying that we —re always free to 
assent to what is unclear; this is true, only if it is realised that on
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** h. <?• a, Voi 1 , P 236
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most occasions at least, we think we understand when we assent - as 
Descartes insists, we are taught b., the light of natural reason to judge 
only those things we understand. In most oases of error and of making 
other judg 'erits we do not have evidence for, we convince ourselves that 
our understanding of the matter is sufficient. Descartes thin a- that 
"dherence to his rules will enable us to see with certainty whether or 
not we really inderstund. The : in burden of the Fourth Meditation is 
thus not a gratuitous warning against an extreme sort of voluntarism 
(which uv: ns see s to tike it to be), but a demand that we never assent 
before applying the rules Desc rtes ha3 discovered. This shift of 
emphasis m kes r ther more sense of some of what is being proposed there, 
as we shall see.
¿vans' main line of argument against Descartes is to ask if Descartes
ir.i lies that error is volant ry, nd then to show the incoherence of the
id of man deliberately being wrong* In order to est- blish th t
De oartes believed that error w a deliberate, Bvana writes:
Clearly, Descartes must have believed that error w; s avoidable since 
he gave us the recipes by the use of which we o n '.void error. Dut 
s .ell as bein; voidable, he .apparently thought that error was 
also deliberate since he attributes its occurrence to the misuse of 
the will.*
It is not easy to see exactly how Descartes thinks of the will being 
operative in judgments, as we shall see, but one tiling he did not think 
his doctrine of assent being willed implied was that error was deliberate 
or voluntary. This is explicitly stated in the Principles, l.JCLII - 
whose title is 'How, although we do not will to err, we yet err by our 
will'. The text goes on:
But inasmuch as we know that all our errors depend on the will, and 
s no one desires to deceive himself, we may wonder that we err at 
all. ’.Ve must, however, observe that there is a great deal of 
difference between willing to be deceived and willing to give one's 
assent to opinions in which error is sometimes found. For although 
there is no one who expressly desires to err, there is hardly one
* P 136
** H & k , Vol. 1, pp 235-0
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who is not willing to give his assent to things in which 
unsuspected error is to be found. And it even frequently happens 
that it is the very desire for knowing the truth which causes those
who are not fully aware of the order in which it should be sought
for, to give judgment on things of which they have no real know­
ledge and thereby fall into error.
This pass gs has been .iven here in full, because in it Descartes Bakes 
distinction that effectively takes the force from much of ’-’vans' 
argument# For D loes not . , Ivans continually asserts he
oes, that error .3 such is wilful; what Dese rtes says is wilful, and 
for which we are therefore responsible, is the assent we give to a propo­
sition. He seems to s- y, particularly in the fourth Meditation, that
issent is noth avoidable and deliberate (though, s we shall see, he 
also thinks that so.-.e assents cannot but be given), whereas error, 
qua error, is avoidable but not deliberate. -vans misrepresents 
Deso rt In taking hi... hold that the error, as -veil -is the assent whioh 
ives rise to it, is both avoidable -and deliberate. In fact, not only 
oes gvans misrepresent Descartes at this point; he also seems himself 
to oe wrong when he finds it 'odd to assert that ocmitting myself to 
what I do not know to be true and is in faot false i c deliberate act'.* 
Unfortunately people all too often deliberately commit themselves to wh t 
they could not possibly ’.mow to oe true (because the propositions in 
juestion are false), either l'or emotional reasons, or because, as 
Descartes pointed out, they fondly imagine they did once have adequate 
grounds, which they have 'forgotten'. If such acts of committing ones-11 
to nropositions one does not have 1 equs.te evidence for are not deliberate, 
why do we blame and nunish people for doing so? Certainly no one cm 
assent to what he knows at the same time to be false, provided he is not 
being convinced oy threats or arguments that he does not really think that 
it is false, but we often assent to what we do not mow to be true; and 
the .assent itself is deliberate.
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Ev-ins goes on to say that ' just as it is unpractical and foolish 
advice to tell someone never to commit himself to what he does not know 
to be tr.e, so it is unnecessary advise to tell someone to commit himself 
to wh t he clearly and distinctly perceives'. The first part of this 
is extremely puzzling. It may be very wise for a mother to tell a 
child not to believe wh t strangers say, while one constantly has to be 
telling oneself not to believe a thing just because it is in print or 
argued for persuasively, Spinoza and Jilliam J mes may be right in 
thinking that the natural tendency of the human mind is towards complete 
oredulity» and that it is only by this tendency constantly leading us 
into difficulties that we learn a critical sense. '.'/hat Descartes is 
urging us to do is to exercise effectively the control over our beliefs 
which we c m  nd ought to have over them. Practical experience leads 
one to feel that such vice is neither unpr ictio 1 no ■ foolish.
rhere is sore to the seoond part of what ivans says, that it is 
unnecessary to tell someone to commit himself to something he clearly 
nd distinctly perceives. Desc rtes would reply that, althou h we must 
see what we clearly md distinctly perceive s true, he has raised the 
possibility of such clear and distinct perceptions in fact being false"", 
and that what he is now saying i3 that, having established the Cogito 
and the veracity of dod, we have a complete metaphysical assurance that 
we will be right in committing ourselves to what we clearly and distinctly 
perceive. If this reply is not totally convincing, Descartes would have 
more difficulty with Evans' next sentence in which he says that the need 
to commit oneself to what one knows to be true does not arise. One 
believes it in knowing it to be true, :md there can be no gap between 
ap/rehending this and assenting to it. If, as it looks, Descartes' 
model here is one of the will - the fucultas alec diva - coming in to choose
* p 139
* on now they could be false, c.i'. Killer on cit, who is rightly 
critical of the whole programme.
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to assent after the intellect - the facultas_<a£<u^ehensiva - has seen that 
something is true, it is certainly incoherent, and Ivans' criticism of it 
is well founded, 17e 3hall have more to say about the relations between 
the intellect and the will in the Cartesian analysis of the judgment in 
summing up the strengths and weaknesses of that analysis,
Ivons' next point, however, is less cert- in. He thinks that 
Descartes must hold that error is Liberate, • h .ve seen, and it 
follows from its being deliberate that when we err we must know that we 
re in error, or t least th. t what we are assenting to might be wrong. 
Once igai , we must emphasise the distinction between the assent which I 
am responsible for (which is what Descartes really seems to be getting at 
when he speaks of assent as willed jl .nd the state of error a bad is sent 
or belief puts me in, Ivans goes on to say that in fact we do not know 
that we are in error, because when we err, we thin: we know and that this 
is what constitutes the error. Psychologically, he says, knowledge and 
error are indistinguishable. In fact, Descartes would agree here 
tot lly. The reason why he resorts to the stratagem of the malin ;;5nie 
is precisely because in the past I have thought that have known some­
thin for certain which later turns out to be guise. In Principles l.V
he says one reason why we may doubt of the demonstration of Mathematics 
is that 'those who have fallen into error in reasoning on such matters 
have held as perfectly certain >.nd self-evident what we see to be false'j 
he then imm ali tely raises the ouestion AS to whether Cod, who can do what 
he wants, might not be deceiving us into thinain- mathematical demonstra­
tion is correct - such a (fod, would, of course, be the malin génie of the 
Meditations. Whether, as Miller points out, it makes any sense to doubt 
that 2 + 3 = 5 ,  or that a triangle has three sides, is another matter.
* c.f. Fourth Meditation esp., H & R Vol.l, p 17/
^  p 140
**• H & R Vol.l, p 220
•n-lso, Desoartts implicitly relies on the correctness'hie memory about 
people being mistaken, which he is not entitled to do yet, in order to 
establish his point. But, what we must insist on, against Evans, is that 
Desc rtes does not think that we are in ny sense aware of being in error. 
Descartes does hold that when we apply the rules he gives us we know that 
we know, and that one who follows the rules strictly will never be in 
error, out it docs not follow from this even if it is correct that anyone 
in error must know th t he i3. Many people have not heard of Descartes' 
rules, :nd those that have may not think them necessary or helpful in 
..very case, or may be slap-dash in applying them.
divans goes on to melee a number of distinctions in which he shows 
that error is not to oe confused with falsity (which applies to proposi­
tions, not to the people holding them), nor with ignorance, nor with 
supposal (which can be either true or false). lie finally attempts to 
distinguish error from mistaken belief, on the grounds th t in error we 
ni claim to know, whereas in mists! n Lef, we merely believe
the proposition in question, and are thus iwaro of the possioility that 
we might be wrong.* This is questionable; in many senses of 'believe', 
including that which is given as part of the definition of knowledge in 
terms of ustified true belief, we simply accept the proposition as true 
without making any distinction between degrees of certainty. ¿uestions 
about the degree of certainty one is justified in having by the evidence 
or reasons that one can produce ere very much of a second order nature 
in everyday matters. Xf a philosopher showed a man that he could not 
be c rtain or actually claim to know that p was true, according to some 
philosophical sense of 'know' .nd 'be certain', the man might well retort
that he still believes that p is true .and that there is nothing conditional 
bout his i cceptunce of p. If p turned out to be false, the man would
surely have been in error.
Indeed, there is something Strang« in t.alking, as Brans does, bout
knowledge and error as states of mind. The reason for talking in this
way seems to be that error and knowledge are conditions that 'someone may
be in'.*  But this is hardly sufficient for speaking of a state of mind.
In f ot, as .vans himself hos pointed out, knowledge and error are
psychologically indistinguishable, because in ooth cases a nan is holding-
some proposition to be true. And what could 'psychologically indistingui-
shaole' aean except 'indistinguishable as states of mind'? Strictly
uccejhkHte
speaking, the state of mind is the "srnwtin ^of or assenting to the 
proposition; the oeing right or wrong about it, which are conditions of 
knowing it or oeing in error about it, depend on additional factors outside 
one's state of mind. Knowledge and error, then, involve states of mind, 
but .re not wholly constituted by them. ,7hat constitutes the state of 
mind is the belief in the proposition concerned, and this is an automatic 
claim of the truth of that proposition. .Vhether or not we claim actually 
to now the proposition (which -.vans takes to be a necessary condition of
eing in error) is irrelevant. For taking a claim to knowledge to be a 
strictly defined or technical concept is, as Findlay points out,-*to 
introduce an .rbitrary and conventional element, which is not necessary 
for belief that the proposition in question is true. Cf course, if 
'claim to knowled e' is not taken in any technical sense, but simply as 
the equivalent of 'holding as true', ¿¡vans is right in saying that only 
claims to iuiowledge can be erroneous, but then his distinction i3 quite 
vacuous, because in all our beliefs that p, we hold p to be true. If, 
as a vans thinks, there is in belief that p, as opposed to a claim to know 
that p, something partial about our commitment to the truth of p, we ore 
not re .lly believing p at all, but another proposition which says that p 
is more or less likely. **
-/alues and Intentions, p 131 * p 141
• '“c.f. pp 41-3 above I'or comments on the notion of dl|Tt •• of belief.
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Svans points out that Descartes' question really boils down to asking 
why I accept something as true when I do not know that it is true. This, 
as he says, becomes a specially perplexing problem for Descartes who 
thought ho had one simple and infallible criterion of knowledge. However, 
although we may not believe we have one or even a group of criteria for 
guaranteeing us certainty, we are often able to distinguish a better 
method of getting at the truth of a matter from worse ones. 7e know 
that some sources are more reliable than others, we may luoow for example 
that we are more likely to get a complicated sum right if we do it on 
p. per th:m if we do it mentally. But the fact remains that we often 
do give full credence on the basis of what we know to be inferior methods 
for attaining truth. If the problem i3 not as acute for us as it was 
for Descartes, it does not seem to be substantially different. 'That 
explanation can be given for assenting to that about which we are not as 
sure as we could be?
In his summing up of the question, ivons repeats that error is
unconscious, and so cannot be deliberate or willed. We have already
seen that Desc rt I Iso thinks that error is unconscious. ¿vans then
goes on to 3ay that there can be no element of w’ill in the intuition of
cle r and distinct ideas, as in perceiving them we 3ee their truth (at
le Lst, such is Descartes’ theory). Tie will come back to this point, but
it should be noted that Descartes does not hold that for the will to be
said to be operative, it must have the sort of liberty of indifference
which would enable it to choose at random either of two alternatives.
In the Fourth Meditation, he writes
In order that I should be free it is not necessax^y that I should 
be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries; 
but contrariwise the more I lean to the one... the more freely do I 
ohooae and uabrme* it... lienee this indifference which I feel, when 
I am not swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of 
reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather evinces a 1. ok or 
ne0ution in knowledge than a p. rfection of will: for if' I I ..s 
recognised clearly h't was true and good, I should never have trouble 
in deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make, and then 
I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent. *
“ h i • r ,*7oT.i, V 17 5
Descartes, then, holds the characteristic rationalist view of freedom 
which sees the height of liberty in a self-possessed acceptance of what 
we realise could not be otherwise because of its nature or definition.
He thinks that we act with our will when we act without being constrained 
bt ny outside force. 'We would say that we will to accept clear and 
distinct i :ea3 not because we have the option of not accepting then, 
but because we ourselves perceive and accept the inner logic which nudees 
them necessarily true. Descartes may have a strange sense of will and 
of freedom here, but it saves him i'rom the strictures of logical absurdity 
thrown by Evans at his doctrine of a free assent to clear and distinct 
ideas.*
Evans goes on to criticise Descartes for telling us to restrict 
our assent to matters that are obviously true"* or platitudes*"*. We 
don't know whether Evans considers the truths of mathematics and physics 
to be platitudes, but Descartes certainly thought he had the means of 
attaining them.** *'"
However, if Descartes is too restrictive in what he allows us to 
assent to, this is not because he is wrong in telling us to ensure that 
we ssent only when what we assent to is well-founded, but because he had 
too rigid a criterion of the well-founded. In fact, we do not have a 
single criterion of reasonable belief, and the criteria we do have are 
not infallible. This explains why even the best and most scrupulously 
attested judgments sometimes turn out to be wrong. That Descartes could 
find no room in his account for excusable error is certainly a defect in 
that account, but it arises from mistakes in his conception of the role 
of clear and distinct ideas and the notion that we have an infallible 
criterion of truth, rather than from his analysis of error.
* c.f. p 145
* p 146
*** P 147
• * c.f. e.g. p.art V of Discourse on the Method, H & R, ITol.l, pp 10'-118
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'vans concludes his criticisms of Descartes by reiteratin that to 
s that error is (sometimes at least) unavoidable is not the same as 
saying it is deliber- te* But, of course, be*3cartes never mads this 
fund mental mistake. Evans concludes by asserting that error is intrin­
sic lly neither unavoidable nor avoidable; it i3 just something that 
h p ens to one like falling downstairs.* Curiously enough, Bernard 
.r'O in his ttack on Descartes’ vie.-' of belief uses the same metaphor. 
But is belief like falling downstairs? Do we not have some control over 
our explicit beliefs? Common sense would seem to support Descartes here; 
we should make ourselves responsible for our explicit beliefs, and up to 
a point, error is avoidable, even if not cjua error deliberate. "7e 
do not excuse people for givin false testimony even if they are sincere 
lerely on the grounds that they did not want to be wrong* 
i'_ -rt 2 - besc -rtes on 'irror: Assessment
•7e re now In a position to 1 ke balanced assessment of Descartes' 
views on error "aid on the role of the will in judgment. If we are to 
.rgue that his ipproach to these questions is basically sound, we must 
first indicate where his theories of human psychology and clear and 
distinct ideas lead h? tray in the exposition of this approaoh*
Desc rtes' basic distinction between the will and the intellect, so 
that the intellect is completely passive and the will responsible for 
actually making judgments leads him to speak of the will as a mode of 
thinking*'* *. But this is a curious way to speak of faculty which is 
in itself bli d, and which has to be guided by the intellect before it 
c n pprehend anything* It is difficult to see the precise role of the 
■•ill in the act of assenting to clear and distinct ideas, which are all, 
in Descartes' view, that we ought to assent to. Although the role oi the
* PP 147-8
'Belief nd Constraint', loc cit, p 152 
Principles. 1.XXXII, H & it, Vol.l, p 232e v V
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will is more often emphasised as being one which enables us to refuse 
. ssent to anything not perceived s certain, Descartes insists that the 
will is essential for making any judgment.’'
However, there is a certain ;jnbiguity here, as if at times Descartes 
thought that no positive act of will w s in fact necessary after we had 
perceived something as clear ;ind distinct. We have already seen that 
he thinks of true liberty as consisting in submission to the demands of 
the intellect, which would 3eem to imply that we make no positive act of 
will when we perceive that something is certain. Further, in Principles 
l.VT and 1.J0CXIX* ' he sees our power of suspending judgment extending 
only to notions which -re not indubitable or perfectly certain. In the 
Sixth bet of Replies , r,c rtas writes that ’nothing whatsoever can 
be clearly and distinctly perceived... that is not perceived to be such 
is it is, i.e. which is not true.’, while in the fourth Meditation, he 
writes of the Cogito that he ’could not prevent (himself) from believing 
th: t - thing !)ie; so clearly uerceived was true ’• * * In the Second Set 
of Replies , Descartes explains that we can doubt the Cogito only 
by believing it to be true because to doubt it we have to think of it, 
and we cannot think- Of it without seel ig it is true, which is equivalent 
to saying that v.e can never doubt it. Vith the Cogito and ’other similar 
truths' there would seem to be no distinction between apprehension and 
assent, no possibility for the will to do anything but assent. Here the 
will is constrained to assent, which would seem to be the same as saying 
that it plays no role at all in the act of assent once the intellect has 
seen the self evidence of the Cogito.
Does this lack of activity of the will extend to our assents to 
mathematical truths nd to other clear ■ nd distinct ideas, as well s to
c.f. Principles, 1.XXXIV, H & R, Vol.l, p 233 
.. . R, Vol. 1, pp 221 and 2^5 
■ to the Seventh Objeotion, H i R, Vol.2, p 267 
■ ' H c- R, Vol. 1, p 176 
■* ■ ** Ii & ft, Vol.2, p 42
1 f* •».?* * M B b * if ;-i, ■M M n M R n m ■ n ■ "j a
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3 well as to the fundamentally self-verifying ideas of the Cogito and 
the existence of od? Although Descartes thinks that we .re naturally 
c rrie to believe any dear and distinct idea, he thinks too that it is 
possible to douct, for example, that the t r Les of a triangle .--.re 
equal to two right angles, unless we know that the criterion of clear and 
distinct ideas is Itself metaphysically assured.*  He thinks, of course, 
that he had succeeded in effecting just such a doubt by the device of the 
alia genie. We probably feel that the truths tics re just
s (if not more) 'self-evident* than the Co ito or tl fence of u-od,
and that Descartes should not have located a possibility of refusing 
issent in the one case, where he found no such possibility in the other. 
Perhaps the most that can be said in his defence here i3 that a faulty 
..ethodology led him postulate a gap between apprehension aid ssent where 
none exists in fact or could exist in theory, cold where he himself thinks 
that ve • re so disposed by r.1 ture that on apprehending ve cannot possibly 
fail to assent.** He should have seen how unnatural was the device 
vhich 3ug --‘ste 1 e could doubt whet we clearly perceive to be true, and 
vhich would in such a case have the will at first suspend judgment and 
later give assent.
The other major defect in Descartes account of the function of the 
will in belief and error also rises from his account of the nature of 
cle r nd distinct ideas. Because he felt that his criterion of knowledge 
w s both infallible and universal, he could give no account of excusable 
error. "ith Descartes, there could, in speculative matters, be no mid­
point between certainty .nd ignorance, no concept of the probable, nor 
could we ever De excused for being wrong. ibis mistake is also aue to 
his belief in his criterion, rather than to his account of error being an 
ffnir of the will; we are prepared to speak of error being avoidable
* c.f. Replies I, H & R, Vol.2, p 39
* Principles. 1.XLIH, H R, ITol.l, |
nd, in a sense, culpable when the person who errs has not used the best 
criterion open to him for attaining truth.
Once it realised that Descartes is not saying that "e have liberty 
of indifference when we are faced with what the intellect sees as certain 
nd that the defects in his account of error arise principally from his 
misguided methodology it is possible to come to a more positive assess- 
ent of what he says about the place of the will in belief. "hat he is 
driving :t is that we are responsible for our acts of assent in the 
sense th t the criterion and evidence on which we .judge is adopted by us, 
it r actively or ult. On his account, w ve to do is
to ssent only when we are sure we have a clear and distinct idea; 
where the will really comes in is in restraining ourselves from making 
cognitive decision until we re certain of the matter (or, we would 
say, reasonably assured).
Desc rtes does not say that ■ e re free to believe what we see as 
false. 'Vhat he does say is tint we will (i.e. are responsible for) the 
explicit acts of assent we make. ffe are responsible for them because 
3 ccept the reasons on which the beliefs are base . e^ may if they 
re adequate and convincing have no choice but to accept then and to 
ssent. This Descartes does not deny; as e have seen, he thinks this 
is the height of freedom.
¡low in particular does Descartes think that we are induced to go 
beyond what we dearly and intellectually grasp in our judgments, how, ±n 
other words, do we misuse the will? In the D -,-"c Jure.-.' or. lie _ othod- , 
lie speaks of I voiding precipitation and prejudice in .ud_ments. '.tienne 
lilson in his well-known commentary on the Discourse. " explains what 
» Descartes means by these terms. Precipitation arises from excessive 
confidenoe in the resources of our mind, the fear of effort which makes *
* H f R, Vol. 1, p 92
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us prefer to guess about difficult matters at random than to restrain 
one's judgment to the truth of simple matters, human respect which makes 
us r-ther judge at random than admit ignorance and excessive haste 
le ding ua to examine questions which have not been well put. Prejudice 
rises first from what we have been brought up to believe and the 
impossibility of forgetting these ideas, together with the difficulty of 
thinking without recourse to the imagination and the necessity of using 
words udging them rather than ideas* If some of these failings
.re not positively willed, it is not stretch ln„ language too mu oh to 
say that it is often weakness of will which allows them to go unchecked 
:.n.l undetected. It is because we are unwilling to practice the intellec­
tual virtues of circumspection (not assenting where we do not understand) 
and methodic doubt that ae fall into the errors for which we may be 
blamed - that is, Lee- use for acme reason or other, we do not use the 
best ivailable method of reaching the truth* Thus in Replies /••, 
Descartes writes:
When you judge th t the mind is s. certain attenuated body, you are 
indeed dole to understand that the mind is itself, i.e. a thinking 
thing, nd likewise that an attenuated body is an extended thing; 
but assuredly you do not understand that the tiling whj.ch thinks and 
tlie extended" thing are one .nd the same thing, you only wish to 
believe it because you have already believed it and do not willingly 
change your mind. Thus when you judge that an apple which has been 
poisoned will suit you as food, you indeed understand that its odour, 
colour, and similar qualities are pleasant, but not that the apple 
is therefore good for you as food; it is because you wish to 
believe it that you pass that judgement.
7ie have here examples of prejudice and precipitation respectively.
The person making the mistake does not .now that he is wrong, and so he 
cannot wish to err. But in both cases, his judgment is taken to exc od 
the evidence (or whit he understands). Por making these judgments, he 
is responsible, and, .s they are bad jud^ents here, culpaole too.
This is why Descartes says that he wishes to oelieve these errors. 3y
f.
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the word 'wish', Descartes implies that the man has decided that the 
judgments in question are acceptable. It is not that the will has a 
voluntaristic effect over our assents (though there may be such an effect 
s well, s we 3hall see below), but that in making any judgment, right 
or wrong, we decide to accept or reject a proposition on the basis of 
some particular evidence and criterion. As with other types of action," 
our reasons for isRenting may be good or bad. Descartes has trieu to 
m-ice us aware of the factors which lead us to assent and to show us the 
control we could and should have over those factors.
- rt Assent as Somethin,; for which 'iV re Aesnonsiole
The conclusion from this examin tion of Descartes’ views on error 
nd the place of the will in judgments is that when I explicitly advert 
to belief, in the manner described in the previous chapter, in making 
my decision on that belief, I use certain criteria and methods, the 
responsibility for which I must be prepared to take. This is not to 
deny that sometimes this responsibility may be excused on the grounds 
that I was 30ci.Jly or psychologically conditioned to accept a proposition 
s true, and to take s acceptable cert-in ways of reaching a cognitive 
d cision. Nevertheless, as we showed in Chapter 3» belief is a public 
concept only because there is a basic common understanding oi what counts 
c true, nd hence of which ways of reaching the truth are justifiable.
The concept of belief could not be grounded on a totally perverse set of 
beliefs or of rules for believing, nor on beliefs and methods which were 
accepted only in certain social contexts and not in others or the concept 
of belief would it3elf be specific to particular societies ana times. 
Clearly, many beliefs, including many of the most basic ones, transcend 
particular conditions, and on the basis of these we derive universally 
acceptable criteri of truth.
however, it cannot be denied that a large number of beliefs which 
. L j import nt pi rts in people’s lives O U  be analysed un terms of social 
nd psychological conditioning, so that it looks as if the believers in
.ct exorcise little rational control over them. But once we realise 
this, we should become Cartesians, rigourously enquiring into our 
re sons nd motives for beliefs in areas we have cause to suspect are 
ffectod by such conditioning. Far from destroying the sense of 
responsibility we should have for what we believe, sociology and 
psychology enable us to see the non-rational factors which influence 
our beliefs, and then - and not before - we can do something about then. 
These sciences make us more rather than less responsible for what we 
believe, for once the irrationality of holding a certain belief is 
pointed out, we can no longer hold it and remain rational without finding 
some better reason.
In insisting that the responsibility for a belief is ultimately 
that of the believer, even if sometimes his responsibility is limited by 
other conditi'ns lie could not control, we do not aetan that a man c .n 
necess rily believe what he likes, or even necessarily what, for some 
ctran ioui re son, he thinks he ought to believe. This would seem to be 
partly a consequence of the logical connection of belief with the public 
sense of what is true; in believing ft proposition, ft nan as implicitly 
putting it with propositions other rational beings will iind crediule.
-_nd of course, because of the transparent nature of his own current 
thoughts, a man cannot believe something which at the 3ame time he 
iznows or thinks to be untrue. Thus, there is in belief no self-'eception 
:in to lying or deception of others. A man deceives someone else when 
he makes that other person take as true what he himself thinks i3 ialse.
A condition of possibility of success here is that the deceived should 
not realise that the deceiver does not believe what he is saying, out 
when deceived and deceiver are the same person, this condition obviously 
cannot be fulfilled. Self deception of this type is ns paradoxical 
s deliberately erring or intentionally and consciously forgetting.
140.
So* however much a nan may want to believe p, if p does not seem 
to him to be true he will not there and then be able to believe p. 
e might come to oelieve p by searching out new evidence, or by changing 
iteri h# considers relevant to the truth of p, or even by bringing 
p .bout, but once he has done one of these things, p will seem true to 
him, uid so he //ill now automatic/ lly believe p. Por a man to say 
' ' ould like to believe p* is, at the tine of utter rice, a profession
of scepticis ., s it implies that, whatever else he might do later, at 
that does not believe p. When we read of Mahler, for example,
that he strugi *d for religious faith, without being able to jive
lefinite 'Yes' or a definite 'ho', or even to put the question aside, 
we must recognise that a wish to believe and to be relieved from the 
irritation of doubt, is not in itself enough to bring about the desired 
result.
People who are mentally ill may be able to satisfy some deep need of 
tire psyche by 'forgetting' wh t they really ’mow perfectly well. A 
holo leal cample of this is Siegfried's forgetting of his betroth" 1  
to Briinnhilde, if ter having been given the magic potion, (the drinking 
of magic notions in myth frequently standing for the effects of under­
lying ourposes of the unconscious). In his conscious sell, aiegjried 
r s lly does not remember irurmhilde; there is a OOmplete bloc.o here 
- 1. en his present and his past. But it would be hard to • rgue oh t 
■ moles, real or legendary, of such schizoid amnesia were cases of 
itlievin b< cause we want* Apart xrom the f>-ct that they 1 1 . c.uei. 
only .t the expense of the disintegration of the personality, so that 
-t different times the subject is in two states which are unrelated to 
each other, we could not oe said to will to forget what we forget in 
schizophrenic moments. Even if on an unconscious level some psychic
do not will thi3 purpose, in any ordinarypirpoae is oeing served, we
lifl.
So, however much a nan may want to believe p, if p does not seen 
to him to be true he will not there and then be able to believe p. 
ho might come to believe p by searching out new evidence, or by changing 
the criteria he considers relevant to the truth of p, or even by bringing 
p about, but once he has done one of these things, p will seem true to 
him, and so he will now automatic lly believe p, i’or a man to say 
' .-ould like to believe p' is, at the tine of utter nee, a profession 
of scepticism, as it implies til .t, whatever el3e he might do later, at 
that time, he does not believe p. Then we read of Mahler, for example, 
that he struggled hard for religious faith, without being able to give a 
definite 'Yes' or a definite 'No', or even to put the question aside, 
we must recognise that a wish to believe and to be relieved from the 
irritation of doubt, is not in itself enough to bring about the desired 
result.
People who are mentally ill may be able to satisfy some deep need of 
the psyche by 'forgetting' what they really know perfectly well. A
] - Lc 1 -¡pie of this is Siegfried's forgetting of his betrothal 
to Brunnhilde, fter having been given the magic potion, (the drinking 
of magic potions in myth frequently standing for the effects of under­
lying purposes of the unconscious). In his conscious self, Siegfried 
re lly does not remember iriinnhilde; there is a complete block here 
- t ten his present and his past* But it would be hard to t rgue ui t 
■ moles, real or legendary, of such schizoid amnesia were cases of 
be lie yin >.- cause we W nt. ¿qjart x'rom the fact that they . re ch-^ eved 
only t the expense of the disintegration of the personality, so that 
t different times the subject is in two states which are unrel ted to 
each other, we could not be said to will to iorget ‘•h t we - orget in 
schizophrenic moments. iven if on an unconscious level some psychic 
purpose is oeing served, we do not will this purpose, In any ordinary
sense of 'will', because it is of its essence that on a conscious level 
we should be unaware of it.
But we should not conclude that because a certain model of the way 
the will operates in belief is incoherent, the will has no role in our 
forming of our beliefs. The example of the man wishing to believe 
so isthing he mows to be false, as wall s that of schisoid amnesia 
if it is thou hi state consciously sought nd chieved, both
>elieve something -t first, but who r  , 
bt -n ct of will m m ges to believe what he cle; rly sees to be false. 
Against ti-is view, it will be objected that once I have understood the 
, I , or ax ib tie, that 2 + 2  = 5, however much I
ant to, nd however strongly I will to. Neither does it seem possible 
: or me to believe that I an rich or powerful or living in the nineteenth 
century . ust because X would Hire to believe these things; the contrary 
is too often ¿orced on my attention .md I see that they are false all too 
cle rly. Stuart Hampshire concludes that bee .use we are not free to 
control assent as we please, it is wrong to speak of it as an act oi 
will. He ex mines locutions like 'I want to believe what you are telling 
e, but I c .nnot' .and 'I ;jn determined to believe whatever he tells me', 
concluding that they are 'virtually professions of scepticism'« Iis 
reasoning here is that there is no sense in which X decide to decide that 
-a state i-;nt is true. TThile wh.it he says about the lirst oi the locu^ xons
(Mi t it is a nrofes3ion of scepticism) would seem to be correct, it is 
not at all clear that the second is a profession of scepticism, virtu lly 
or otherwise. Occasions can be envisaged where one is convinced of 
someone's veracity, and so determines to believe whatever he says, despite 
its possible Tirima facie implausibility. If this is true, Hampshire's 
re .son falls too, for deciding to decide that the man's statements re *
* 'i’hou ht .and Action, London, 19v ’> PP 155-8
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true i3 precisely what I am doing. (Presumably anyone who makes an 
open commitment to someone else's authority, religious or secular, does 
just this).
re-son why 'I want to believe what you re tellir.. , it I 
cannot' is a profession of disbelief is because I have already assented 
to the op osite or at least concluded that the evidence is inadequate 
either way, I have already seen that the opposite to what you are telling 
e is or equally well could be the case, and this precisely is to assent; 
so once this has been done, there can be no new fre t >r this,
so long as I do not change ny mind, Si ilarly, why I oaunot isaent to 
2 + 2 = 5 is because I see immediately th°t 2 + 2 = 4 is true (i.e. assent 
to it). Here there may be no distinction between understanding and 
ssenting, jut it in not inoonoeiv ble that so .-.eone else night assent to 
2 + 2  . . i hi ■' th t he h's Misunderstood the question, but we
c .nnot say that - however wrongly - he doe3 not think that 2 + 2 = 5 is 
true. The reason why I cannot assent to 2 + 2 = 5 or the statement that 
I am rich and so on is not because I sm 1'orced to believe that these things 
are false and have no chance Of thinking them true, but because I see 
a ■ L tely th t they ore f lse, and thus I assent to their being lulse, 
probably without noticing any distinction between understanding the 
question and giving judgment on it. It probably seems to me that I have 
no control over these beliefs, because I seem to have no choice with 
r<-;' .rd to them.
But to return to the person for example, a child who thinks 2 + 2 = 5, 
we might manage to show him that he ¡-3 wron; (i.e. to ; et hi..i to c.- n, e 
his belief); in doing this, we help him to «zeroise I more rational 
control over his beliefs, so that he no longer simply puts down a larger 
number where he sees • plus sign, but works it out accurately. Kventually, 
for him too, simple addition sums will require no working out, and he will
143.
simply see the correct answer immediately, but this will be because he is 
regulating correctly the evidence and methods on which he bases his beliefs 
not because ne has no control here t all.
In fact, it is at the point of applying the rules for coming to 
cognitive decisions that we do have control over what *e believe, and 
whare the will nay be s ..id to be operative* Once the rules .re applied, 
we often assent as soon as we understand the question; in any oaae,
. fr# dom of choice at this point. Of course, where 
uot.. the criteria nd subject matter of the belief come under the general 
c -tegory of common sense, e normally decide what to believe according to 
common sense witho it t kin any thought over it, out oven here it is 
possible to judge according to completely wayward criteria. In the 
Z .iro ai dhouse scene in Ibsen's Peer lynt, we neat a nan whose misfortune 
it is to . for blotting paper when he is in fact a pen. It
is not easy to see wh it criterion could lead a nan to think of himself 
as a nen, but of course, we are dealing with e nadnen* One of the ways 
insanity manifests itself is presumably in the tenacious holding of 
erratic beliefs, which cnnot be justified on any normal criterion of 
truth. We have argued in Chapter 3 that without a normal or common 3ense 
criterion of truth, there would be no concept oi oelie.’ , so in a sense we 
.re not free to choose whether or not to believe according to this 
criterion; hence segregation for those who re unable to ccept i..
Then we move away from natters of accepted common sense and ordinary 
f otu l bell -3 to natters on which people feel strongly (.or cxfiipl#, 
politics or sport) we find that the criteria on which judgments are based 
ere frequently of an Individualistic nature, if no. actually irr ti nal 
and unjustifiable. So much is this the case sometimes th-t in addition 
to saying that belief .is under the control of the will aa far as the 
criteria used are chosen ay, or at least the responsibility oi the
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oeliever, we seem to be forced to say that people are believing what 
they want to believe and because they want to. It might be difficult 
to find any other reason for the belief of the rugger player that all 
demonstrators are communists agitators, or that of the demonstrator
'veryone who opposes his views is a fascist. In the3e cases, the 
criterion on which the belief i3 based is very largely one of prejudice, 
nd bett r criteria re vailable, which the people in the examples 
ijpiore. 'Thy do they not choose the better criteria? It is simply that 
they decile to use the ones which they want (i.e. which ■ tisfy their 
prejudices or emotions). As we have seen, it is only marginally possible 
to rant to take up different criteria for buliure. ivf ordinary factual 
a tters, hut in other matters the possibility of freedom here'* is quite 
ide. Of course, people probably would not say that they use less good 
criteria for their judgments or that they choose them irrationally or 
•ven ej in ted them; what we have been trying to show is that,
for etteMT. reason, good or bad, intellectual or voluntaristic, they 
chooae them or at least are responsible for them, "ind the more they become 
re of this, the mor rational their beliefs can become. In the sense 
that we ourselves are responsible for the rules and criteria according to 
which we assent, assent itself can be spoken of as involving the will.
In so far as a belief can be shown, as a result of prejudioe or emotion, 
to go gainst or beyond the evidence wliich is available, we can see what 
Descartes means when he says that more is contained in the judgment <>han 
is resented to the intellect, and /hy he attributes this to th will.
We have tried to show that the will is operative in all assents, including 
o d ones, in the sense that we adopt the criteria on wh .ch we assent, 
re not arguing for total freedom even here; one criterion (e»g. 
science) might seem better than another (superstition), ven though the
Desoartes' liberty of indifference.
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latter might serve our ends better. Then it might seem that we have no 
option except to choose scienoe, but in so far as we see the reasons for 
science, the decision can still be ttri'outed to us, as Descartes himself 
showed. Further, if, in renouncing superstition, we had to throw over 
a number of past beliefs md attitudes, we would realise just how personal 
an act this decision was.
Acceptance of a framework in which we believe may be as methodical 
and excogit ted as the scholastic interpretation of Augustine’s Credo ut 
intellegian according to which no proposition of natural philosophy could 
be llowed to contradict any theological truth, or it may be random and 
haphazard as when a mother believes those propositions about her children 
which fit in with her feelings, or it may be a matter of taking up a 
dogmi tic political £ ttitude and believing only whi t will fit in with it, 
or it could be a cool and rational decision to root out all that is not 
cle r and distinct, or it might be what we all do almost imperceptibly 
in accepting to a greater or less extent the decrees of common sense. 
Perhaps we have suggested that taking up a framework is more explicit and 
conscious that it often is, find that there is more freedom of choice here 
than people in fact experience, and that the distinction between a belief 
nd its framework is too clear cut and schematic. Nonetheless, in 
arriving at any belief, I implicitly make use of, and thereby accept, some 
. .ethod of getting at the truth. To become conscious of just what method 
is being used is what Descartes proposes. Although it is not impossible 
th■t common sense might be modified in certain respects, because belief 
is only ossible at ; 11 given its basic criteria and assumptions, we will 
not find that we have any option but to accept it in general, but on other 
matters, such as taking up a theory of history, there may well be some 
room for an exercise of choice regarding methods oi investigation. Tt 
might not be stretching language too much to follow Descartes in speaking
of such decisions, and even of the beliefs which arise from them, as 
willed.
Before closing this chapter we must refer to two ways in which the 
will might be said to operate where we have previously suggested it had 
no place; that is, after we have seen that something is true (assented 
to it), to believe the opposite. As both the methods seem to require long 
term 'brainwashing', even though it is self-'.nduced, they do not really 
contradict our thesis that to see something as true is simply to believe 
it, s the person involved will never at the same time see that something 
is true and fail to believe it. In fact, the first method, at least, 
fit3 in with what we have said about selecting frameworks within which 
we believe, as it involves concentrating only on what favours our side.
The methods ..re mentioned by ¡1. H. Price in 'Belief and rill'.* The 
first method proposed by which I might control my assent is by delibera­
tely and systematically directing my attention to wha^ t favours my interest, 
iy lafli ting the importance of favourable evidence, I may be able to 
convince myself th t contrary evidence is of less value. riven though 
it might be difficult to put one's finger on a particular deliberate ct 
of will, as the process is a gradual one, the process itself ma^  oe called 
deliberate, particularly if it moves in the direction of some admitted 
bias.
Price's second method of deliberately influencing a belief is, he 
claims, even more powerful than the first. Certainly it is more clearly 
deliberate. It is to fix the mind on the proposition we want to be 
convinced of and 'to ira ..pine In s much . etuil us possible the kind of 
situation there would be if the proposition were true'.’1 This new 
realisation of what the belief means is supplemented with acting s i* 
the oelief were true, ;-nd it is quite possible that the result will be
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belief that is firm enough to stead independent of evidence. Price 
points out that states of belief are produced involuntarily by manipula­
tion of 3uch methods by advertisers, politicians nd so on, so there 
seems to be no reason why we should not be able to produce such states 
ourselves. Experience would suggest that sometimes we can. The author 
of the Imit ,ti:n of Christ, for example, recommends people who doubt of 
their salvation to act as if they were saved in order to overcome their 
doubts. Hampshire says that it is logically absurd to prohibit the 
holding of o<rtain beliefs by law.' The reason for this would seem to 
be not, as he suggests, that we may not be able to bring ourselves 
eventually to believe wh t we want, but that it is impossible that one 
can legislate that people want something - though of course, even here 
■ nts can be subtlely induced.
If Price is right, then, there may be a sense in which we can believe 
what e want. One could add that in emotional states, people may 'see' 
or 1 understand' things they normally doubt, and that they can deliberately 
induce such states to re-inforce their belief. but in these cases, there 
is willing additional to and distinct from the willing we find in all 
cases of explicit belief. ”.'e hope that it is by now sufficiently clear 
that this willing does not consist in some act after X have seen that 
something is the case, but that in seeing - rightly or wrongly - th: t 
something is the case, I implicitly accept some way of attaining truthj 
and that even if this method is, as Descartes thought of his method, 
self-verifying, I can still be said to will to use it, at least in 
distinction to other less good methods I might have used and in so far as 
I myself decide that it is the best method.
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Introduction
In this chapter we will continue our discussion of the contexts 
into which our individual beliefs fit, and within which they make sense.
’»Ve will consider how far the adoption of such a framework can be seen as 
the result of decisions taken either by individuals or by the communities 
to which they belong. Vie will attempt to show how the limits of what is 
believable or acceptaule may be determined as the result of having such 
frameworks. 7/hat we say here will tie in with our insistence in 
Chapter 3 that the concept of belief requires for its intelligibility a 
common standard of cognitive acceptability. It will also tie in with 
the stress in Chapter 4, Part 1, on the importance of understanding the 
context of individual beliefs in order to grasp their true import. In 
order to show how the beliefs of an individual must themselves, if they 
are to be rational, begin to form a system, we 3hall make use of ideas 
proposed in Chapter 3 about the awareness an individual has of his beliefs. 
This chapter will therefore sum up much of what has gone before. In the 
first two sections we will emphasise the constraints imposed on what a 
man may believe by the drive towards logical consistency in his own 
beliefs, on the one hand, and by the social understanding of what it is 
possible for a reasonable man to believe on the other. In the third 
part, we will consider how it may be possible for the belieis of a 
community to 3hape the evidence on the basis of which it is able to 
verify the same Deliefs. We will, however, stress throughout that to 
say that belief is socially determined in various ways does not mean that 
we should not or cannot criticise society's standards oi belief, and 
suggest new ones. Belief may then remuin both rational and free, in the 
sense proposed in Chapter 6.
P rt _1 - The Need for Logical Consistency in relief
Cardinal Newman remarks in the preface to his Idea of a University 
th t there are many people who 'have no difficulty in contradicting 
themselves in successive sentences without being aware of it'. Of 
such people, is it true to say that they believe p and not-p at the 
same time? However unpalatable it may be to philosophers, the state of 
affairs envisaged by Newman is not uncommon, particularly when the 
contradiction is only implicit, in the sense that the juxtaposition of 
p nd not-p irises only fter we h ive drawn some logical consequences 
from a man's explio . Wt should not s y th t a man is
irr tional (as opposed to obtuse) for holding on to two beliefs which 
re implicitly contradictory so Ion, s he is unav. re of the contradic­
tion. aven less is there anythin;; irrational in holding together two 
beliefs which are only contradictory given some piece of factual information 
not currently ,v ilable to the subject. This latter is the Category into 
which the examples of referential opacity fall: Jom is irrational in 
believing th..t Cicero denounced Catiline while at the same time denying 
that 'fully denounced Catiline only if he knows that Cicero and fully are 
the suae person.
If, however, we find that a man at one time sincerely assents to p 
nd then later ssents to not—p, either Dy implication or .n the same 
words, does the later belief automatic .lly rule out the earlier? Or 
might we find ourselves accepting a conjunction of this type:
(l) w sincerely denies w believes that...
with one nd the same sentence in both clanks (regarded as objectionaole 
by Quine)?* Although we have argued in Chapter 5 that a man's 
explicit sincere assents must be regarded as the 1 st word on his 
also stressed in Chapter 4 that we should notbeliefs, we have
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assume a man accepts any of the logical consequences of his beliefs. In 
other words (l) does not necessarily describe our situation, which is 
rather:
(2) w believes not-p.w believes p
Obviously this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, but it is not as 
bad as (l), because an assent to not-p is not the same as a denial of or 
disbelief in p.* In other words, even if we rule out (l) as internally 
inconsistent, in view of the primacy we have given to a man's current 
thoughts in determining what he believes, so that if he says he does not 
believe p (i.e. either denies p or is agnostic about p), we cannot say 
consistently that he believes p, we are not thereby committed to ruling 
out schemata such as (2).
Indeed, (2)-type schemata are sometimes true (and a fortiori consis­
tent), when we put a person’s explicit beliefs side by side, or make one 
or two simple logical moves on two of his explicit beliefs. In such 
cases, it is in showing the person concerned that (2) is true of his 
beliefs that we get him to move to a more rational set of beliefs. To 
rule out (2) as internally inconsistent would seem to imply that a man could 
not (as opposed to should not) have contradictory beliefs.
It is therefore possible for a man to have beliefs which are contra­
dictory, find even to hold on to them tenaciously after the fact has been 
pointed out to him (perhaps in the hope that the contradiction will 
eventually be resolved); but, as pointed out in Chapter 3* the concept 
of belief demands for its intelligible application that there exist common 
standards of appropriateness whioh link belief with what is believed.
Later in this chapter we will consider what implications this has for the 
content of what is believed. But as far as the logical relationship of
* Israel Scheffler has a similar argument to the effect that denial or 
disbelief of p is not the same as non-belief of p. Thus to assent to 
p and not-p is not equivalent to believing and not-believing p.
(c.f. The Anatomy of Inouiry. London, 1964, p 97n)
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beliefs is concerned, common standards of appropriateness demand at the 
very least, as a purely formal requirement, that a man's beliefs should 
be consistent with each other. Otherwise, if a man could hold contra­
dictory beliefs, without this itself being a ground for criticism of his 
beliefs, communication between believers would be impossible, for no one 
would ever have to renounce a belief that p just because not-p turned 
out to be the case. He could believe p and not-p. This would of 
course have fatal results for communication, because if a man were 
allowed to believe p and not-p without this being a ground for complaint, 
there would be nothing he could be barred from believing on grounds of 
consistency as any proposition whatever is derivable from the conjunction 
of p and not-p. Moreover, we would never be justified in inferring that 
just because a man believed p he did not believe not-p as well.
Findlay in /alues find Intentions characterises the logical require­
ment that beliefs should be taken to exclude whatever contradicts them 
explicitly or implicitly as the essential 'openness' of beliefs, which 
he describes as 'unconditioned':
To take something to be real or true, in contexts where these 
words express unqualified belief... does mean being ready to 
consider what is asserted in the light of countless possible 
circumstances, however alien, that could possibly bear upon it, 
it does in short mean being ready to fit it into a context 
capable of indefinite expansion and in every possible direction...
An essential omnidirectional openness may therefore... rightly 
be affirmed of belief.*
He qualifies this by saying that he does not wish to imply that in 
making an assertion of belief, a man includes in the content or meaning 
of that assertion all the infinite possible circumstances that might 
at some remote remove bear on his belief • Obviously a man will often 
be quite unaware of precisely what he is committing himsell in his 
beliefs. His commitment i3 then unconditioned or indefinite, looking 
forward to whatever will tend to corroborate the belief find expecting
pp 98-9
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the absence of whatever will refute it, even though the believer himself 
is unaware of what form possible corroborations and refutations might 
take, and perhaps lails to recognise them when he actually encounters 
them,
Findlay goes on to speak of the way this openness grows into a
single picture of reality:
The unconditional character of believing means, further, not merely 
that we are ready for an indefinite contextual extension of what 
we have in mind, but also that this contextual extension must be 
unique and embracing, that it brooks no parallel infinite along­
side of itself... If our thought and experience roved to and fro 
between two systematic contexts, neither of which w-s in any way 
continuous with the other, we could not be said to believe in 
the contexts of either context, except perhaps in some loose and 
derived sense. Only if both were somehow co-ordinated in a 
single picture... or if the one were definitely subordinated 
to the other, being thought of as a dream or fiction or purpose 
of beings placed in the other, could the notion of belief have 
significant application.*
i.'e could add that it is not possible to have two contexts of belief with­
out self-contradiction. dither the contexts do not clash, in which case, 
there is really only one; or they do clash, in which case we have an 
inconsistent set of beliefs, the undesirability of which has already been 
indicated.
What for Findlay distinguishes our serious beliefs from fictions 
and imaginings is the expectation that serioud beliefs will be corroborated 
by compulsive experience - experience which will impinge on us in some 
way, whether we like it or not. It is certainly debatable whether 
every belief is like this; many beliefs are tenaciously clung; to despite 
being refuted by compulsive experience, however this notion is worked out 
in detail**. However, it is clear that such wayward beliefs are possible 
only given a foundation of beliefs which, to use Findlay's idiom, are 
corroborated by compulsive experience, as an understanding of truth 
clearly owes much to such experience.
Findlay in fact goes on to say that it is only when we have a
* pp 100-1
** Objection due to Griffiths, loc cit, p 1 } 6
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relatively systematic and coherent picture of or feeling lor compulsive 
experience that explicit belief in individual circumstances is possible. 
This picture has to loom massively and inevitably in the background, 
rather than being consciously believed, or there will need to be yet 
another background for it.’' Findlay is probably correct in thinking 
that without some underlying feeling for reality, it would not be possible 
to distinguish what we believe from what we merely imagine, though 
whether he is right in thinking that this grasp of reality is itself the 
foundation of belief in the way he suggests is another matter. In so 
far us it seems to be something purely personal, it would seem to suffer 
from so le of the drawbacks we found associated in Chapter 1 with theories 
which identified belief through private feelings. Certainly, it is not 
cle r that everybody's sense of reality i3 the same, as we ooviously 
modify and adapt our individual pictures in the light of public criticism 
and scientific discovery.
We have tried to base the beliefs of individuals not on their 
personal feeling for reality, but on their grasp of public criteria of 
cognitive acceptability. .That is important in Findlay's account for our 
present purpose is the suggestion that belief, because of the open nature 
of the commitment a believer has to future and further corroborations of 
his beliefs, has of its very nature a tendency to build up a logically 
coherent and single picture of reality. These two notions come together 
at this point, when we consider that the public grasp of truth, from which 
we first learn what it is to believe, is itself a system, or as 
Wittgenstein puts it, a totality of judgments. In the same place he 
says:
When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not 
a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light 
gradually dawns over the whole) . *  *‘r
* Findlay, op cit, pp 104-5
** On Certuinty. edited by 0. k. 4. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, 
translated by Denis Paul and G. K. l»i. Anscomoe, Oxford, 19 >9, p 21.
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The need, as it were, of individual beliefs to achieve logical consis­
tency is answered oy the fact that they can be seen as already members of 
a system of beliefs, and that they derive their intelligibility from the 
way of looking at things of which they are a part. Wittgenstein goes 
on:
It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system 
in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.*
from the point of view of the person learning to believe, it is possible
to look at what is happening as a response to the need to develop
consistency among his beliefs: Wittgenstein writes of the child learning
to believe a host of things, and
Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that 
system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or 
less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is 
intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by 
what lies around it.*
But, as we stressed in Chapter 3, there is a sense in which the system 
within which one learns to believe is itself autonomous in that its 
logical development is to some extend independent of what those who 
work within it may think, while the 3y3tem itself is at any given time 
something prior to the mental states of belief of the individuals 
concerned, as it determines in the first instance just what is believable 
for those individuals. We will now look, in Part 2, at just how a 
system of belief determines the limits of the believable.
Part 2 - Contexts and Credibility
In this section, we will examine the notion of a system of beliefs 
as it is exemplified in common sense and in examples taken irom the 
history of science. The examples from the history of science are of 
interest because as concerning highly developed and well-articulated 
systems of belief, they show fairly clearly how what is credible may be 
determined by the framework in which one is working. This is in contrast
* On Certainty, p 21
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to what we showed in Chapter 4, Part 2, about the belief context deter­
mining the meaning of one’s beliefs« What will become apparent here, 
particularly from the scientific examples is that the more highly 
developed one's system is, the less freedom one has to decide what one 
will believe without being inconsistent. Negatively, this may be seen 
as a limitation on the freedom of belief, though, of course, what has 
been discovered in science has emerged only through the limitation and 
direction the contemporary scientific context has imposed on the 
speculations of individual scientists.
We are basing what follows about history of science largely on 
examples and interpretations put forward by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions. What is important for us is the way in 
which Kuhn shows that the adoptions of a well-articulated and consistent 
set of beliefs defines and thereby limits what a man might believe while 
remaining within the system, even though beliefs which are excluded by the 
system of one period may, from the point of view of later history, be 
better than some of those demanded by the system. This does not mean 
that we have to accept that scientific revolution and paradigm change 
.re as clear cut or as dramatic as Kuhn suggests*, nor, more importantly 
that we agree with Kuhn's tendency to think that we are forced to substi­
tute a psychology of the scientific community for a logic of scientific 
methods and research. This aspect of Kuhn's thesis has been well 
criticised by Imre Lakatos in 'Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes1,*we will in fact insist throughout this section that 
the postulation of a belief 'system' or scientific paradigm does not 
necessarily lead to relativistic conclusions about the possibility of 
knowledge or of rational discussion. In so doing, we will criticise
* c.f. 3. Toulmin, 'Conceptual Revolutions in Science, Svnthese. Vol.17, 
1967, pp 75-90
** PAS, Vol. 69, 1968-9, PP 149-186
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whi.t underlies both Kuhn's thesis and much of what Wittgenstein says in 
•• Oertainty, to which we will return in discussing common sense as a 
system of beliefs. But first we will attempt to show what is meant by 
belief system or context.
One of Kuhn's most highly developed examples concerns the possibility 
of interpreting the phenomenon of gravity in terms of innate qualities 
•under different types of scientific theory. The point about each 
successive theory is that it made the way of looking at falling bodies 
advocated by it3 predecessor untenable. In the scholastic period, 
explanations had been offered in terms of the natural tendency of heavy 
bodies to move towards the centre of the earth, but the 'new science' of 
the seventeenth century succeeded in doing without the appeal to occult 
and e3sentialist qualities.
To say that a stone fell because its "nature" drove it toward the 
centre of the universe had been made to look a mere tautological 
word-play, something it had not previously been. Henceforth the 
entire flux of sensory appearances, including colour, taste, and 
even weight, was to be explained in terms of the size, shape, 
position, and motion of the elementary corpuscles of base matter.
The attribution of other qualities to the elementary atoms was 
a resort to the occult and therefore out of bounds for science.*
The corpuscular mechanics had made a different decision from Aristotle
and the Aristotelians concerning the basic inhabitants of the universe
and their inter-relationships; in the light of the new science, reference
to occult qualities was positively unscientific. But although corpuscu-
iarism had considerable success in solving many of its problems in
dynamics, culminating in Newton's three laws of motion, in Newton's own
work 'gravity, interpreted as an innate attraction between every pair of
particles of matter, was an occult quality in the same sense as the
scholastics' "tendency to fall" had been'.** Of course, many attempts
were made to reject Newton's theory for its failure to explain gravity
in terms of collisions of corpuscles, or to find a mechanical explanation
157.
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of gravity. out as it proved impossible to find such an explanation or 
to do without the Principia, scientists gradually came to accept the view 
that gravity was innate.
By the mid-eighteenth century that interpretation had been almost 
universally accepted, and the result was a genuine reversion (which 
is not the same as a retrogression) to a scholastic standard.
Innate attractions and repulsions joined size, shape, position, and 
motion as physically irreducible primary properties of matter.*
Kuhn points out how this reversion to innate qualities had beneficial
effects on the study of electricity and chemistry, where advances were
made which would not have been possible in an atmosphere when the very
idea of occult qualities was a fit subject for Moliere's humour. Of
course, this is not the end of the story - it seems that Kinstein has
now succeeded in explaining gravitational attractions without innate
qualities, and so 'that explanation has returned science to a set of
canons and problems that are, in this particular respect, more like
those of Newton's predecessors than of his successors'. Kuhn sums up
the story as follows:
The attempt to explain gravity, though fruitfully abandoned by 
most eighteenth-century scientists, was not directed to an intrinsi­
cally illegitimate problem; the objections to innate forces were 
neither inherently unscientific nor metaphysical in,e pejorative 
sense. There are no external standards to permit a judgment of 
that sort. What occurred was neither a decline nor a raising of 
standards, but simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new 
paradigm.**
Whether Kuhn is correct in saying absolutely that there are no external 
standards to judge competing paradigms (his expression for the set of 
theories and problem solving techniques characteristic of a given 
scientific movement) has been questioned (by Lakatos, for example), but 
historically he shows clearly enough how the paradigm determines for its 
adherents the range of possible scientific beliefs and questions.
It is one of Kuhn's theses that historically a paradigm is challenged 
only when it is presented with problems it cannot solve, and actually
* pp 104-5 
** p 107
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abandoned only when a better one -.rises to take its place. This is 
important because it shows that what in the terns of the new theory or 
Sr. .. -heories .re the 'prejudices' of the previous paradigm are shown 
to oe prejudices only when it is realised how they obstructed the solving 
of the pro'oleas raised b and within the paradigm.* We shall return to 
this point later. In the case of the strict corpuscular tneory it would 
have been obscurantist to postulate innate forces in order to articulate 
view o: the universe in terns of atoms and their inter-action, before 
the corpuscular theory had been shown to need revision. out in terns 
of .«ewtonian mechanics this had - reluctantly it seems - to be abandoned 
as a prejudice. In a similar way, there was, at the time of its 
s-ggestion, no need to take seriously Aristarchus' heliocentric system, 
oecause the Ptolemaic astronomy wos not only enjoying considerable success 
in furthering iOiowledge of the heavens, but it had not yet encountered 
the problems which were to lead to its eventual rejection in favour of 
Copernicus' theory. So there u î  no reason for abandoning a quite 
successful proposal in favour of one logically incompatible with it, which 
h . nct-.ing in particular at the time to recommend it, even though looking 
sack we might be tempted to say that Aristarchus' theory was, at least 
in certain respects, more 'correct' and free from some of the assumptions 
that were to prove fatal to the Ptolemaic system.*' At the time, there 
w-_s every reason for carrying on with the Ptolemaic progr-uane, mid none 
for the Aristarchan.
The intimate way in which the context affects the content of beliefs
is illustrated further by the fact, already alluded to in Chapter A,
Part 1, that the meaning of scientific statements as well as their
possible limits within a rational system, is frequently dependent on the
total theory to which they belong. This is because of the fact that the
* c.f. K. k. Popper, -he Open Society, hd its enemies, Vol.2, London, 19Ô2 
pp 220—1
c.f. Kuhn, op cit. pp 75_o
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whole network of our theories and the facts which give rise to them and 
which they interpret and articulate is interdependent. As we have seen 
in Chapter 4» the mere fact that two people use the same words or even 
give the same definition of a given concept is no guarantee that they 
mean the same thing by the words or the concept. (We are speaking here 
of concepts like 'chemical element' or 'rational animal' which have had 
a long history. but the fact that they have had a long history should 
make us cautious of attributing synonymity to their use in two different 
er. s). Of course, it is possible to go too far in this direction, and 
h: t is being said here applies mo3t of all to words and concepts in 
which a high degree of theory i3 emuodied. dven if there is some truth 
in Quine's claim that 'our statements about the external world face the 
triounal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
body''", many simply descriptive statements involve very little theory 
of the sort that undergoes frequent and radical change, comparable to the 
revolutionary changes in the interpretation of gravity. This is not to 
deny that theoretical - i.e. dispositional - elements are involved in the 
most ordinary descriptions; but these theories are far more constantly 
and widely accented than the more highly developed scientific theories 
we have been considering, and do not seem to play so direct a part in the 
interpret tion of common sense descriptions as scientific theories play 
in the interpret tion of scientific observations.
The fact that a scientist's beliefs are limited and determined by 
the paradigm within which he works does not mean that.he has any notable 
feelings of conviction about his theories or thut it is impossible lor 
him to conceive the opposite. feelings of conviction are 01 no 
particular importance to science, while, as Popper points out , in
* from a Lo. ;ical Paint of /iew, New York, 1963, P 41 
■'* The Lo»:ic of Scientific I/iscovery. p 429
reductio proof what we know to be false or contradictory is often 
'conceived to be true' in order to show that some other statement whose 
truth we are testing presupposes it. It is rather that in working 
within a paradigm, both the problems and the ways of dealing with them 
are presented within the framework of the paradigm. As Kuhn points out 
in connection with the Copernican revolution, what led astronomers to 
accept a heliocentric system was the crisis which arose within the 
Ptolemaic system. Similarly
one reason why the theories of comou3tion by absorption from the 
atmosphere - theories developed in the seventeenth century by 
key, Hooke, and I.iayow - failed to get a sufficient hearing was 
that they made no contact with a recognised trouble-spot in 
normal scientific practice.*
Scientists of the seventeenth century had neither the incentive nor the 
..leans within their own systems to accommodate such a theory of combustion, 
which was therefore not scientifically credible. As we know, in an 
infinite universe the absolute logical probability of any scientific 
theory being true is equal to zero, so the acceptance of one theory as 
against the rejection of another cannot be justified in terms of such 
probability.Acceptance of one theory rather than another must be 
made with reference to current scientific practice, that is to say, 
against the background of the way scientists currently think and work.
Analysis of scientific activity along the lines attempted by Kuhn 
is valuable from our point of view because it reflects something of the 
autonomous logical development of theories, showing how the possibilities 
of belief are determined more and more precisely, the more highly 
developed and articulated one's explanations ;nd observations become.
One reason why the language and concepts of common sense do not seem 
subject to constant radical re-orientation is probably because the
* P 76
c.f. Popper, op cit, pp 257, 363f‘f
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'theories' underlying common sense are far looser and less rigourously
articulated, and so changes of scientific viewpoint within the scientific
section of society infiltrate gradually and imperceptibly into the
thought of that society as a whole.
Although to work within a scientific community restricts and defines
the limits of the credible at least in so far as one works as a scientist,
to enter into such work and to accept its current presuppositions and
methodology is, significantly, represented often as a decision. Kuhn in
answering the question as to why a new paradigm is adopted when an old
one begins to create more problems than it solves, says
Gradually the number of experiments, instruments, articles and books 
based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men, convinced 
of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode of 
practicing normal science, until at last only a few elderly hold­
outs remain. And even they, we cannot say, are wrong. Though 
the historian can always find, men - Priestly, for instance - who were 
unreasonable to resist for as long as they did, he will not find 
a point at which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific.
At most he may wish to say that the man who continues to resist 
after his whole profession has been convertedhas ipso facto ceased 
to be a scientist.*
The reason why we cannot simply condemn resistance as wrong (as opposed 
possibly to calling it unscientific) is that just as scientific viewpoints 
cannot be simply and conclusively verified, neither can they be 
conclusively falsified. Lakatos * * gives the example of Prout, who in 
1815 in face of the current scientific evidence and theorising held on 
to the view that the atomic weights of the chemical elements were whole 
numbers. In the end, Prout was shown to be correct, but only after 
there had been a change in the concept of a 'chemical element', such 
that their separation could be effected by physical means as well as by 
chemical reactions. Until this change in the concept, however, it 
became increasingly hard for scientists to accept Prout's theory.
P 158
loc cit, p 174
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Kuhn's conclusion is that although observation and experience
can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible 
scientific belief... they cannot alone determine a particular 
body of such belief. An apparently arbitrary element, 
compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a 
formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given 
scientific community at a given time.*
One might indeed argue that without this 'apparently arbitrary element'
which restricts and determines the particular type of investigation and
theorising of scientists at a particular moment in history, there would
be no science, precisely because observation and experience alone do not
sufficiently determine the admissible body of knowledge. Even so, it
looks as if a decision to accept something less than certain is required
if one is to be a working scientist, and that this decision is not one
which is required logically.
The arbitrary or non-eapirically determined element in a system of 
scientific theories has sometimes been spoken of as 'metaphysical'.
In one 3ense, of course, every descriptive statement, except possibly 
those concerned purely with sense data, contains a metaphysical - i.e. 
a theoretical and absolutely speaking non-falsifiable - element, but here 
we are thinking simply of the general preSsuppositions of a given 
scientific paradigm as its metaphysics. It is often possible to distinguish 
this level of metaphysics from the often more basic or at least more 
enerally acceptable descriptive statements the paradigm is invoked to 
explain and predict. The metaphysical element we are speaking of is the 
core of the paradigm, as it represents the 'world-view' articulated by the 
paradigm, and provides a programme for research. In an article entitled 
'Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics',** J. W. N. ;Vatkins has shown 
how such metaphysical assumptions have been at the bottom of many 
scientific theories; among his examples are determinism in its various
* P 4
l-lnd, Voi. 67,1958, pp 3A4-365
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forms, biological attempts to exaplain life mechanistically rather than 
vitali3tically, doctrines of conservation of energy, and Faraday's 
counter-i.ewtonian belief that every kind of energy, gravity included, 
is directly transformable without loss into every other kind of energy. 
Failure to show how these beliefs are borne out in practice in any given 
case can always be put down to present ignorance; indeed, as representing 
the kernel of the theories in question, these beliefs are treated as 
irrefutable, although, as Watkins tries to show, they can be gradually 
undermined by criticism.’' To work with such pre\suppo3itions cannot 
unreasonably De thought of as a decision, either by individuals or by a 
community as a whole, to enter a system. This decision cannot be 
reduced merely to adopting certain methodological conventions, for as 
Wat .ins points out, these metaphysical elements in addition to guiding 
method (by telling us, for example, always to look for a cause), 'clash 
with certain kinds of falsifiaole hypotheses and so forbid their 
construction' ***
Popper, who would criticise much of what Kuhn is doing as 
'naturalistic', ’i"‘ nevertheless agrees that, from the psychological 
angle, progress in science would hardly be possible without a scientifi­
cally unwarrantable or 'metaphysical' faith in ideas of a purely specula­
tive kind. '"- ’' He also speaks most eloquently of the decision involved 
not in accepting any particular theory or of its metaphysical core, Dut 
of engaging in scientific work at all:
My business (is)... to formulate a suitable characterisation of 
empirical science, or to define the concepts 'empirical science' and 
'metaphysics' in such a way that we shall be able to say of a given 
set of statements whether or not its closer study is the concern 
of empirical science.
* c.f. below p 173-4 
loo cit p 357
• ' The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p 52 
•'*-* ibid p 38
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My criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded 
■ s a proposal i'or an -greenent or convention. As to the suitabi­
lity of any such convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable 
discussion of these questions is only possible between parties 
having some purpose in common. The choice of that purpose must, 
of course, be ultimately a matter of decision, going beyond 
rational argument...
".hat Popper is arguing is that owing to the impossibility of an inductive 
method or of conclusive justification science cannot achieve certainty in 
its enquiries, and so the scientist has to decide to work with the 
theories and methods that are available, in the belief that some progress 
will be made, at least negatively:
Anyone who envisages a system of absolutely certain, irrevocably 
true statements as the end and purpose of science will certainly 
reject the proposals I shall make here... There is only one way,
.s far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my proposals. 
That is to analyse their logical consequences: to point out their 
fertility - their power to elucidate the problems of the theory of 
knowledge.
Thus I freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been 
guided, in the last an .lysis, oy value judgments and predilections. 
But I hope that my proposals may be acceptable to those who value 
not only logical rigour but also freedom from dogmatism; who seek 
practical applicability, but are even more attracted bg the adventure 
of science, and by discoveries which again and again confront us with 
new and unexpected questions, challenging us to try out new and 
hitherto undreamed-of answers...’
Thus for Popper, there is a fundamental value decision involved in 
enga. ing in science at all, a decision which is further characterised and 
defended in Chapter 24 of The Uoen bocietv end Its Tnemies as a moral act, 
justified by having better consequences than the adoption of any irrationa- 
list or uncritical position.
Popper calls his position over the adoption of scientific method 
'critical rationalism', the muin characteristics of which are that, given 
we cannot achieve certainty in scientific knowledge, all theories and 
hypotheses are to be subjected to tests ;ind criticisms. As we hope to
show, purely relativistic conclusions may be avoided despite the fact that
we have to rely on such factox's as intuition, imagination and the state
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp 37-8
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of the question at our place and time, so long as whatever theories are
devised are open to puolic testing and the people concerned are prepared
to listen to e-ch other. At the same time, it would be psychologically
dishonest to pretend that there are not many statements and theories
which we are at present quite unable to criticise and which we cannot,
at present, see ourselves being argued out of.* Lakatos, it is true,
speaks of belief as a 'regretfully unavoidable biological weakness',**
but even though we would not, on logical grounds alone, speak of any
theories or set of theories as absolutely certain, this does not in
itself give us a reason for not believing what seems most in accord with
reality or most likely to lead to new :isceveries. 'Jver. Popper, who
has developed a theory according to which the scientist, qua scientist
concerned simply with the objective development of scientific knowledge,
neither knows nor believes the hypotheses he attends to, but deals with
them ith various 'objective' or 'third world' activities, such as trying
to understand them, trying to derive new problems from them, and above
all, trying to criticise them, nonetheless admits that even here the
scientist can be said to have suDjective ueliefs in that he guesses that
the hypotheses he deals .'.ith will be fruitful in wringing about a growth
in the third world of objective knowledge.** Apart from this, clearly
some statements have to be used as beyond criticism just to put other
statements to the test. There must be a body' of doctrine, accepted at
least provisionally & true, in order to start work. ihe iact that it
is not possible conclusively to justify this body does not necessarily
imr>ly it is irrational to accept it, or that which body ol statements is
token s basic is simply a matter of arbitrary choice, even in science.
* " p o i n t  m a d e  "by V .  k . I.'. W a t k i n s  in a n  u n p u b l i s h e d  p a p e r  c a l l e d  'CO.;: 
a Refutation'. 
l o c  c i t , p  150
c.f. 'Epistemology ithout a iuiowing aubject', loc cit, 
especially pp 231 and 265
* c.f. below, pp 172-4
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The example of scientific systems as complex structures of well 
articulated rational belief, and of the restrictions imposed by these 
systems on the scientifically believable is obviously not simply reproduced 
in the way beliefs according to which we live our ordinary lives form 
themselves into a system. For one thing, we seem, on the face of it, 
to have far less freedom to tamper around with this system, or to think 
of the ccepting of its assumptions as something we are free to do or 
not to uo. (. any people in order to uphold 'mysticism' run down scientific 
methods). but to refuse to accept what we might loosely tern common 
sense is going to change our lives r ther radically. Also, common 
sense is less explicitly worked out as a system, and yet more pervasive, 
enterin' every moment of our lives. Although one night wish to see 
science as being a technical development of common sense, and the line 
between science -nd common sense being often crossed in uoth directions, 
the scientist can break off from hi3 work and theories and perhaps even 
ve into working with competing theories in a way a sane nan cannot 
break off from the beliefs and canons of common sense. aven when 
indulging in fantasy, we know at the back of our minds that it is not 
real.
So, to talk of a decision to accept the beliefs of common sense, 
even if b a descriptive metaphysics we could from the inside determine 
just what these were, seems inappropriate. Indeed, we have argued in 
Chapter 3 that it is precisely because we all accept a common area of 
truth that we have an understanding of what it is to believe at all.
In On Certainty. ’.Yittgenstein stresses that although common sense itself 
cannot be finally and conclusively justified, just because every reasonable 
person accepts some beliefs as certain, it makes no sense for an 
individual within the group or culture to doubt those belieis.
168.
Doubtini' has cert.tin characteristic manifestations, out they are 
only characteristic of it in particular circumstances. If 
someone 3aid that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept 
looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn't 
til done b, mirrors', etc., we should not be sure whether we 
ought to call that doubting. We might describe his way of
Although it does not matter very much what we call the man's behaviour, 
if everything else he did was normal, we might well begin to wonder 
whether such doubt was genuine. It seems that common sense — and this 
is the basic point of our discussion of scientific systems - does limit 
the genuinely credible in the 3ame sort of way as a scientific theory, 
lthough this does not mean we have to accept the conclusion that failing 
absolute justification of common sense, its grounds of acceptability 
are purely sociological.
Wittgenstein himself comes near to such a conclusion. He talks of
a nan thinxing he might be mistaken in his assumption that he had never
been on the moon (in his sleep, for example) as 'playing the game wrong' * *
The idea is that such a possibility is ruled out by our other beliefs
(or, at least, was ruled out at the time of writing), and so it is not
to be entertained. But, another belief which is ruled out by our system
of beliefs is the belief that we should consult oracles at appropriate
timeso e would rather trust the propositions of physics - but
Supposing we met people who did not regard this as a telling 
reason... Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle.
(And for that we consider them primitive). Is it wrong for 
them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? - If we call 
this "wrong" aren't we using our language game as a base from 
which to combat theirs? ***
The answer is that we are. He seem to have the impasse which arises 
when two competing scientific paradigms clash. 3ut does Wittgenstein's 
conclusion follow?
I said I would 'combat' the other man - but wouldn't I give him 
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of 
reasons come3 persuttsion. (Think what happens when missionaries
behaving like the behaviour of doubt, but his game would not 
oe ours.-“
convert natives).*'-1
* pp 3 > 4
***jp 80 * siA C
This is clear example of the dogma that for criticism to be valid, it 
ct itseli proceed from unguestion blc assumptions.*
This dogma, which is presumably shared by those who see the adoption 
of new scientific paradigm in place of an old as a basically irrational 
procedure, incapable of rational reconstrv.ction, overlooks the fact that 
1though any theory must have 33umptions which cannot be finally justified 
(bee-use Of an infinite regress of justifications), we con get nearer the 
truth through testing end criticising theories. (See page 169a). The 
f >ct that the criticisms themselves mat be b sed on other assumptions need 
not worry us so long us we are prepared to give up these assumptions if 
they c .n be shown to be prejudices themselves obstructing the solution of 
some problem. Indeed, it is o showing that trust in oracles positively 
hinders adv nee in knowledge, by falling back on merely linguistic and 
,d hoc moves, th t we might hope to show that physics is better t 
explaining what happens in the world.
Of course, s Pop-.er showed, v lue ,udgments will be involved here, 
which are typically those used in ssessing the achievements of physics, 
and no doubt someone could, if he wished, continue to insist that orrcles 
■ri . or- fruitful than phy sics. i/nless he could show this, there would 
indeed oe breakdown of communic tion. But there are an,, possible 
re- sons for this much vaunted psychological phenomenon, such as obstinacy 
on the p. rt of one or both of the parties, their mutual lack of immediate 
or pr ctic 1 interest in the matter being discussed, or their mutual 1 ; ck 
of cleverness in thinking up stronger reasons in favour of their respective 
positions. In other words, there is no re ^ on why we should not treat 
bre kdown of communic tion us something of solely psychological interest, 
reflecting rather on the dispositions of the communicators than necessarily
on the ultim-te insolubility of the problem. **
________________________________  f'Tflcf- f'7-)
• c.f. K. R. Pop -er, The Cpen uociet- iv ;ts .nemies. /ol. 2, p 380
I m :ruteful to r. David .iiller for discussion on this - and other 
points - in this Chapter.
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A
! nfortun tely a symposium entitled Criticism nd the Growth ol‘ Knowledge, 
edited by Imre Lakatos and A1 n Muagrive (Cambridge, 1970) has appeared 
too 1 te (September 1970) to be consulted during the writing of this 
thesis or to be included in the bibliography, although it i3 very relevant 
to the issues here and in P rt 3 below. Obviously it is not possible to 
0 Into any det il here, but it seems at first sight that hat is in it 
0 is not c 1 1  for .Iteration in the substance of what we say, which Is to 
s ;gest an approach comparable to that elaoor.ated more expertly in the 
contributions of Popper and Lakatos. i.owever, it should be noted that 
in this new volume, Kuhn hi self rejects the suggestion that the choice of 
one paradigm rather than mother is basioally irrational*, even though 
eywrabtnd apparently aelco.es the charge.'- In fi.e .Structure of 
scientific -.evolutions. Kuhn had said that the re sons for change x'rom 
one par digm to mother re not singly decisive or compelling]*** here ha 
stresses th t for scientists reasons - and good reasons - for change 
do exist.* ■ however the implication th.t outside the community that 
shares these values there are no criteria of rationality with which to 
sse3s them is repeated. ■ * Moreover, although Kuhn is prepared to 
admit - trivially, it seems - th t we can assess one scientific theory 
as batter than another if it does better what scientists normally do, his 
st nee remains fundament lly relativistic, .s he is doubtful whether 
'truth' is term with . ore than intra-theoretic application. Moreover, 
he firmly rejects attempts to characterise one theory as approaching 
absolutely nearer to the truth than another,****** though, ¿a Lakatos 
points out, this could be partly due to a confusion over the interpret tion 
of Popper's technical term ' verisimilitude ' • * *
*- p 2 ¿6
*" pp 214-229 
'* c.f. pp 154-6 
**** pp 261-3 
***** op 263-4, pp 20-2
**’1** pp 264-6 
*****’* pp 188-9
(All references in this note, except , re to Cr i ticise, nd _th»-_jfroathi 
of Knowledge)
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Wittgenstein is right in suggesting that we would be asking an 
oracle believer to change his ideas of what was credible when we ask him 
to accept modern physics. That we want to resist is the further implica­
tion that it therefore is not possible to 3ay that modern physics provides 
a better explanation of what goes on in the world. Nevertheless, the 
oracle believer would probably find great difficulty in saying this, as 
lots of tilings which had seemed to him to be perfectly credible and 
likely would, under the new system, become impossible. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon, when there is such a conversion for the individual's life to 
continue to express a curious and uncomfortable duality. Rene Vallejo 
Ortiz, the Cuban leader, who was a well-known lung specialist refused 
to operate when the 3pirit3 were not propitious, while Castro himself is 
said to have acted on his consultation of the orisha during the Bay of 
Pigs ffair. Creek politicians are well-known to consult soothsayers, 
which is part of a wider belief they have in the irrationality of 
politics.* Such examples, which could be multiplied, are interesting 
because they show that belief in magic is not confined to primitive 
agricultural communities, but can appear in quite sophisticated contexts. 
They also show that forms of life and language games are not as clear cut 
or as self-enclosed as Vittgenstein seemed to think.
Despite examples of amalgamation of two rather different types of 
belief, which may in themselves be no more peculiar than the marriage of 
Jewish Christianity and Greek philosophy, it seems that in any set of 
beliefs, however heterogenous the beliefs are in themselves, there must 
be some area where doubt is not genuine. In his insistence on this point, 
Wittgenstein over-states his case. lie say3 that in these cases, to preface 
one's observations by saying 'I am sure that...' or 'I am certain than...' 
would be more or less incomprehensible: I
I thank Peter Levi for this information.
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e..-ine dou.t by saying, for instance, that he was not quite certain that 
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\v? a5-70
' ¿¿¿5 , /Ol. 35, 1961* ?p 12 1-152
* p ifO ~
171
j-j. someone were to look at an Knglish pillar—box and say "I am 
8ur* ~'n :t -I's red", we should h ve to suppose that he mss colour­
blind, or oelieve he had no mastery 01' English and knew the correct 
name for the colour in some other language»
-1 neither Wj.s the case we should not quite understand him,■ *
As H. ?. Irice points out in Ms article 'The Causal Theory of Perception', ,1’‘ 
the fact that it might be misleading or unusual to 3ay something does not 
me n that it is necess rily either false in itself or unintelligible to 
assert it. This would seem to be what Wittgenstein is trying to say 
¡¿ere, and he is surely wrong to do so. (One might en pass ant remark 
i general tendency in ’Yittgenstein's later philosophy, for example when 
writing on religious belief, to characterise lack of agreement that it 
is correct or appropriate to say something as lack of understanding of 
what it is that is said).
We car. still agree ith the general trend of Yittgenstein's remarks - 
that if someone were to preface his remarks on matters where there is no 
er.aine douot by saying, for instance, that he was not quite certain that 
the pillar box (in normal light and in England) was red, but that he 
thourht it probably was, we should try to see if his behaviour w s odd in 
other ways. If not, it would be open to conclude that he had not under­
stood what it meant to 'doubt', 'believe','be certain', etc. Charity 
at least would suggest some indeterminacy oetween our use of these expres­
sions and his:
A mad doctor (perhaps) might ask me "ho you know what that is?" md 
I might reply "I know that it's a chair; I recognise it, it's 
always been in my room". Ha a ays t.ais, possibly, to test not my 
eyas But my ability to recognise things, to know their n sas and 
their functions» What is in question here is a kind of knowing 
one's way . bout. Now it would be wrong for Die to say "I oelieve 
(i.e. I think, but I un not certain) that it is a chair" because 
that would express my readiness for .... st tenant so oe tested.
While "I know that it... " implies uewilderaent if what I said is 
not confirmed. '
Qr- C* A** My
\po ¿9-70
2E4S, 7ol. 35, 1961, pp 121-152
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Xi someone were to look at an English pill r—box and say "I am 
5“rt‘ ***** **’• red", we should h ve to suppose that he was colour- 
uluiid, or oelieve he had no mastery of English and knew the correct 
name ior the colour in some other language« 
xi neither was the case we should not quite understand him.*
As H. P. ilrice points out in his article 'The Causal Theory of Perception',**
the fact that it might be misleading or unusual to say something does not
mean that it is necess rily either false in itself or unintelligible to
assert it. This would seem to be what Wittgenstein is trying to say
here, and he is surely wrong to do so. (One might en uassant remark
. general tendency in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, for example when
writing on religious belief, to characterise lack of agreement that it
is correct or appropriate to 3;>.y something as lack of understanding of
what it is that is said).
We can still agree ith the general trend of Wittgenstein's remarks - 
that if someone were to preface his remarks on matters where there is no 
eiiaine doubt by saying, for instance, that he was not quite cert.-in that 
the pillar box (in normal light and in England) was red, but that he 
thou ht it probably w.s, we should try to see if his beh viour w s odd in 
other ways. If not, it would be open to conclude that he had not under­
stood what it meant to 'doubt', 'believe','be certain', etc. Charity 
t least would suggest some indeterminacy oetween our use of these expres­
sions and his:
A mad doctor (perhaps) might usk me "ho you know what that i3?" ¡nd 
I might reply "I know that it's a chair; I recognise it, it's 
always been in my room". He says this, possibly, to test not my 
eyes out my .bility to recognise things, to know their mmes and 
their i unctions. '.That is in question here is a kind of knowing 
one's vay bout. :.ow it would be wrong for me to say "I believe
(i.e. I think, but I m not certain) that it is a chair" because 
■ t would express i.y rsadiSMI fo r ...■ - . tement to oe tested.
While "I now that it... " implies uewilderaent if what I said is 
not confirmed. *
O C«
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'That Wittgenstein seems to be getting at is that in some situations doubt 
is unrealistic - unless it is possible to show that the situation is in 
some »ay unusual, and so to Justify the raising of a doubt. Hance, parh ps, 
our uneasiness with Cartesian doubt, if it is interpreted psyohologloally.
Of course, it would lw ys be possible to raise questions about any 
proposition whatever, but Yittgenstein is saying that unless we can show 
a reason for doubt, in some cases to doubt would go right -gainst the 
concept of eridenoe within the system of belief. To use bear th's image 
of . shin, whioh no have to rebuild plank by plank, it seems that some 
planks -re more central and nora essential to the ship. It is not just 
th.1 some premises h ve to remain in order effectively to criticise anything, 
but rather that in any system of beliefs there re some elements, the 
doubting of which would lead us to 3ay 'This doubt isn't one of the doubts 
in our game. (But not as if we chose this game! )'.*
This position seens to be irr tional or relativistic only if it is felt 
th t because so:ne rropositi’ns - rv central to ccrt’ in system of beliefs, .t 
could never be possible for someone from that system to question them. As 
■ e have -.lready pointed out prejudices can be rooted out only when they 
p seen s such - that is, when e h TS Ira ; t>S UB to dispose of them.
The attempt to avoid all pre%suppositi ns is cle ply self-contradictory.
It would thus De irrational to try to go on without them. Having them 
beoomes irrution l only when we realise they re open to some criticism and 
refuse to ouestion them further. Ve gree with 'ittgenstein that no final 
justification is uossible of even the sir.ipli-st beliefs, apart perhaps from 
logic 1 truths, if only because .11 our general terms ixe dispositional and 
hence, in a strict sense, ..invérifiable. 3ut we do not agree that it .is 
therefore not possible to criticise and so to improve our beliefs. We re not, 
s Wittgenstein thinks, condemned to stay forever in exactly the same 
unchanging vessel, nor, as Kuhn seeir.3 to some to think,do we scuttle
On Cert inty 
* Wittgenstein/p 
** pp 158-9
one ship in a panic and jump into another one. This is because, reject­
ing dogmatic justificationism, we do not think we have to be absolutely 
certain of something before we can begin to criticise rationally.
Popper shows four basic ways in which criticism of theories can proceed 
without having to start from established and justified assumptions.
First, the theory mi<ht be internally inconsistent. Secondly, it might 
be shown to come up a ainst generally accepted assumptions. Thirdly, it 
dght be challenged by some competing theory, which answers its problems 
oetter or, less importantly, stands up better in some crucial test. 
Fourthly, and quite gener lly, it will count as a valid criticism of a 
theory if it finally fails to solve the problems it is invoked to solve. 
This might well lead to a general review of its pre-supposition3.
Pin lly, of course, even invalid criticism can throw valuable new and 
fruitful light on . theory.*
Perhaps it should be mentioned that criticism of basic assumptions 
should not necess rily be thought of as falsification of them. Indeed, 
the 'metaphysics' of a given paradigm set °f theories will, provided 
it is not self-contradictory, resist formal l'alsific tion both because it 
is not laid out in such a way that any particular single event or set of 
events c;m be regarded as refuting it, and because it may itself determine 
the form ;nd nature of the evidence relevant to it.** Counter-ex moles 
re treated as problems for future research; it is hoped that with 
ingenuity and more complete knowledge they will also be brought within the
■ c.f. The Open dociet.y and Its dnemies. Vol. 2, pp 379-360 
For a good example of the third type of criticism, c.f. below p 185 
host of the scientific theories mentioned in this chapter can oe 
criticised under the fourth category, but this is not to deny the 
problems involved in knowing just .hen to do so.
** c.f. Part 3 below on the way in which the evidence itself may be 
ffected by the theory it i3 supposed to uphold. Although what we 
say ubout this is not in the end different from what we say ibout 
belief systems enerally, the phenomenon i3 important enough to be 
dealt with in a separate section.
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net physics. Nevertheless, it nay be possible to criticise these meta­
physical views because it becomes less and less possible to show just 
how they might be applied except as articles of faith. One might even 
be able to show in some cases, that even if what they say is true, we 
ill never be able to make use of it. This seems to be the case with 
determinism, because although it could be true that every physical event 
w 3 determined by inflexible laws, there will always be some events which 
ppear to oe impossible in practice to predict, among them, the future 
st te3 of knowledge of the predicting machine or person. On other 
occ sions, the metaphysical belief could be criticised on the grounds 
that it required ever more complex and unlikely hypotheses to explain 
it3 pplication; this seemed to be the case with specul tive mechanism. 
Yet other types of metaphysics could be criticised because their effects 
were either useless or positively harmful} Popper's criticisms of 
irr ti nalism take this form. Indeed, if we were to take it as an 
effective ground oi criticism of metaphysical beliefs th .t their defenders 
would admit no possible state of affairs as in any way counting against 
their beliefs, nd no degree of complexification of auxiliary,saving 
hypotheses as tending to cast doubt on the beliefs, then even though 
formal refutation of such beliefs would not be possible, no such system 
would be uncritioisable. Irrefutability does not necess rily entail 
uncriticisability.
In general, so long as we are ready for our beliefs to be discussed 
,nd criticis d in the ways we have rather schematically suggested, and 
so long as the relevijit evidence is freely available and the experiments 
on which the beliefs are based are repeatable, we show that our methods 
ire objective, and we can with justification hope that they will ta .e 
us ne .rer the truth, ev n though, as Popper says,
It certainly has to be .dmitted that, at iiny given moment, our
scientific theories will depend not only on the experiments etc.
. .e up to that moment, out also upon prejudices which ere taken
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for granted, so that we have not become aware of them... We can 
say in regard to this incrustation that science is capable of 
learning, of breaking down some of its crusts. The process may 
never be perfected, but there is no fixed barrier before which 
it must stop short. Any assumption can, in principle be 
criticised. And that anybody may criticise constitutes 
scientific objectivity.*
So with science, and we hope, with common sense, we can agree that any 
set of beliefs will contain at their heart assumptions which seem 
nimpeachnble at one time, and which are later thrown out. but, far 
from lea ling to relativism, this phenomenon should encourage us, because 
it shows that although the community in which one lives determines one's 
beliefs to a quite considerable extent, it i3 possible, through criticism, 
to change and improve one's doctrinal legacy.
In fact, the central beliefs and assumptions of one's community - 
the beliefs everyone must have nd those which are totally incredible - 
provide the limiting cases according to which we understand and interpret 
other beliefs. These certainties Mice up, at any iven moment, the 
foundation which is required in order that we should be able to tack 
other oeliefs on. It is because belief is, in the final analysis, tied 
down to what is believed, that Wittgenstein says that 'the grammar of 
"believe" just does hang together with the grammar of the proposition 
believed' . * * We do not learn 'i..t belief is, and then start ipplylng 
the concept to likely candidates. We learn and understand belief only 
as tied down to some Drier set of beliefs, and it is in terms of this 
ori in il set that we begin to extend our applic: tions of the concept.
Hence our insistence in Chapter 3 oft the notion of oelief being intelli­
gible onlj in terms of a common acceptance of what is to be believed,
..nd why Griffiths, for example, says that we would h ve no right to speak 
of uelief in the case of a hypothetical community of persons whose 
standards of appropriateness in judging were totally different from ours.***
v The Onen Jociet. aid its aiei.i-h n. Vol.2, p 221 
** -p 40 O* , f. fO.
*** c . f .  loc clt, P lifl
i .
176.
It night be objected th t if we found a community which treated 
certain propositions which we thought were absurd and inconsistent as e 
tre t our beliefs, (acting on them, thinking about them, etc.) «• should 
till talk of them oelieving these propositions. In other words, the 
most th t we have shown is that belief requires that each group of 
oelievers hold certain propositions as true, -nd not that 'bel-ef' itseli 
re-aires for its intelligible application that both the person the concept 
is predicated of and the person using the concept should hold oertain 
o in conn on. After all, we have concede.! that
people c >n h .ve widely differing ide .s on v;h: t is certain; why should 
these differences not be tot.l? Although nothing hangs on the use of 
the word 'belief', we could say immediately that if nothing counted as a 
reason for oelief for this hypothetical community that counted as a 
son for us, it wo^ld be quite misleading to Spe 01 beliei in their 
case. To sue .k of someone believing p would no longer o. rr; with it the 
suggestion th t they tre t p on ;• par with what is acceptable to our 
common sense; presumably a man could not now be criticised lor naving 
r^itr try or irr ti’n -1 beliefs. But the re 1 prodem with s..ch u. 
community would -rise in describing its oeiiezs t 11. ¡ o r  this .s not 
just a question of them having a different cosmologic. 1  or metaphysical 
nterpretation of wh t we all recognise as iacts, for onoe there .^s a^ree- 
ment on some b sic facts, the hypothesis of complete disa reement nd 
total non-communication breaks down. Discussion becomes possiole, nd 
ith it revision of cosmologies and metaphysics, perhaps on our side 
well : s on theirs. nut the Case here is when people do not accept even 
the same basic fact3 as us.
Is it plausible to think of . community with a conceptual framework 
which made no contact with ours at ..11? Ihe im gination boggles here, 
nd for the very good reason that it would not be possible - or us to
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It might be objected that if we found a community which treated 
certain propositions which we thought were absurd and inconsistent as we 
tre. t our beliefs, (acting on them, thinking about them, etc.) we should 
still talk of them believing these propositions. In other words, the 
most that we have shown is that belief requires that each group of 
believers hold certain propositions as true, and not that 'belief' itself 
requires for its intelligible application that both the person the concept 
is predicated of and the person using the concept should hold certain 
o „.liefs • nd standard* in common. After all, we have oonoeded that 
people can have widely differing ideas on what is certain; why should 
these differences not be total? Although nothing hangs on the use of 
the word 'belief', we could say immediately that if nothing counted as a 
reason for oelief for this hypothetical community that counted as a 
re .s in for us, it would be quite misleading to spe k of belief in their 
case. To speak of someone believing p would no longer carry with it the 
suggestion th t they treat p on a par with what is acceptable to our 
common sense; presumably a man could not now be criticised ior having 
roitrary or irmtionul beliefs. But the real problem with such a 
community would arise in describing its beliefs ut all. ior ihxs as not 
just a question of them having a different cosmologic..1 or metaphysical 
nterpretation of what we all recognise as fact3, lor onoe there is agree­
ment on some basic facts, the hypothesis of complete disagreement nd 
total non—communication breaks down. Discussion becomes possiole, nd 
ith it revision of cosmologies and metaphysics, perhaps on our side s 
well as on theirs. But the case here is when people do not accept even 
the same basic fact3 as us.
Is it plausible to think of a community with a conceptual framework 
which made no contact with ours at all? The imagination boggles here,
■nd for the very good reason that it would not be possible . or us to
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to describe such a community's conceptual framework. For imagine 
trying to understand (interpret or translate) such a rrumework. With
e ch divergence from our own, the alien framework becomes less intelli- 
ible, and the mystery simply thickens if many disagreements are inter­
spersed with the odd agreement. As Barry Stroud puts it:
We c-n give no content to the notion of a conceptual scheme or a 
laagviu ge which is a genuine alternative to our present one, :.’o 
revision open to us can take us beyond the language we now use and 
understand - any 'alternative' is either something we already 
understand and can make sense of, or it is no alternative at .11. 
Any difference betw en ourselves and other tribes can therefore 
only be partial... *
Long before we ttribute wholes .le divergence of belief to another tribe, 
we will be thinking that we have got the translation or interpretation of 
their l.unguage wrong. We can only start attributing differences of 
belief when we have a foundation of a consider ble body of agreement, for 
it is only through what we think are their assents to what we think 
re the same states of affairs s we are picking out, that we con begin 
to understand or translate alien idioms or languages into our own. So 
the hypothetical community turns out to be impossible even to describe, 
and so our hypothesis that belief can be predicated only on the basis of 
common understanding of what is true is corroborated.
P rt 3 - Community nd evidence
In section 2 we have shown some of the ways in which individual 
beliefs often presuppose and .re made intelligiole by the whole context 
of which these individual beliefs are a part. A system or context of 
beliefs can usually be regarded as something held in common by a whole 
community. ffe have already seen Kuhn suggesting that working as a 
scientist involves entering a community which shares a paradigm; he says 
farther that scientific progress is possible only once this has been 
settled, because only then are scientists free to concentrate on their 
problems without having constantly to re—ex ¡mine first principles.'
* 'Conventionalism and Translation', in ..ords and i) un c tions, p 92
** pp 162-3
Kuhn is prepared to say that there is nothing irrational in an absolute 
sense about a man who uoe3 not accept the current scientific paradigm, 
but that unless he does, he will not be a scientist. Certainly, such a 
man would be irrational from the point of view of the scientific community 
he is refusing to enter; if his rejection of scientific standards was so 
fundamental that he studied the heavens from the point of view of 
strology rather than ol astronomy, his work would not, without consider­
able demythologisation, be scientifically acceptable.
We can see common sense as the framework of a given community as 
well. Here the situation for the dissenter is more critical, as he 
does not just cease to be a scientist if he rejects this way of looking 
at the world. tiven though no one may be logically compelled to accept 
the propositions inherent in our way of looking at the world, as these may 
be at root 'metaphysical' and 'unjustifiable', there would come a point 
where a man who refused to accept certain things as facts would have to 
be told 'our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and 
thei’ef ore of acting' . *
llsewhere, "Wittgenstein stresses the communal aspect of common sense:
'We ..re quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single 
person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which 
is bound together by science nd education.''
So someone in our community who continually failed to judge and act in
accordance with what we took to be a matter of common sense would simply
be accounted eccentric or actually mad, however prophetic or visionary
his beliefs were found in retrospect by later generations. Living in a
given community imposes limits on the credible, just a3 much ¿^s the drive
towards logical consistency in belief. As an illustration as to how
far one is insulated by the beliefs of one's community from taking
seriously what for other people is a matter of daily life, at might be
worth considering just how widespread belief in magic is in the world,
* Wittgenstein, On Cert'inty, p }0
38
¿ind hence how limited is the obviousness of some of what we take for 
granted. (This, of course, has nothing to do with the correctness of 
vhat we take for granted), bo doubt, there will often be enough common 
¿round elsewhere to carry on a reasonable discussion with someone whose 
belief in magic was quite extensive, and to that extent, there would 
still be an area of common sense between us, although it would not cover 
all of what we, in our community would call 'common sense'.
What we now want to examine briefly is the way in which the beliefs 
of a community can influence the evidence on the basis of which the 
beliefs are verified. for beliefs not only form an interlocking system, 
cut they also determine the way in which a community looks at the world.
To the extent th t what is 3een in a given situation depends partly on 
the beliefs (or hypotheses) of the people lookin;; t that situation, 
people who have differing fundamental beliefs relevant to the situation 
may well be at cross purposes in discussion with each other. What seeus 
to one side to strengthen their position may seem to the other side to 
strengthen their3 or to be unimportant, and vice versa. This fact is a 
consequence of the further f ct, epitomised by Popper in the assertion 
that truth is not manifest. There are no brute facts at the basis of 
our beliefs, but what we believe is always mediated through inteipreta- 
tions of one sort and another. -.Ve have seen, in Chapter 1 how even 
b sic f ctu:1 .ssertions m.y be described as 'theory-laden'. This 
observation is striking only because many of the theories behind our 
factual assertions seem to find universal acceptance, and so we forget 
that there is a theoretical element even in a simple statement to the 
effect that what I now see is a glass. Indeed, translation and under­
standing of other people's beliefs is possible only on the assumption of 
considerable . greement on basic facts.* However, in order to illustr te 
the inter-relation of fact nd theory in determining evidence, we will
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consider two ex uaples, one social, one scientific, where it is possible 
to see a new theory influencing the selection and interpret.- tion of 
evidence. Although we will suggest in the end that this phenomenon does 
not invalidate what we said in Part 2 about the rational criticism of 
belief systems, it is important to realise that evidence is not available 
which is itself independent of theory.
Our first example is made slightly more complicated because we can 
see in it both a change of nuance in the meaning of some key terms as 
well as an important ch-nge in attitude which results from people taking 
up the belief and which by a feedback effect helps to bring about the 
verific: tion of the belief. About twenty years ago, it would have been 
eccentric to speak of the black ghettoes in North America!! cities as 
'colonies', but this is just what is being done now by black militants.
th<i ,.iy 1 .sluiiias an objective analysis of the situation, or 
is it just a matter of sloganising? Let us assume that the over-riding 
purposes of colonisation are economic - this is notwithstanding the many 
people who have gone out to colonies to 'civilise' or evangelise - and 
th: t the econo . ic situ .tion, which consists in getting cheap raw materials 
:nd opening new markets for the industries of the colonising country is 
institutionalised so th t  not every member of the colonising class needs 
consciously to oppress the colonised and so that some inemDers of the 
colonised people can be assimilated into the government and administra­
tion. The vast majority of the 'n tives' in such a situation are 
economically and politically impotent; they cea3e to care bout those 
areas of life over which they have no control and oecome 'lazy , because 
work does them no good. They seek emotional outlet in frensied cults, 
alcohol etc., while pent up aggression is loosed in fight3 among them­
selves. At 1 te st- ;« in the process, 3ome natives are assimilated by 
the colonisers; in renouncing their own customs .nd religion these will
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lose the trust of their own people.
All these aspects of colonialism are exemplified in the black
ghetto, if we think of the cheap raw material as human labour. The
ownership of houses, shops and produce is largely in the hands of whites,
and the very things produced by the cheap black labour are re-sold in the
ghettoes at a profit. Stokely Carmichael and Charles /. Hamilton write:
The black community perceives the 'white power structure' in very 
concrete terms. The man in the ghetto sees his white landlord 
come only to collect exorbitant rents and fail to make the 
necessary repairs, while both know that the white-dominated city 
building inspection department will wink at violations or impose 
only slight fines. The man in the ghetto sees the white policeman 
on the corner brutally manhandle a black drunkard in the doorway, 
and at the same time accept a pay-off from one of the agents of 
the white-controlled rackets. He sees the streets in the ghetto 
lined with uncollected garbage... *
Black leaders are seen to be integrated into the white power structure 
and in -nipul ited by it -according to Carmichael nd Hamilton, the classical 
coloni 1 situ tion. The laziness of the American Dicks has often been 
noticed, a3 has the high incidence amon them of alcoholism, drug 
addiction and pentecostal sects. Finally the middle class negro is often 
regarded s h ving betrayed his fellow blacks by turning his back on them 
once he has successfully entered white society.
Of course, in our exeunple the putative coloniser does not come from 
outside, but the force of this is diminished as an objection when one 
re .embers South Auric and Rhodesia. What has been said should be 
enough to show that there are grounds in favour of the 'colonial' analysis. 
Its adoption represents what Kuhn would call a significant paradigm shift, 
because the black militant now sees the internal America situation as a 
colonial struggle, without any change in the material circumstances. It 
is true that once the analysis grows in acceptance there is a gradual 
hardening of attitudes all round; black sell' defence organisations start 
to defend the ghettoes against the police (the invading army), black
.1 -ck Power, il rmondsworth 19^9, P 25
Our .analysis of the black milit.ant case is based on this account.
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community organisations replace the civil rights movements, nd there 
is a complementary hardening of attitudes among the whites. Because 
of the new attitude the material position does begin to change and the 
alack c&3e is 'proved' as a result of its own adoption.
However, before the belief had actually begun to bring about its 
own verific tion in new tangible effects, we c n see it as a signific uitly 
different point of view from the normal one regarding the blacks in 
American cities, which saw integration as its goal end which was 
encouraged b successful assirail tion of middle class negroes. This 
new attitude sees such piecemeal integration xs failure, and as proof 
of the colonial nature of the situ .tion. The same fact is used by one 
groun to prove that advances are taking place in the society, and by
the other group as a sign that the black community will never be able to
stand on its own feet. The black militants' insight is incompatible
ith the hopeful 'liberal' view, and proponents of two views will
presumably be more or less at cross purposes, s the same data mean such
different things for e ch of them. out, as far as the militants' view
is concerned, ts dobert L. ocott, a commentator of the situation writes:
'7e must .assume that their rhetoric makes clear the world as it is 
'or many, perh ps most, Black Aueric ns. The ghetto is a colony; 
the nite is the enemy... Truth in a social sense is always 
created by the human beings who participate in its articulation.
..Tiat at le .st a few members of the Hack minority see as truth, 
they see permeating the reality of America. '*
The point to notice here is how this new theory for the first time 
'makes clear' a problematical situation, and how it creates a new inter­
pretation of the relevant evidence. e have tried to show how there is 
30me justification for this new clarification, out that the justification 
will be acceptable only to those who are disposed to accept the theory.
Our second example is rather cle rer cut, s there is no question of 
the changes of attitude resulting from the adoption of the belief them­
selves ltering the situ' tion, nor re there shifts of meaning in the key
" from The .inetoric of .lack Power, by Uobert L. dcott nd ... ookricd# 
w Yn-nir. T*oTq. r>r,
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ter s. Indeed, in it we have highlighted the fact that wh t we might 
take to be the basic evidential datum is itself a factor of the hypothesis 
which explains the datum. The example, given by Kuhn, concerns the 
change of aspect which took place with a perfectly familiar phenomenon, 
the pendulum. In fact, to speak of a pendulum immediately is really to 
iss the point of the example:
Since remote antiquity most people have seen one or another 
heavy body swinging back and forth on a string or chain until 
it finally comes to rest.*
The Aristotelians did not see this phenomenon as a pendulum at all; 
it was rather a case of constrained fall, in which the heavy body, in 
its attempt to reach its natural resting place (the centre of the earth) 
gets to its lowest point only after 'a tortuous motion and a considerable 
time*.
?e see in this example the pendulum, a swinging body repeating the 
same motion over and over again, the extent of the swing depending on 
the length of the chain ;nd not the heaviness of the body. Galileo, 
to whom ,ve attribute this insight, .Iso saw many other properties of the 
pendulum 'and constructed man.,' of the most significant and original parts 
of his new dynamics around them'.
Why did that shift of vision occur? Through Galileo's individual 
genius, of course. But note that genius does not here manifest 
itself in more acourate or objective observation of the swinging 
body. Descriptively, the Aristotelian perception is just as 
acourate. When Galileo reported that the pendulum's period was 
independent of amplitude for amplitudes as great as 90 , his view 
of the pendulum led him to see far more regularity than we can 
now discover there. Rather, what seems to have been involved 
was the exploitation by genius of perceptual possibilities made 
available by a medieval paradigm shift.**
Kuhn goes on to describe how Galileo's approach to the problem had been
u.de possible for him by the work of Buridan and Cresrne in the fourteenth
century, and how Oresme was the first to see a swinging stone as a
pendulum.
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The data and how phenomena are seen are transformed in a paradigm 
shift; Kuhn likens such transformations to those shifts of vision under­
gone by subjects of Gestalt experiments, and suggests that this may be 
why scientists who solve problems by new models often speak of 'lightening 
flashes' and of 'scales falling from the eyes'. 3ecause the model or 
paradigm according to which a scientist looks at what he sees determines 
the relevant parameters in his experiments, the type of fact and law 
which is discovered will ..I30 be determined by the p radigm. Any idea 
that i scientist moves to his theories from perception of pure data is 
falsified not only by the fact that no satisfactory language of pure 
ercepts h as been developed, but also because such language would have 
to be erected on the basis of those objects which the scientist works with. 
In fact, as dyle points out in in interesting passage in The Concent of 
¿nd, when we speak of someth! g looking green, for example, what we saj 
is dispositional in the sense that it is a matter of applying to the 
actu-1 look of the object a rmle or 'recipe' ubout the typical looks of 
green things. Thus to say that something is green is to refer to more 
than simply the observer's visual sensations; it is to bring what the 
observer sees under a fairly general perception recipe - an operation not 
in principle different from picking out common, fully-fledged objects, at 
least in its general and hypothetical implications.* On what we see 
immediately, or basically, Kuhn sums up:
As a result of the paradigm-embodied experience of the race, the 
culture, and finally, the profession, the world of the scientist has 
come to be populate' with planets and pendulums, condensers and 
compound ores... Compared with these objects of perception, both 
meter stick readings and retinal imprints are elaborate constructs... 
This is not to suggest tht pendulums, for example, are the only 
tilings a scientist could possibly see when looking at a swinging 
stone. ( !e have already noticed that members of another scientific 
community could see constrained fall). But it is to suggest th t 
the scientist who looks at a swinging stone can have no experience 
that is in principle more elementary than seeing a pendulum. **
* c.f. Ayle Ch VII passim . esp pp 217-9
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And what shape th..t experience will take is determined by the paradigm 
(or conceptual system) of the community, lthough, of course, there are 
objective limits on possible plausible interpretations.
Kuhn draws an even stronger conclusion than that the evidence is 
interpreted in the light of the paradigm from the pendulum example and 
from others like it, such as Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and all 
tht implied where Priestly h d seen only dephlo istic ted air. He says 
that 'though the vorld does not change with change of paradigm, the 
scientist afterward works in a different world'.* This is surely an 
exagger tion. The scientist oefore nd after the paradigm shift works 
in the same world (and the sane goes for people from radically differing 
jelief backgrounds); it is just that, to take n example, Galileo and the 
Aristotelians saw the swinging stone phenomenon differently. It is not 
that Galileo would h.ve been unable to understand what the constrained 
fall people were saying; he would have h d no more difficulty in doing 
this than Kuhn himself who is apparently able to enter and leave several 
different worlds at will.
Once it is realised that people with one point of view are at least 
sometimes able to understand other points of view, and the way in which 
the other point of view interprets its evidence, the talk about the two 
groups being t cross purposes in their discussions loses some of its cite. 
Of course, each will interpret the evidence in his own way, and to that 
extent what e ch sees will be somewhat different. But this only takes 
us back to breakdown of communication again; it is not that one side 
cannot understand what the other side is doing, it is just that neither 
side is willing to renounce its pre-suppositions. Until some means is 
found of deciding between the competing paradigms, (or, as Kuhn would have 
it, until no one io left to defend one of them) there may be a deadlock,
‘pl20
but this does not mean that the only reasons for deciding between the 
competing paradigms are necessarily arbitrary and irrational. Indeed, 
it would not be difficult - though this is not the place to do it - to 
show how much better and more fruitful Galileo's interpretation of the 
swinging stone was than the Aristotelian, how, in other words Galileo's 
insight was a genuine clarification which Aristotelian assumptions would 
have made impossible. It is true that a new insight might well change 
the nature of a problem and with it, the form of the evidential basis, 
but once it is appreciated that all evidence is more or less theory-laden, 
this ceases to be a particular problem for us. What is important is to 
criticise and improve the theories, and in so doing, the evidence will 
also be refined and improved. Of course, it may not be e-isy to give a 
clear criterion of an 'improved' theory, but as far as the possibility of 
giving such a criterion goes, the absence of irrefutable and theory- 
independent evidence on which to judge competing theories would be an 
absolute block only for the dogmatic justific itionist.*
Part -  Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to show how individual beliefs 
naturally form part of a more general context of beliefs. W* have shown 
how a system of beliefs con be seen to answer the purely logical demand 
for consistency. In examining belief-contexts, we have seen that we 
naturally have an idea of whit is believable, but that this idea is not 
necessarily equivalent to the idea of what is possible. In looking at 
the oelief context as something held in common by a community as a whole, 
we were able to examine from a different angle the requirement stressed 
in Chapter 3 for an acceptance of a common sense is a condition of possibi­
lity of belief; belief cannot be seen in total abstraction from what is 
believed. Finally, we attempted to illustrate two c ses in which the
* L katos (loc cit) attempts to give just such a criterion, while
recognising no evidence is pure of theory or in principle uncriticisable.
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beliefs of a community might be said to affect the evidential basis of 
the beliefs.
In stressing the contextual and social aspects of belief, we can 
see that the more interesting problems concerning the freedom of belief 
do not relate to individual beliefs in isolation. Granted that it is 
always psychologically possible for a person to hold on to a belief in 
face of all the evidence, there is not much more that can be said about 
this from a philosophical point of view. Such a person is behaving 
irratimally, and we hand him over to a psychiatrist if he behaves in 
this way too radically or too often. There is not really a philosophical 
problem here. '.Thut is far more important is the control a person has over 
the belief context in which he gradually learns to see the world - either 
in his infancy, or in learning some discipline such as physics. .That 
has tended to emerge fro this largely descriptive chapter is a process 
whereb, the more deeply involved in making his system of beliefs explicit, 
the more committed to the system man usually becomes, but also the more 
he is in fact ble to criticise and change that system. Although Kuhn 
makes some play with the fact th t significant scientific discoveries, 
where these have involved paradigm shifts, have usually been made by 
scientists new to the branch of science in question*, we could equally 
point out that such ch.nges have only been made by scientists. They 
have not been made by oracle consultors.
It is only in milking explicit the background of our beliefs - which 
is so largely taken for granted, as stressed in Chapters 1 and 5 - th t 
we can see just what problems are involved and what wight need to be 
examined further. It is this possibility of criticising our beliefs in 
the light of the problems they lead to that means that belief contexts are 
not prisons, despite the impression to the contrary often given by talk
of 'language games' and 'f01111® °f lif®'» ^t i® i*1 this ability to. 
criticise the ways of thinking that are current at any time, and in the 
imagination that is required to produce new and better ways to replace 
them th t the r tional man may continue to exercise freedom in his 
beliefs.
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